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Hope: Global Interdisciplinary Perspectives 
 
Whitney A. Bauman 
 
 
 From September 17-19, 2007, around 25 people met at Mansfield 
College in Oxford, UK, for an interdisciplinary and international conference 
exploring the philosophical, religious, literary, psychological, and social 
implications of “hope.”  The following papers represent the bulk of the 
papers that were presented at that conference.  Few changes have been made 
from their original presentation format.  Several of the papers were also 
selected for revision and publication in book form, which will be published in 
late 2008.  In this brief introduction, I lay out some of the questions that arise 
in confronting the “issue” of hope and provide a summary of the four sections 
into which this e-book is divided. 
 What role does hope play in our daily lives at the beginning of the 
21st Century?  Living with the knowledge of the failures of the last century 
(such as the Holocaust, Rwandan Genocide, and Hiroshima) and facing the 
problems of this century (mass economic inequity, the AIDS crisis, global 
climate change, continuing racial and gender inequity) what reasons have we 
to hope for a better future?  Furthermore, given the growing number of 
human beings that must deal with various diseases and mental illnesses, what 
role does hope play in our lives?  Finally, when faced with our own eventual 
mortality and the overall mortality of the planet (when the sun dies out or an 
asteroid hits the planet), how can we even begin to hope?  These and many 
other questions were the types of things we addressed at the 3rd Global 
Interdisciplinary Conference on “Hope: Probing the Boundaries.”  In doing 
so, there were four primary categories into which our investigations fell: 
philosophical, psychological, literary/artistic, and engaged social projects. I 
will discuss each of these seriatim in this brief introduction.  
 
1. Philosophical Perspectives 
 So much has been written on the topic of hope, that one wonders if 
anything new can be said.  However, part of the purpose of this conference 
was to provide us with the philosophical/historical context out of which the 
question of “hope” emerges.  Thus, part I of this volume begins with various 
philosophical and religious perspectives on “hope.” From Buddhist, Islamic, 
and Christian perspectives, from theories of Hope found in the works of 
Immanuel Kant, Miguel Unamuno, Ernst Bloch, Judith Butler, Hegel, and 
Bruno Latour, and from phenomenological, post-structural, scholastic, and 
other philosophical perspectives, this section analyzes how hope functions in 
the minds of human beings.  If anything, this section asks the questions about 
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the ontological, metaphysical, and epistemological roles that hope plays in 
our lives.   
 Is hope merely the negation of despair?  Is hope necessary for 
knowledge of the world? Is hope an ontological/metaphysical reality “out 
there” or is it a construction of human beings?  What role does hope play in 
our understandings of past, present, and future? Readers interested in these 
questions will find much in part I of this volume.  
 
2.  Psychological Perspectives 
 This section of the book is not nearly as long as the first section, but 
it is just as, if not more, important.  Unlike the first section of the book, these 
papers were grounded in actual therapy experiences or psychological tests.  
Whereas the first section deals more with “big” questions, this section asks 
how hope functions at various times in our lives.  For instance, what role does 
hope play at the end of life when one is faced with death?  If it is not mere 
denial of death, might it play an important role in human well being viz. a viz. 
confronting the end of life?  Another paper in this section analyzes the role of 
theatre in therapy and how this increases empathy with the other and future 
possibilities for one’s own present, and thereby increases the hopefulness 
with which one confronts the future.  Finally, the third paper in this section 
asks about the roles of optimism and pessimism in relationship to our 
experience of hope.   
 Together, these papers give us a fuller perspective of the roles that 
hope plays psychologically.  Though the papers deal with widely different 
contexts, one thing is certain: hope plays a central role in the well-being of 
human life and human thriving. Regardless of the ontological/metaphysical 
reality of hope, it is an important part of the human experience and cannot be 
ignored. 
 
3.  Literature, Art, and Hope 
 Another important area in which the boundaries of human life are 
probed is literature and art.  Again, this section is shorter than the first, but no 
less rich.  Moving from the film, “The Departed,” to Wierszalin Theatre in 
Poland, and finally to a Quranic analysis of Hope, this section explores hope 
through cinema and literature.  How do these media provide different lenses 
through which to explore “hope” than say, psychological or philosophical 
lenses?  Might literary and cinematic sources provide hope in situations 
where all hope is lost?  In other words, might literature and art (including 
cinema) be one of the last great oases for hope when the rest of the human 
experience of life seems like a desert of despair?  These are some of the types 
of questions this section raises and explores. 
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4. Engaged Social Projects 
 Fourth and finally, the last section of the book deals with what I am 
calling “engaged projects” of hope. From Affirmative Action in South Africa, 
to HIV and hope, and NGO’s in Brazil, these papers look at the question of 
hope as it relates to societal issues.  Furthermore, they all take data analysis 
seriously and in this sense “ground” our understandings of hope in the 
realities of peoples’ lives.  After all, what good is all of the philosophy, 
psychology, literature and art about hope without evidence that it matters in 
the world and to people living lives in various communities around the 
world?  If anything, these papers bolster the idea that hope does matter in and 
to the world.  Perhaps this is an intuition for which you didn’t need proof, but 
these studies will give you tools for answering the critics of hope.   
 
As you read through the papers in this volume you will find many 
places of agreement and disagreement. I hope that you will take them both as 
opportunities for expanding your ideas about humanity and life where 
possible, and respectfully disagree where that is not possible.  As is the case 
with any interdisciplinary conference, these papers draw on some methods 
that may not be “conventional” in the sense of rigidly defined academic 
boundaries.  Furthermore, as with other international, multi-cultural, and 
multi-religious conferences of this sort, one will inevitably find points of 
view that are unacceptable. As a whole, these papers are probably 
incommensurable in a systematic sense. However, taken as a variety of 
perspectives on something central to most human life - hope - I think it 
represents a vast swath of the spectrum of beliefs, methods, and ideas about 
hope.  
 

Part I 
Philosophical Perspectives 

 Moral Theory and Hope 
 
Andreas Lind 
 
Abstract: James Griffin argues that our human capacities, our ’human 
nature’, impose constraints on the possible content of moral norms. As he 
says, “A moral standard that ignores human capacities is not an ‘ideal’ 
standard; it is no standard at all”. He believes that utilitarianism is an 
example of a moral theory that disregards human capacities in this way 
(ignoring, for instance, cognitive and epistemic limitations that we all know 
we have as human beings). Yet he acknowledges that “This would be flatly 
denied by the sort of objectivist who would maintain that moral norms are 
independent of human capacities, that they are simply to be discovered by us, 
that we can hope that their demands will not outstrip our powers, but that this 
can only be a hope”. 
 There is no doubt that Griffin, and many with him, think that this 
hope is slim. In this paper I argue that ideal standards (now without the scare 
quotes), pace Griffin, indeed are real standards. Furthermore, I argue that 
such standards function regulatively, that they are a kind of focus imaginarius 
for moral discourse, in such a way that they actually make sense of, and 
rationalize, the hope that Griffin thinks is a telling argument against them.  
 
Key words: Utilitarianism, James Griffin, criterion of rightness, decision 
making procedure, regulative ideal 
 
1. Introduction 
 Socrates to Cephalus: 
What do you consider to be the greatest blessing which you 
have reaped from your wealth? 
 
One, he said, of which I could not expect easily to convince 
others. For let me tell you, Socrates, that when a man 
thinks himself to be near death, fears and cares enter into 
his mind which he never had before; the tales of a world 
below and the punishment which is exacted there of deeds 
done here were once a laughing matter to him, but now he 
is tormented with the thought that they may be true: either 
from the weakness of age, or because he is now drawing 
nearer to that other place, he has a clearer view of these 
things; suspicions and alarms crowd thickly upon him, and 
he begins to reflect and consider what wrongs he has done 
to others. And when he finds that the sum of his 
transgressions is great he will many a time like a child start 
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up in his sleep for fear, and he is filled with dark 
forebodings. But to him who is conscious of no sin, sweet 
hope, as Pindar charmingly says, is the kind nurse of his 
age: 
Hope [he says] cherishes the soul of him who lives in 
justice and holiness and is the nurse of his age and the 
companion of his journey; - hope which is mightiest to 
sway the restless soul of man. 
   Plato, The Republic, 330d-331a 
 
In Value Judgement: Improving Our Ethical Beliefs1, James Griffin argues 
that our human capacities, our ‘human nature’, impose constraints on the 
possible content of moral norms. As he says, “A moral standard that ignores 
human capacities is not an ‘ideal’ standard, but no standard at all”.2 He 
believes that utilitarianism is an example of a moral theory that disregards 
human capacities in this way (ignoring, for instance, cognitive and epistemic 
limitations that we all know we have as human beings). Yet he acknowledges 
that:  
 
This would be flatly denied by the sort of objectivist who 
would maintain that moral norms are independent of 
human capacities, that they are simply to be discovered by 
us, that we can hope that their demands will not outstrip 
our powers, but that this can only be a hope.3 
  
There is no doubt that Griffin, and many with him, think that this hope is 
slim. In this paper I argue that ideal standards (now without the scare quotes), 
pace Griffin, indeed are real standards. Furthermore, I argue that such 
standards function regulatively. That is, they are a kind of focus imaginarius 
for moral discourse, in such a way that they actually make sense of, and 
rationalize, the hope that Griffin thinks is a telling argument against them. An 
example of an ‘objectivist’ that Griffin sees as his main opponent would be 
an act-utilitarian who argues (roughly) that what makes an action right is 
whether it actually produces at least as much pleasure as any other action 
open to the agent at the time of action. This version of utilitarianism focuses 
on the actual consequences brought about by our actions. Hence it disregards 
human capacities in the sense that an action can be right, say, irrespective of 
whether you or I or anyone else can know about this. There is, simply, a fact 
of the matter as to whether it is right or wrong. In this paper I will defend 
such a version of utilitarianism against Griffin’s criticism. 
 Another problem that I will address is what we might call 
Cephalus’s worry. One need not be an old man or believe in an afterlife to be 
worried about whether one has done many people great harm or to ask 
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whether the sum of one’s transgressions is great. But had Cephalus been a 
utilitarian would he not be utterly filled with dark forebodings and constantly 
start up in his sleep due to the simple fact that is so hard to know whether one 
has done the right things on this picture? Would he ever be accompanied by 
the sweet hope on his journeys? My answer is that whether Cephalus should 
worry about this has nothing to do with the question of whether he is a 
utilitarian or not. Utilitarianism is neither better nor worse than any other 
theory in this respect.  
    
2. Moral Metaphysics and Human Capacities 
 One central claim that Griffin constantly revisits is that moral norms 
and standards must “be tailored to fit the human torso”4 and that the only way 
in which they can do so is if they tie in with a (psychologically, 
epistemically, motivationally and cognitively) realistic picture of human 
agency and human capacities. Such a picture of human nature and the facts 
about human agents that it makes possible will, he thinks, “undermine certain 
important ethical systems”.5 So if a moral theory requires us, for instance, to 
make utility calculations about effects that potentially extend a hundred years 
or more into the future - calculations we can do, if ever, only in certain highly 
unusual circumstances - then we have a potential argument not only against 
its decision procedure but also against the criterion that sanctions such a 
procedure in the first place. Let us quote Griffin at length here to see why he 
is unimpressed by the utilitarian’s defence of distinguishing between the 
theory understood as criterion of rightness and understood as a decision 
procedure:    
 
Although criterion and decision procedure can indeed 
diverge, they may not, I think, get far apart from one 
another. Our decision procedure will, of course, be 
restricted by our capacities, but any criterion for a human 
practice cannot become too remote from them without 
losing its standing as a criterion. […] What most promotes 
interests is often permanently beyond our reach. Then a 
would-be ‘criterion’ like that can play no role, not even that 
of a criterion. Our moral life cannot start from such an all-
sanctioning background principle. We have to conduct it 
with what is within our reach. One might – and the 
capacity-blind objectivists…do – flatly deny my claim that 
there are knowledge constraints on a criterion. The criterion 
in morals, they say, is independent of human capacities; it 
is the sort of thing to be discovered by us; we may hope 
that it does not outstrip our powers of knowledge, but that 
can only be a hope. But this form of objectivism seems to 
Moral Theory and Hope 
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me to lack support. And if the criterion were to outstrip our 
knowledge, then it could play no role in our moral life, it 
would leave…utilitarianism in need of some new, yet 
unknown, standard for sanctioning the rules of our decision 
procedure. This objectivist move is so drastic that it 
punches a large hole in utilitarianism that the theory has no 
obvious resources to fill.6 
 
And in relation to this he makes the claim that: 
 
[N]orms and relations must be tailored to fit the human 
torso. They are nothing but what such tailoring produces. 
There are no moral norms outside the boundary set by our 
capacities. There are not some second-best standards, 
standards made for everyday use by agents limited in 
knowledge and will, and then, underlying them and 
sanctioning them, true standards, standards that make no 
compromise with human frailty. A moral standard that 
ignores human capacities is not an ‘ideal’ standard, but no 
standard at all.7 
 
According to Griffin, then, the only way in which we can keep the criterion 
and decision procedure within a tolerable limit is if the former is constrained 
by the latter. Moral norms must be determined, at least in part, by human 
capacities. But Griffin’s somewhat vague remarks regarding the extent of the 
divergence between criterion and decision procedure are unfortunately not 
particularly helpful. What one would like to know is where the line should be 
drawn and why it should be drawn at that particular point, whatever it might 
come to. Furthermore, no one would deny that we must conduct our moral 
life with what is within our reach. And surely the utilitarian does not deny 
this. To suggest otherwise is to misrepresent his rationale for the criterion in 
the first place.  
 As I understand Griffin he is saying that moral metaphysics is 
constrained by moral epistemology. One important question in moral 
metaphysics is what makes actions right or wrong. The utilitarian argues, in 
the words of G. E. Moore, that “A voluntary action is right, whenever and 
only when no other action possible to the agent under the circumstances 
would have caused more pleasure; in all other cases, it is wrong”.8 Causing 
more pleasure in this sense is what makes the action right. I will not here 
discuss how Moore actually reaches this position and thus I will not discuss 
whether it is justified in the first place. What is important to note, for our 
present discussion, is that there is no reference here to human capacities or 
human beliefs; in short, there is no knowledge constraint. 
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 What does Griffin say about the utilitarian criterion? Well, like most 
of us he agrees that there are cases where we can do the requisite 
calculations. His worry is that there are not enough cases where this can be 
done.   
 
The crucial question therefore is: ‘How often would we fail 
and how central to ethical life would the failures be?’ If 
utility calculations is beyond us fairly often and in fairly 
central parts of ethics, then utilitarianism is in jeopardy.9 
 
But why would our failures to find out which action in a situation of moral 
choice would maximize pleasure constitute an argument against the idea that 
producing a maximum amount of pleasure is what makes actions right? If one 
feels the pressure of this question one need not immediately pledge a 
commitment to some form of robust realism.10 One need only admit that there 
is a crucial difference between the two alternatives in the following question: 
Should I take Anna to the hospital because she has a really bad allergic 
reaction or should I take her to the hospital because I believe she has a really 
bad allergic reaction? Well, I should probably take her to the hospital in both 
cases but it is only in the former, I would say, that I genuinely ought to do so. 
 Griffin says that ‘ideal’ standards are no standards at all. But what 
does he mean by that? Well, he says that such standards can ‘play no role’. 
But what is this role that the utilitarian criterion is supposed to play? The 
utilitarian answer is simple: The criterion tells us what makes actions right 
and wrong. But utilitarianism is also a normative theory and thus tells us 
what we ought to do. What it says is that in situations of moral choice we 
ought to do the action that actually produces most pleasure. This is a 
normative requirement without much ‘content’ since it does not in any way 
indicate which action, in the situation I am in, I ought to do. 
 When Griffin says that the criterion can play no role in our moral 
life what he thus means is that since I cannot do the requisite calculations to a 
reliable degree (and there are no other substantial ways in which I am told 
how to act) the utilitarian criterion and thus the utilitarian theory fades out of 
the picture. 
 In the next section I will indicate how a utilitarian should respond to 
Griffin.  
 
3.  Justifying Our Actions 
 Griffin is, in one sense, right to say that we can only hope that the 
criterion in morals does not outstrip our powers of knowledge. In fact, most 
utilitarians readily admit that there are many cases in which we cannot know 
whether a particular action will maximize pleasure. In such cases it is correct 
to say that, strictly speaking, we do not know what we ought morally to do. 
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But this does not imply that we are always at a total loss about what we ought 
to do in another sense, namely, about what we ought to do based upon what 
we can justify to others.  
 It is regarding the interplay between what we ‘really’ ought to do 
and what we ‘justifiably believe’ we ought to do that Griffin and the 
utilitarian differ. The utilitarian agrees with Griffin that there can be and 
often is a great distance between what we really ought to do and what we 
justifiably believe we ought to do. Griffin sees this as a failure because he 
thinks that this distance makes the ‘real’ ought useless, where ‘useless’ more 
or less equals ‘ideal’. 
 But it is only on the assumption that moral epistemology can (and 
should) constrain moral metaphysics that such an inference is possible. If, 
however, one does not believe that moral epistemology plays this sort of role 
one is not likely to be impressed by Griffin’s arguments. The kind of 
utilitarianism I have in mind denies exactly this assumption. Because it is 
concerned with the actual consequences produced by our actions, it denies 
that an action can be right or better than another action if it produces less 
pleasure. Hence, there is no stopping-point short of defining the right or best 
action as that which produces the most total pleasure. Once again, this is to 
say that there is no knowledge constraint on the criterion.  
 For the utilitarian this is as real a criterion as one could get. 
Functional role in human moral life does not determine existence (as Griffin 
has it). Moral metaphysics is prior to, and independent of, moral 
epistemology. But there is nevertheless a way in which the criterion of 
rightness has a function in our moral life. One way in which the distinction 
between criterion of rightness and decision making procedure has been 
understood is that it makes it possible for the utilitarian to say that we should 
not always consciously deliberate about what to do. Were we to do this we 
would not only rely upon an overly intellectualistic (and thus false) picture of 
moral life and, furthermore, to constantly deliberate about what to do would 
most likely produce suboptimal consequences. The idea is that decision 
making procedures will be connected with questions of moral motivation and 
whether one should aim directly at producing the best consequences is 
something which, in turn, should be evaluated according to whether it 
produces the best consequences.      
 So even if one should not always deliberate in a ‘utilitarian fashion’, 
something which, according to Griffin, we cannot do anyways because “what 
most promote interest is permanently beyond our reach”11, there is 
nevertheless room for the utilitarian to say that the criterion functions in a 
regulative way. For lack of space I can only say something very brief about 
retrospective deliberation and will have to leave my ideas about prospective 
deliberation for another occasion. 
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 Retrospective deliberation is deliberation about what has happened; 
it is deliberation about how we deliberated and decided to act and about the 
actual consequences of our so acting. As I said above, it is hard for the 
utilitarian to say with certainty what one ought to do in a situation of moral 
choice. Regarding retrospective deliberation, when the ‘facts are in’, as we 
say, we are in a slightly better position to judge with confidence. But the 
effects of our action can extend very far into the future and it is likely that 
there is no point in time where I can say with certainty about a former action 
of mine that it was right. But we all know that there is a clear difference 
between the two. If Anna tells me that she was only faking her allergic 
reaction in order to play a trick on me, it certainly makes a difference for my 
evaluation of the situation. This goes for the original situation as well as for 
the situation when she has told me that it was all a joke. 
Consider the following case to see more clearly how the criterion 
functions regulatively. Assume that Peter is justified in thinking that he 
should do X and so does X. The consequences of X seem at first to be very 
good but gradually it becomes clear that they are not very good at all. What 
Peter should conclude at this point is that X was probably not the right thing 
to do. There might come a time later when it becomes clear again that X does 
have good effects, but at this point Peter cannot tell whether this will happen. 
But the very fact that his future self will be able to pass judgement on his 
earlier self, and the fact that the earlier self is aware of this, is not only a sign 
that there is a fact of the matter as the criterion says (although it is extremely 
hard for us to tell what it really is) but that this is something of which Peter is 
aware when he acts, both now and in the future.  
 Much, much more needs to be said about this in order to make the 
regulative function of the criterion perspicuous. Once that fuller story is in, I 
believe, the utilitarian can respond to Griffin’s charge that the criterion has no 
function to play, or rather that it has a function, but a highly indirect one.  
 
4. Cephalus’s worry 
 If Cephalus is a utilitarian of the sort that we have been considering 
would he have more reason to start up in his sleep than had he not been a 
utilitarian? That is, given the way utilitarianism deems actions right and 
wrong in relation to other moral theories, is it correct to say that he has done 
more wrong according to it than to any of the latter? In short, can the 
utilitarian hope for as much as, say, a Kantian or a virtue ethicist? 
 I think that Cephalus the utilitarian has a bit more reason to worry 
than the others due to the fact that it is so hard to tell whether an action 
actually is right or wrong according to utilitarianism. But Cephalus’s worry 
will only be a worry regarding justification. Whether he has actually done 
many wrongs to others is not a question that arises for him because he is a 
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utilitarian. If he has actually done many wrongs in his life, he has probably 
done so whether he is a utilitarian or a Kantian or a virtue ethicist.   
 When Griffin charges the utilitarian for relying merely on a hope 
that the criterion does not outstrip our powers of knowledge he is, in a sense, 
saying something which the utilitarian already affirms. It is just that the 
utilitarian is more hopeful than Griffin on this point. And rightly so, I think.   
 
  
Notes 
 
1 J Griffin, Value Judgement: Improving our Ethical Beliefs, Clarendon Press, 
Oxford, 1996.  
2 Griffin, p. 47. 
3 J. Griffin, ‘Incommensurability: What’s the Problem?’ in 
Incommensurability, Incomparability, and Practical Reason, R. Chang (ed), 
Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1997, p. 265. 
4 Griffin, Value Judgement, p. 105. 
5 Griffin, p. 103. In fairness to Griffin I think it is important to stress what he 
states explicitly, viz., that attacking a rich tradition such as utilitarianism in a 
couple of pages with the aim of refuting it is not possible. At one point he 
says that “I want merely to explain the source of my own doubts about these 
three traditions [utilitarianism, Kantianism and virtue ethics] and why, on 
balance, I prefer to look elsewhere”, Value Judgement, p. 104. I have my 
doubts about Griffin’s alleged modesty but I will not press the point here. 
6 Griffin, p. 105f. 
7 Griffin, p. 105. 
8 G. E. Moore, Ethics, Williams & Norgate, London, 1912, p. 19. 
9 J Griffin, ‘Reply to Critics’ in Well-Being and Morality. Essays in Honour 
of James Griffin, (eds.) R. Crisp and B. Hooker, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 
2000, p. 305. 
10 For a brief discussion off this, see R. Crisp, ‘Griffin’s Pessimism’ in Well-
Being and Morality. Essays in Honour of James Griffin, (eds.) R. Crisp and 
B. Hooker, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 2000, p. 124., and for a longer defence 
of realism coupled with utilitarianism, see D Brink, Moral Realism and the 
Foundations of Ethics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1989.  
11 Griffin, Value Judgement, p. 105. 
 
 
Bibliography 
 Brink, D., Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics. Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 1989. 
Andreas Lind 
______________________________________________________________ 
9 
 
 Crisp, R., ‘Griffin’s Pessimism’ in Well-Being and Morality. Essays 
in Honour of James Griffin. R. Crisp and B. Hooker (eds.), Clarendon Press, 
Oxford, 2000Griffin, J., Value Judgement: Improving our Ethical Beliefs. 
Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1996. 
 Griffin, J., ‘Reply to Critics’ in Well-Being and Morality. Essays in 
Honour of James Griffin. R. Crisp and B. Hooker (eds), Clarendon Press, 
Oxford, 2000. 
 Moore, G. E., Ethics. Williams & Norgate, London, 1912 
 
 
Author’s Note 
Andreas Lind, Department of Philosophy, Lund University, Sweden. 
 
Distinguishing Between Hope and Despair 
 
Ariel Meirav 
 
 
Abstract: According to a widely accepted view, hope can be adequately 
analysed in terms desire and partial belief. I argue that this view misconstrues 
the nature of hope and the essential difference between hope and despair. I 
propose an alternative view according to which hope depends on one's 
conception of the power (external to oneself) that determines whether or not 
one's desire will be fulfilled or not. Hope, in contrast with despair, involves a 
conception of the relevant power as good, that is, as operating in ways that 
the hoper considers to be good. 
 
Key words: hope; despair; desire; probability assignment 
 
 
 
If you look at (analytic) philosophical writing on hope in the last 
few decades, you come out with two strong impressions: First, little has been 
written on the topic, and second, there is a remarkably wide agreement 
between those few who have written on the topic, as regards the nature of 
hope. This justifies speaking of what I shall call the 'Standard Doctrine' 
regarding the nature of hope. A paradigmatic representation of the doctrine 
may be found in John Patrick Day's 1969 article 'Hope'.1 The essence of the 
doctrine is that hope is a complex attitude consisting of desire and the 
assignment of probability (or partial belief). Thus, for example, Jacob's hope 
that Rachel will agree to marry him consists of two things: 
 
1. His desire that she will agree 
2. His assignment of some probability to this. 
 
In the contrary case of despair, he still desires that she will agree to marry 
him, but fails to assign it probability - he disbelieves that it is probable. 
Different versions of the Doctrine take different probabilities as 
minimal for hope. But nearly all agree that we may hope for things we take to 
be very unlikely. And all agree that what constitutes the difference between 
hope and despair is the probability we assign to the prospect. We despair 
simply because we think the prospect is too unlikely.  
There is no doubt that this is an appealing theory at first glance. 
Nevertheless, I think it is fundamentally mistaken: The conditions it 
describes as constitutive of hope are found, I claim, in cases of despair - 
indeed in typical cases of despair - no less than in cases of hope. Thus I am 
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saying that in cases of hope and despair you may find the same desire and the 
same probability assignment. In this sense the theory fails to distinguish 
between hope and despair. It misses that crucial part of the nature of hope 
which transforms one who desires and assigns probability in despair, into one 
who does so in hope. 
 
2.   
Why do I say that the Standard Doctrine fails in this way? I am led 
to do so by considering examples such as the following. 
Two men, Andy and Red, have been serving life sentence for 
murder in a brutal prison.2 They are in many ways similar. They understand 
equally well the workings of the prison and the ways of the prisoners and 
guards inhabiting it. Neither of them has lost the desire to be free again. They 
have an equal grasp of the very small chances of escaping. And yet, Andy 
lives in hope, and Red lives without hope. Indeed, Red thinks that hope 
should be resisted, suppressed (and he succeeds in suppressing it). He thinks 
hoping in this virtually hopeless situation will threaten his sanity. You may 
recognize the outline of Frank Darabont's film, The Shawshank Redemption. 
It seems reasonable to say that the film suggests that Andy hopes and Red 
does not, in spite of their similar desire for freedom and similar assessment of 
the probability of attaining it, and to that extent it challenges us with a 
counterexample to the Standard Doctrine.  
My second example is more mundane, perhaps trivial, but has the 
advantage of presenting quite explicitly the possibility that two people might 
desire something to the same extent and assign it numerically the same 
probability without differing with regard to their hope for that thing. Suppose 
I buy a lottery ticket, and come back home full of enthusiasm, showing the 
ticket to my wife and wanting to share with her my great hope in winning a 
sizeable monetary prize. But she is unconvinced. Her sceptical gaze 
expresses an amused indifference that is incomprehensible to me. Of course, 
she desires the extra income no less than I do. And we do not disagree in our 
assessments of the probability of winning. She entirely agrees with the 
content of my enthusiastic claim (though not with its enthusiastic form) that 
there is a chance of one in a hundred thousand of winning. In other words: 
We have the same desire for winning the lottery, and assign the same 
probability to winning it. And yet I am hopeful of winning, and she is not. 
And this, of course, is incompatible with the Standard Doctrine, according to 
which we should both have exactly the same hope (or despair) in these 
circumstances.  
A defender of the Standard Doctrine might object to my examples or 
my interpretation of them in various ways (which I do not have the time to 
discuss), but I think these objections can be convincingly answered. My 
conclusion is that whether one hopes or despairs is not determined by such 
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desires and probability assignments. And so it cannot be correct to claim that 
hope is constituted by such desires and probability assignments. The 
Standard Doctrine must be rejected. 
This leaves us in the following position: We know that something 
distinguishes between hope and despair. But upon reflection we suddenly 
realize that this something is quite mysterious. 
 
3. 
I think the reason why both the Standard Doctrine and a few recent 
proposals to revise it (which, again, I do not have the time to present here) 
misconstrue hope is their assumption that it is exclusively a matter of the 
relations between the hoper and some desired prospect. I think the key to a 
more satisfactory theory lies in recognizing that hope inherently involves 
reference to a third factor, distinct from both the hoper and the desired 
prospect. The kind of hope one can have depends on one's conception of this 
third factor. 
The first step in my argument is to notice that hope involves a rather 
special kind of desire. Hope involves desiring a prospect while viewing that 
desired prospect as not within my causal or cognitive control.3 I recognize 
that it is not within my power to guarantee the realization of the prospect, for 
I am neither able to bring it about, to cause it to obtain, nor possess the right 
sort of epistemic access to its obtaining. I can neither make it happen nor 
prove that it will happen. If you asked me whether I will return the book 
which I borrowed from you a while ago, you would be annoyed if I said in 
reply that 'I hope so', because this would imply that I take myself not to have 
causal control over its return, and therefore that I do not acknowledge my 
responsibility for returning it. It would be less annoying, but similarly 
inappropriate, for me to say that I hope that it will be the case tomorrow that 
two plus two will be four, because the insight I have into this prospect allows 
me even now to guarantee its obtaining. 'Resignation', as I am using the term, 
designates an acknowledgement of lack of control or power over something. 
In the context of desiring that some prospect be realized, it designates the 
acknowledgment that I do not have the power to guarantee its realization. 
Desire that is accompanied by such resignation may be described as 
resignative desire.  
But despair too involves desire, and it is even more evident in the 
case of despair that the desire it involves is resignative. Think of Jacob and 
Rachel - if he despairs of her agreeing, he still wants her to agree, and still 
thinks he does not have causal control over whether or not she will agree. So 
we have still not found what it is that distinguishes between hope and despair. 
And yet, noticing that they both involve resignative desire brings in an 
additional factor into the picture. For acknowledging that the causal power to 
fulfil a prospect does not lie within me seems to be much the same as the 
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same as acknowledging that the power to fulfill it lies outside of me, in some 
factor external to me. It is to that external factor (i.e. in relation to it) that one 
resigns.  
In many cases the external factor will simply be another person. 
Your resignative desire that I return the book you lent me is likely to involve 
me in that role of the external factor. It would then be in relation to me that 
your desire is resigned. In other cases it might be a group of persons, or an 
institution (e.g. the government, or the police). Less personally, the external 
factor might be conceived simply as chance, or fate, or law-governed nature. 
Finally, it might be conceived in religious terms, as the gods or God.  
No matter what sort of factor it is taken to be, however, the question 
arises of the extent to which one considers that factor is 'on one's own side' or 
not, the extent to which it is a 'good' external factor or an 'indifferent' or 'bad' 
one. My proposal for distinguishing between hope and despair is this:  
Hope involves probability assignment and resignative desire in 
relation to an external factor one conceives as good. Despair involves 
probability assessment and resignative desire in relation to an external factor 
one conceives as bad. Let me explain this distinction. 
It can be more easily understood in case the external power is a 
person – though I think the distinction applies, in principle, also if the 
external power is conceived in non-personal terms. A good external factor is 
not necessarily one which fulfils my desires, even though it is (by definition) 
within its power to do so. It might not do so if, for example, it is mistaken 
about what I desire. Or, if it identifies my desires correctly, it might still not 
fulfill them because it considers their fulfillment to be against my own 
interest (even if I myself fail to see this). Finally, even if my desires agree 
with what the external factor takes to be my interests, it may still not fulfill 
them, because they conflict with other interests that are more pressing – ones 
that I myself would have preferred to my own in the circumstances, had I 
fully understood the situation. 
Consider an example: I am in a desolate, cold street after a long day, 
waiting for my friend to pick me up by car. I hope she arrives at seven, as we 
arranged. Whether she does is largely under her control. I think she is 'on my 
side'. But this does not necessarily mean that she will come at the appointed 
time. My hope that she will come does not imply a belief that she will come. 
She might be under the impression that I wanted her to come at half past 
seven. Or she might think that in spite of my wanting her to come at seven, it 
is better for me if she came at seven thirty. Finally, she might think it would 
be better for me if she came at seven, but encountered a problem one the way 
which requires her attention – say, an accident in which a cat was hurt.  
Hope enables me to feel reasonably happy about a prospect of which 
I am unconfident because, basically, I think that if my desires are not 
fulfilled, this will be for a good reason. Even if they were not fulfilled 
15 Ariel Meirav 
______________________________________________________________ 
 
because of a mistake made by the external factor, I would still have the 
consolation that it (she) was striving to benefit me. But if they were not 
fulfilled because this was better for me, or because there were more 
important concerns – concerns which I would judge to be more important 
than her being on time, I have the greater consolation of the thought that what 
did happen was better than to have my desire fulfilled.  
What I take to be a crucial advantage of this account is the way it 
explains how hope encourages us without modifying our probability 
assignments. Hope and despair differ in respect of the way in which one 
accepts the possibility that one's desire will be frustrated, not in respect of 
how probable one takes that possibility to be. Hope, therefore, does not 
require evidentially unwarranted optimistic probability assignments, and need 
not involve self-deception or wishful thinking about probabilities. 
 
Notes 
 
1 J Day, 'Hope'. American Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 6, 1969, pp. 89-102. 
Examples of other authors subscribing to the Standard Doctrine are: R  
Downie, 'Hope'. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol. 24, 1963, 
pp. 248-251; H Price, Belief , Allen & Unwin, 1969, pp. 268-274; M Quinn, 
'Hoping'. Southwestern Journal of Philosophy, vol.7, 1976, pp. 53-65. 
2 Luc Bovens discusses this example, though not to argue against the 
Standard Doctrine but rather to raise questions about the extent to which, and 
the contexts in which, hope is beneficial to the person who hopes. See L 
Bovens, 'The Value of Hope'. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 
vol. 59, 1999, pp. 667-9. 
3 Victoria McGeer makes a related in point in 'The Art of Good Hope', 
Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, vol. 592, 
2004, pp. 100-127.  
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Transcendent, Sublime Hope as an Antidote to the Ethos of 
Pride and Commodity Culture 
 
Beverly R. Sherringham 
 
 
Abstract: Utilitarian hope engenders an ethos of pride and commodity 
culture when socio-political structures depend upon hopeful manifestations of 
national pride for economic well-being. The triangulation of utilitarian hope, 
national pride, and economic well-being creates a formidable means of 
establishing a nation’s global supremacy. Utilitarian, unilateral hope has the 
propensity to reap capital and ossify a nation within the magnitude of 
historical splendour. The palimpsest of utilitarian hope underpins the 
interaction of commodity culture and the ethos of pride through the ages. 
Nineteenth and twentieth century theorists explicate socio-political structures 
that embody a finite, cost-effective utilitarian hope. At the other end of the 
spectrum is transcendent, sublime hope, which isolates the individual from 
the group and enables ascension to unspeakable realms that compromise and 
thwart the ethos of pride and commodity culture. Although the transcendent 
sublime can invoke the beautiful or the horrific, it enables the individual to 
construct alternative paradigms that are indeterminate, infinite, and beyond 
the machinations of pride and commodity culture. This paper examines 
transcendent, sublime hope as an antidote that destabilizes the power 
structure of utilitarian hope and minimizes its ability to create an ethos of 
pride emboldened by commodity culture. 
 
Key words: commodity exchange, social effectivity of the market, soft 
power, utilitarianism, transcendentalism, aesthetics.  
 
 
Hope and the ethos of pride and commodity fuel a world-view that 
is as solipsistic as it is transcendent. The subtle underpinnings of commodity 
culture are entwined within most socio-political systems; thus, individuals 
cannot envisage hope without indicators of cost-effectiveness. Though 
unilateral, utilitarian hope, which is a false hope that engenders an image of 
pride, commodity culture, and socio-political well-being, is dominant in the 
Twenty-First Century, nineteenth and twentieth century theorists explicate 
socio-political structures that shape the systems that embody unilateral, 
utilitarian hope. A nation’s educational system, government, and media 
representation create a hope that functions as a false sublime, as it were, with 
the propensity to reap capital. Deviation from the construct of unilateral, 
utilitarian hope elicits consequences that include ostracism, financial 
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reversals, and suspicions of loyalties. At the other end of the spectrum is 
transcendent, sublime hope, which isolates the individual from the group and 
enables ascension to unspeakable realms that compromise and thwart the 
socio-political ethos of pride and commodity culture. Transcendent, sublime 
hope articulates an ethos of silence and transformation. There is risk 
involved, for the sublime can invoke the beautiful or the horrid and either 
validate or compromise an ideological power structure. This paper delineates 
the structure of a unilateral, utilitarian hope and examines an alternative 
transcendent, sublime hope that is not without flaws and has the propensity to 
elevate an individual above the machinations of the ethos of pride and 
commodity culture.  
 
1. The Palimpsest of Pride and Commodity Culture 
Contemporary socio-political turmoil has its roots firmly ensconced 
within a palimpsest of pride and commodity culture. Since the onset of 
civilization, man has defined social good through a commodity lens, where 
everything has an extrinsic and an intrinsic value. Hope, the ability to 
anticipate positive imaginings, manifests a curious relation to commodity 
culture, for the imaginings are mired in the social effectivity of the market. 
The social effectivity of the market is a process that connects human activity 
to the market on condition that the individuals partaking in it remain unaware 
of its logic or existence.1 Slavoj Zizek maintains that the participants’ 
knowledge of the social effectivity of the market destabilizes the structure’s 
projection of social reality; as a consequence, the anticipated reality 
dissolves.2  Thus, it is imperative that the socio-political structure conceals its 
function and design from individuals in order to manipulate outcomes 
through abstract apparatuses. In this configuration, hope becomes a 
commodifiable entity that is inextricably linked to abstract exchange within 
market values. Sohn-Rethel examines the process of abstract exchange in 
Intellectual and Manual Labour A Critique of Epistemology and asserts that 
the market emanates from private consciousness that separates individuals 
from their actions as commodity projection develops.3 
The ethos of commodity culture articulates the individual’s hope, 
unbeknownst to the individual; hence, the individual’s private consciousness 
expresses the commodity values of society. Louis Althusser argues that 
socio-political apparatuses engrain “acceptable” ideological representations 
into the individual’s private imagination in “Ideology and Ideological State 
Apparatuses” and asserts that the immersion of ideological principles into 
consciousness allows a nation to perpetuate its socio-political goals.4 
Althusser’s assertion that ideology manifests “the imaginary relationship of 
individuals to their real conditions of existence,”5 suggests that imagination, 
the market, and the nation’s well-being form a triangulation that has the 
propensity to be rooted in commodity culture. Although Sohn-Rethel disputes 
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Althusser’s premise that the individual’s cognizance of the apparatuses helps 
to perpetuate its goals, both theorists acknowledge the importance of 
economic gain in the individual’s thought processes. Once the economic 
foundation is secure, hope becomes entangled with the socio-political well-
being of the nation, which engenders an ethos of pride.  
 
2. Identity, Power, and Fiscal Prowess 
 A nation’s well-being depends upon a unilateral image of global 
integrity, power, and fiscal prowess. In A Philosophical Enquiry into the 
Origin of Our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful, Edmund Burke affirms that 
the sublime is a modification of power.6 Idealism and hope have the potential 
to become commodities that compromise national image and priorities 
“within the realms of foreign policy and national security…where risks are 
great and the stakes are high.”7 It is in a nation’s best interest to monitor and 
manipulate conceptions of hope; additionally, Hegel articulates a theory that 
links the “history of the state” to ancestral achievements that essentialize the 
citizenry and fills their imagination with the laws and values of the country.8 
Within this paradigm, hope becomes an entity that defines the ethics, the 
virtue, and the strength of a nation. Case in point, during the Eighteenth 
Century, some European nations tried to project an appropriate national 
character to thwart allegations of national inferiority. Europeans attributed 
excessive humidity in the New World to degenerate forms of life.9  Hope of a 
better life in the New World became entangled with hierarchal national 
identity. Pride, power, and economics underpin national identity, and nations 
strive to protect the national identity that guarantees the greatest fiscal 
reward. National identity evolves as a fluid organism that traverses clock and 
calendar boundaries. While unilateral, utilitarian hope seems to be an 
individual imagining, it is actually the product of an imagined community 
that informs a nation’s past, present, and future. Benedict Anderson argues 
that the community is an active organism that reflects a nation’s history in 
Imagined Communities Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism 
and posits that community is “an idea of ‘homogeneous, empty time,’ in 
which simultaneity is…transverse, cross time, marked not by prefiguring and 
fulfilment, but by temporal coincidence, and measured by clock and 
calendar….”10 The individual’s hope represents the nation’s historic 
achievements and global perceptions, which have the ability to influence the 
commodity culture that sustains the nation’s economic and political well-
being. It is imperative that individuals align hope with the national identity 
organism that reflects positive projections of the nation and the national 
goals. Deviation from the prescribed manifestations of hope can alter a 
nation’s global power base; thus, it is imperative that a nation instils correct 
manifestations of hope within its value system.  The Great Exhibition in 
Hyde Park in 1871 typifies this type of hope-filled value system. 
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 The hope of the Anti-Corn Law League Bazaar was to “collapse 
consumption and politics together materially and symbolically and turn the 
whole world into a giant bazaar.”11 Through this initiative, the well-being of 
the nation and the world-at-large was the primary focus. Commodities 
provided an aesthetic that was believed to provide a civilizing effect upon the 
world and created a new “morality of style.”12 This morality was predicated 
upon an English value system that channelled its socio-political mores into a 
“cathedral of modern commerce.”13 Differences in class, religion, and gender 
were assuaged in an effort to create a common body of “believers” in the 
tenets of free trade. Interestingly, the political movement’s goals and 
objectives were an integral part of the aesthetic representations sold at the 
bazaar. London’s Covent Garden Theatre was a resplendent, sublime location 
for the bazaar, and the beautiful items displayed were enshrined within a 
cathedral-like setting that enhanced the ethos of the bazaar’s commercial and 
socio-political objectives. England’s commodity culture transformed The 
Anti-Corn Law League Bazaar into “a great and holy thing that ennobles the 
propagation of an idea.”14 The free trade/noble ancestry idea established a 
palimpsest of patriotism and national well-being through the ethos of 
commodity culture, from which citizens were unable to extricate themselves 
without denigrating their ancestors’ sacrificial efforts in establishing the 
nation. The cathedral-like setting with a religious aura exalts the “sanctity” of 
the sublime commercial endeavour. The Anti-Corn League Bazaar provides a 
model, from which modern nations can integrate aesthetics with commodity 
culture and national power. 
 The ensuing “soft power,” the ability to affect the behaviour of 
others in order to influence behaviour and achieve outcomes,”15 not only 
manoeuvres global populations into desired behaviours, but also coalesces 
power, national identity, and commodity culture into a living entity that 
preserves the integrity and ethos of a nation. Within this structure, the 
individual’s deviation from acceptable forms of hope represents an act akin to 
political heresy. While this homologous relationship may seem reductive, it 
can be exhilarating. When socio-political systems flourish and become 
lucrative, the opportunity to disseminate ideologies portends massive 
investment and power potential. Power and fiscal gain act as addictive 
stimulants that transport individuals to seeming heights, but the “heights” are 
fleeting, communal, and finite. The transcendent sublime, on the other hand, 
enables the individual to imagine infinite possibilities that are the essence of 
hope. 
 
3. Hope through Transcendence 
 Through the transcendent sublime, the individual “transcends the 
actual, the logical, and the linguistically lawful, verifiable, and 
comprehensible.”16 Transcendent sublime thoughts are beyond the realm of 
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commodification; they are inarticulable and promote an ethos of silence. The 
individual becomes more aware of infinitude rather than socio-political or 
economic endeavours. In the transcendent sublime state, the individual 
becomes awestruck and “ego-property, health, and even life itself – are 
reduced to the trivial…The individual gives his heart to Being.”17 The ethos 
of Being supersedes the ethos of commodity-culture, power, and pride. The 
individual experiences power internally through the imaginative powers of 
the sublime. This transcendent sublime is formless and boundless and present 
only in thought, which cannot be marketed; its “supersensible faculty” exists 
only to itself and not outside of itself.18 Within the aura of the transcendent 
sublime, the individual’s thoughts are non-communicable. Reversals occur 
when sublime, hopeful imaginings are dependent upon finite speech 
utterances that have the propensity to transform and shroud the individual 
within indeterminate spheres of thought and action. The perceived danger 
exists in that which cannot be interpreted, controlled, or commodified 
according to national interests; hence, the transcendent sublime becomes an 
“enemy of the state,” so to speak. 
 Transcendent, sublime hope evokes a palimpsest that exposes 
centuries of socio-political manipulation for the sake of power, national 
pride, and fiscal gain. As an immeasurable and inexpressible entity, 
transcendent, sublime hope shatters the illusion of community, the ethos of 
pride, and economic well-being and allows individuals to approach infinitude 
without the means to articulate the hope that inhabits the realm or the units of 
measurement that can transform the hope into a commodity. Individuals 
forego group connections and internalize transcendent, sublime hope, which 
supersedes standards of sensibility and defies quantification, community, and 
power. Without a measurable, articulate, and commodifiable hope, socio-
political structures cannot establish a powerbase that facilitates an ethos of 
pride or a viable commodity culture. Transcendent, sublime hope is infinite 
and comprehensible only to individuals with the imaginative resources to 
transcend finite, sensible, socio-political structures in order to ascend to the 
infinite realms of transforming, incommunicable hope that fuels an 
individual’s passion, motivation, and courage to traverse a sphere of 
indeterminate, transcendent, sublime hope.  
 
 
Notes 
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Modes of Hoping and the Utopian Impulse 
 
Darren Webb 
 
Abstract: The paper develops a conceptual framework for studying the 
different modes in which human hope can be experienced and the ways in 
which these articulate with the utopian impulse. The framework comprises 
three key concepts: 1) Modes of Hoping: Hope is a socially mediated human 
capacity. Different individuals and social classes, at different historical 
junctures, embedded in different social relations, enjoying different 
opportunities and facing different constraints, will experience hope in 
different ways; 2) Collective Emotional Orientation: The collective emotional 
orientation of a society is shaped, framed and organised by the dissemination 
of core ideas, beliefs, myths and collective memories through such channels 
as public political discourse, the education system, the media, art and 
literature. Different modes of hoping predominate within the collective 
emotional orientation of a society at different historical points; 3) Utopian 
Clusters: Utopian clusters are spatio-temporal concentrations of utopian 
activity characterised by a proliferation of utopian texts, some at least of 
which capture the public political imagination. When critical or 
transformative hope predominate within the collective emotional orientation 
of a society or social group, utopian clusters are likely to emerge as both a 
product and a source of hope. 
 
Key words: hope; utopia; collective emotional orientation. 
 
1. Introduction 
Within utopian studies, the word ‘hope’ is used a lot. Utopian texts 
are variously described as “figures of hope,” “visions of hope” and “objects 
of shared hope.”1 As a mode of praxis, utopianism is similarly described as 
“a movement of hope.”2 Kumar identifies hope as the source of the vitality of 
the utopian tradition, and Lasky sees utopia as a constant link in “the great 
chain of human hope.”3 It has been argued that “all utopias are driven by 
hope” whilst at the same time functioning to “stir up” and “inspire” it.4 Some 
suggest that “political hope is always somehow utopian” and that “a world 
without utopias would be a world without social hope.”5 For all these 
reasons, Desroche describes utopia and hope as “twin sisters.”6 
More often than not, however, the relationship between utopia and 
hope is simply assumed, and the dynamics of this relationship are left 
unexplored. A great deal of time is spent agonising over definitions of utopia, 
but little attention is paid to the question of human hope. It is almost taken 
for granted that we know what it is. In other areas, however, the past two 
decades have witnessed a renewed interest in hope as a category of human 
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experience. A large body of literature -contributions to what can be termed 
“hope theory” - has developed within the fields of philosophy, theology, 
history, anthropology, sociology, political science, psychology, nursing 
studies and neuro-biology. Within this literature, the nature and 
characteristics of hope are highly contested. It is certainly not something that 
can be taken for granted. The aim of the present essay is to begin - in an 
exploratory manner and in outline form - the process of integrating the fields 
of hope theory and utopian studies. I want to bring the two bodies of 
literature together and develop a conceptual framework for studying the 
different modes in which human hope can be experienced and the ways in 
which these articulate with the utopian impulse.  
 
2.  Modes of Hoping and their Utopian Configuration 
An important initial distinction can be made between two sets of 
questions; those concerning the nature of hope (what hope is) and those 
concerning its characteristics (what it is to hope). Regarding the former, hope 
is variously designated an emotion, a cognitive process, an existential stance, 
a state of being, a disposition, a state of mind, an emotion which resembles a 
state of mind, an instinct, impulse or intuition, a subliminal “sense,” a formed 
habit, a “sociohormone,” some complex, multifaceted affective-cognitive-
behavioural phenomenon, or, quite simply, a mystery. In reality here, there 
are two principal contrasting perspectives. The first sees hope as a human 
universal, an anthropological constant explicable in terms of evolutionary 
biology or divine grace. Schumacher, for example, argues that “the human 
being is incapable of not hoping,” whilst for Mandel, “hope belongs to the 
hard, unchangeable core of our anthropological specificity.”7 The second sees 
hope as a socially constructed pattern of behaviour. The notion that hope has 
any biological basis is rejected and evidence is cited to suggest that some 
humans are indeed capable of not hoping. For Snyder, hope is a learned 
thinking pattern and “people lack hope, therefore, because they were not 
taught to think in this manner.”8  
A more nuanced approach would see hope as both biologically 
rooted and socially constructed. It is possible to accept without too much 
difficulty the claim that hope is a chemical reaction taking place in a neural 
circuit, the circuit having being selected for because it proved better than 
others at solving some adaptive problems faced by our ancestors.9 Whilst 
hope may well belong to our anthropological core, the form it takes - the 
mode in which it manifests - at any particular time, in any particular culture, 
within any particular group, is the result of a complex process of social 
mediation. In terms of the neural circuitry that makes it possible, hope is 
indeed an innate “human universal.” In terms of the specific mode of 
experiencing hope that manifests as a result of the interaction of this circuitry 
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with the human environment, it is also a socially constructed pattern of 
behaviour. Hoping is essentially and biologically part of what it is to be 
human, but our essential human capacities can be suppressed and negated and 
they can manifest in different ways. 
This leads on to the second set of questions, concerning the 
characteristics of hope. Many theorists - Bernard Dauenhauer, John Patrick 
Day, Rick Snyder, to name but a few - strive to identify the defining 
characteristics of hope. For them, hope seems to be a singular, 
undifferentiated experience. As has just been suggested, however, it seems 
reasonable to view hope as a socially mediated human capacity. Understood 
in this way, different individuals and social classes, at different historical 
junctures, embedded in different social relations, enjoying different 
opportunities and facing different constraints, will experience hope in 
different ways. In short, there are different modes of hoping. 
This idea in itself is not new. Ernst Bloch’s The Principle of Hope, 
for example, offers a lengthy meditation on the various modes in which 
human hope has become manifest. Bloch is right, furthermore, to characterise 
hope as an experiential process with differentiated cognitive, affective and 
behavioural dimensions. Problems arise, however, when one considers the 
relationship between hope and utopia. For Bloch reads a utopian function into 
almost every act of hope. Even the weakest hope, he says, outstrips its 
mundane, limited content and “essentially refers” to the utopian All.10 A 
different reading is offered here, in which a clear distinction is made between 
utopian, non-utopian and anti-utopian modes of hoping. 
This idea is best explored with reference to the taxonomy of modes 
of hoping (see Appendix). Broadly defined, hope can be seen as an active 
orientation toward some future good. Within this broad definition, however, 
the objective and activity of hope are open to various interpretations. Here, it 
seems to me that many of the competing conceptions of hope are in fact 
complementary. They are each in some sense right and each capture 
something about what it is to hope. Human beings have concrete experiences 
like those described by Marcel and they would rightly call them hope. 
Human beings have concrete experiences like those described by Moltmann 
and Snyder and Rorty and, in each case, they would rightly call them hope. 
Taken as a whole, then, the various conceptions constitute a kind of 
phenomenology of hope. They capture something of the range of conscious 
experiences that could, and do, go by that name. More than simply a variable 
concept, then, hope is seen as a highly differentiated experience, the 
characteristics of which the various conceptualisations each, in part, help us 
to grasp.  
The five tables contained in the Appendix outline the utopian 
configuration of each mode of hoping. When people hope estimatively or 
resolutely, these modes of hoping will neither drive nor be carried by the 
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utopian impulse. The hopes of the estimative hoper are too much tapered to 
reality, too concerned with the question of what is possible within existing 
constraints. Whilst the word “utopia” may enter the language of estimative 
hope, the referent here will be nothing more than a set of “realistic” 
ameliorative reforms. The hopes of the resolute hoper, meanwhile, are too 
individualistic, too bound to a sense of personal self-efficacy. To hope in this 
mode is to perceive oneself as capable of achieving, sometimes against the 
odds but always within the existing order of things, personal goals such as 
academic, sporting or financial success. These hopes aren’t necessarily anti-
utopian. It is more that utopia, understood in Levitas’ terms as the imaginary 
reconstitution of society, simply would not enter the cognitive, affective or 
behavioural radar of the hoper.11 
The case of patient hope is somewhat different. People hoping in 
this mode would actually resist and negate the utopian impulse. In both the 
religious sense described by Marcel and the secular sense described by 
Dauenhauer, patient hope dismisses utopianism as a species of presumptuous 
impatience. To hope in this mode is to take one’s time, to face the future with 
courageous patience, to stand firm and abide, securely confident that a 
solution to life’s trials will, through the agency of some trusted Other, be 
found. Only in its critical mode - in which hope is experienced as a 
passionate suffering and restless longing for that which is missing - and in its 
transformative mode - epitomised by Gutierrez’s claim that to hope is to 
experience the world as open to collective human design, and history as an 
adventure - only in these modes will hope truly drive the utopian impulse.  
Within utopian studies, it is common to distinguish between 
“blueprint” and “process” utopianism. Utopianism of the former kind is 
representational, prescriptive, and instrumental. Utopianism of the latter kind 
is heuristic and exploratory, more concerned with process than content, 
centred more around the wish-full act of imagining than the will-full act of 
political transformation.12 Analysed in these terms, critical hope is 
commensurate with utopianism conceived as a deterritorialising exploratory 
process; whilst transformative hope is both grounded in and can serve to 
carry wilful, instrumental utopian praxis. Thus, when one looks behind, 
beneath and beyond the assumed correlation between hope and utopia, one 
finds that hope is a complex phenomenon which is sometimes divorced from 
the utopian impulse, sometimes negates it and sometimes carries it in 
different ways. 
 
3.  Collective Emotional Orientation and Utopian Clusters 
The Israeli social psychologist Daniel Bar-Tal suggests that we can 
talk of “cultural-societal” emotions as well as individual ones, and he argues 
that “societies may develop collective emotional orientations.”13 His own 
Darren Webb 
______________________________________________________________ 
29 
work focuses on the collective emotional orientation of Israeli society, which 
he argues is dominated by fear. Utilising and adapting this concept, it may 
well be that different modes of hoping predominate within the collective 
emotional orientation of a society at different historical points. It is well 
noted that some times and spaces have been, and are, more “utopian” than 
others. Utopian ideas and movements have thrived, and in some cases have 
had a profound social and political impact, in certain societies at certain 
times. I use the term “utopian clusters” to refer to spatio-temporal 
concentrations of utopian activity characterised by a proliferation of utopian 
texts, some at least of which capture the public political imagination. The 
spatio-temporal pattern of utopian clusters has never really been explored. 
The suggestion here is that a necessary, though not necessarily sufficient, 
condition for the emergence of utopian clusters is the inscription within the 
institutions of social life of the cognitive-affective dimensions of critical 
and/or transformative hope. When critical or transformative hope 
predominate within the collective emotional orientation of a society or social 
group, utopia is likely to operate as both a product and a source of hope. 
Take transformative hope as an example. The existence of a 
liberating utopia would not be enough to mobilise this mode of hoping. 
Rather, the liberating utopia, were it to become an objective of hope, would 
emerge from and feed back into the collective emotional orientation of the 
respective society. According to Bar-Tal, the collective emotional orientation 
of a society is shaped, framed and organised by the dissemination of core 
ideas, beliefs, myths and collective memories through such channels as 
public political discourse, the education system, the media, art and literature. 
Through these channels, society members learn how to feel, appraise, 
express, and behave in accordance with, particular emotions. For 
transformative hope to predominate within the collective emotional 
orientation of a society, one would expect to find its cognitive-affective 
dimensions - a sense of possibility, and a profound confidence in human 
capacities - embedded in the institutions of social life. 
The social embeddedness of the cognitive-affective dimensions of 
transformative hope may then serve to drive the instrumental, 
reterritorialising utopian impulse. If one looks, for example, at mid-
seventeenth century England, early-nineteenth century France, late-
nineteenth century America, these great utopian clusters were each preceded, 
of course, by decades of economic dislocation, social unrest, political 
upheaval. This factor alone, however, is not enough to explain why 
utopianism thrived to the extent that it did. A key additional factor in 
explaining why utopianism thrived in these periods is that each was preceded 
by decades during which a sense of possibility and a profound confidence in 
collective human endeavour had indeed become inscribed within the 
institutions of social life. Transformative hope had become an integral part of 
Modes of Hoping 
______________________________________________________________ 
30 
the collective emotional orientation of these societies at these historical 
junctures. This then ensured that utopian ideas became shared utopian dreams 
and that large numbers of hoping subjects became committed, in the 
behavioural domain, to goal-directed social praxis. 
Applying this conceptual framework would be a major undertaking. 
It would take a great deal of work properly to explore the collective 
emotional orientation of mid-seventeenth century England or late nineteenth 
century America and then to examine the way in which utopianism both 
emerged from and fed back into this collective emotional orientation. 
Nonetheless, looking at the relationship between utopia and hope in this way 
could, I think, prove useful. For example, it can help us understand the 
widely-noted exhaustion of utopian energies in contemporary life. This 
exhaustion has little to do with a lack of utopian ideas, for there are plenty 
out there. The problem is that these ideas singularly fail to capture the public 
political imagination. There are various reasons for this, but lack of hope is 
not one of them. For hope does still have a place in our collective emotional 
orientation, and necessarily so. Capitalism requires that individuals study, 
sell their labour power, consume, save and invest. The reproduction of 
capitalist relations of exploitation thus requires that individuals possess some 
form of hope.14 The important thing here is the modes of hoping that 
predominate within our collective emotion orientation. Even the most cursory 
analysis of public political discourse, media output and the education system 
would indicate that these are the estimative hope of the risk assessment, the 
resolute hope of the individual striving for purely personal goals, and the 
patient hope courageously directed toward the activities of some trusted 
Other. The revitalisation of utopianism may thus depend, not on more or 
better utopias being written and disseminated, but rather on the institutions of 
social life being reconstituted so that they once again foster critical and 
transformative hope. On this basis, a utopian politics would operate less at 
the level of propagating utopian ideas and more at the level of establishing 
the hopeful preconditions for utopian ideas to thrive. 
 
4.  Conclusion 
Utopian studies is a vibrant, expanding interdisciplinary field of 
inquiry. A key motif within the field - discussed repeatedly though only 
superficially - is human hope. Hope theory is a vibrant, expanding 
multidisciplinary field of inquiry. Research in this field has the potential to 
contribute immensely to our understanding of the cognitive-affective 
underpinnings of the utopian impulse. The present paper has sought briefly to 
outline how the two fields can be brought together in order to inform each 
other. Structured around three main concepts - modes of hoping, collective 
emotional orientation, and utopian clusters - the paper has attempted to 
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provide a framework for studying the dialectical interplay between hope and 
utopia. 
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Appendix: A Taxononomy of Modes of Hoping 
 
Table 1. Patient hope 
Representative theorists and 
texts 
1. G. Marcel, Homo Viator: 
Introduction to a Metaphysic 
of Hope, New York, Harper 
and Row, 1962. 
2. B. Dauenhauer, The 
Politics of Hope, London, 
Routledge, 1986. 
Objective of hope Unrepresentable: 
hope directed toward an 
objective that is so open and 
generalised - in the end all 
shall be well, our status as 
wayfarers ultimately makes 
sense - as to defy any attempt 
to map it. 
Cognitive-affective dimension 
of hope 
Secure trust: 
hope is a basic trust in the 
goodness of the world, which 
affords a sense of safety and 
security. 
Behavioural dimension of 
hope 
Courageous patience: 
hope is other-directed. To 
hope is to be patient and stand 
firm, to place one’s trust in 
the behavioural activity of an 
Other, and to await an 
unforeseen future. 
Utopian configuration of hope Anti-utopian hope: 
hope transcends desire and 
imagination and rejects all 
modes of utopia as species of 
presumptuous impatience. 
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Table 2. Critical hope 
Representative theorists and 
texts 
1. E. Bloch, The Principle of 
Hope, Cambridge MA, MIT 
Press, 1995 
2. J. Moltmann, A Theology of 
Hope, London, SCM Press, 
1967. 
Objective of hope Negation of the negative: 
hope directed toward the 
ultimum novum of a world 
without hunger, oppression 
and humiliation but which 
defies the hypostasis of 
‘closed’ or ‘final’ 
representation. 
Cognitive-affective dimension 
of hope 
Passionate longing: 
hope is a passionate suffering 
and restless longing for that 
which is missing. 
 
Behavioural dimension of 
hope 
Social criticism: 
the forward pull of the 
ultimum novum is 
experienced as the 
compulsion to critically 
negate the conditions giving 
rise to present misery and the 
sense of unfulfilment. 
Utopian configuration of hope Critical utopian hope: 
a deterritorialising processive 
hope which emphasises 
future-oriented critical 
thought but refuses to focus 
on a static final goal. 
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Table 3. Estimative hope 
Representative theorists and 
texts 
1. J. P. Day, Hope: A 
Philosophical Analysis, 
Helsinki, Philosophical 
Society of Finland, 1991. 
2. L. Bovens, ‘The Value of 
Hope,’ Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research, 
59, 1999, pp. 667-681. 
Objective of hope Future-oriented significant 
desire: 
hope directed toward an 
object of desire which is 
future-oriented and deemed to 
be of significance to the 
hoper. 
Cognitive-affective dimension 
of hope 
Mental imaging + probability 
estimate: 
hope is the belief that one’s 
desired objective is possible 
of attainment (probability 
>0<1), founded on a careful 
study of the evidence. 
Behavioural dimension of 
hope 
Possible goal-directed action 
in some cases: 
some hopes may be worth the 
risk of actively pursuing if, on 
the basis of one’s probability 
estimate, these are deemed 
more than fair gambles. 
Utopian configuration of hope Non-utopian hope: 
hopes grounded in a careful 
study of ‘the way things are’. 
Goal pursuit will tend to 
reproduce reality and is 
unlikely to be transformative, 
either personally or socially. 
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Table 4. Resolute hope 
Representative theorists and 
texts 
1. C. R. Snyder (ed), 
Handbook of Hope, San 
Diego, Academic Press, 2000. 
2. P. Pettit, ‘Hope and its 
Place in Mind,’ The Annals of 
the American Academy of 
Political and Social Science, 
592, 2004, pp. 152-165. 
Objective of hope Future-oriented significant 
desire: 
hope directed toward an 
object of desire which is 
future-oriented and deemed to 
be of significance to the 
hoper. 
Cognitive-affective dimension 
of hope 
Mental imaging + cognitive 
resolve: 
hope is the resolve to set aside 
one’s evidence-based beliefs 
and perceive oneself as 
capable of deriving pathways 
to desired goals and 
motivating oneself via agency 
thinking to use those 
pathways. 
Behavioural dimension of 
hope 
Goal-directed action in cases 
of less than fair gambles: 
the hoper strives to realise 
goals that the estimative 
hoper would have dismissed 
as less than fair gambles. 
Utopian configuration of hope Non-utopian hope: 
American Dream-like self-
efficacious private hope. This 
may be personally 
transformative yet socially 
conservative. 
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Table 5. Transformative hope 
Representative theorists and 
texts 
1. G. Gutiérrez, A Theology of 
Liberation, London: SCM 
Press, 2001 
2. R. Rorty, Philosophy and 
Social Hope, London, 
Penguin, 1999. 
Objective of hope Shared utopian dreams: 
hope directed toward a 
historical plan for a 
qualitatively different society, 
a liberating utopia shared by 
members of a collectivity. 
Cognitive-affective dimension 
of hope 
Mental imaging + profound 
confidence: 
hope is a sense of possibility 
grounded in a profound 
confidence in the capacity of 
human beings to construct, 
both imaginatively and 
materially, new ways of 
organising life. 
Behavioural dimension of 
hope 
Mutually-efficacious social 
praxis: 
hope is a commitment to goal-
directed social praxis through 
which human beings become 
the agents of their own 
destiny and willfully strive to 
create a new and better 
society. 
Utopian configuration of hope Transformative utopian hope: 
a reterritorialising hope which 
moves beyond open-ended 
critique and emphasises the 
necessity of transforming 
society in light of the 
liberating utopia. 
 
The Spirit of Hope and Its Near Enemy Indifference: A 
Phenomenological Continuum 
 
Janette E. McDonald 
 
Abstract: A juxtaposition of hope and hopelessness is evident in our 
contemporary lived experience. Regardless of what part of the world we live 
in, what social class we belong to, whatever our gender, age, religious or 
spiritual convictions, there are places where we experience hope, 
hopelessness, and indifference. Hope and hopelessness are close and intimate 
companions. To borrow from Buddhist thought the near enemy of hope is 
indifference.1 Utilizing phenomenology as a method for understanding one’s 
life-world this paper explores the phenomena of hope, hopelessness, and 
indifference. Questions addressed: What are hope, hopelessness, and 
indifference? What motivates people to be hopeful? What are some 
consequences of indifference? Is it possible to sustain hope? As a way to 
grasp these phenomena I suggest they are part of a continuum. This paper 
explores their placement on that continuum and attempts to provide a 
contextual reason for that placement. Through an etymology of the words 
spiritus and pneuma, I suggest that all people are spiritual because of their 
necessity to breathe. The breath or spirit that resides within each of us is 
suggested as the rudimentary seed for hope. Attention is given to Frankl’s 
work on meaning and connections are given to Buddhist thought. 
 
Key words: hope, indifference, meaning, phenomenology, Four Noble 
Truths, spiritual 
 
1. Introduction 
 Few might question that our world is in a sorry state of affairs and 
that the prospects of a better and brighter future seem dim in light of our 
world’s challenges, not the least of which include famine, armed conflict, 
environmental devastation, and a general erosion of our moral compasses. 
Indeed there is suffering and despair in our contemporary world. To suggest 
an alternative, yet cautious view, Viktor Frankl poses the Latin term, 
argumenta ad hominem or an argument for tragic optimism, and he attributes 
such optimism to the “...defiant power of the human spirit”.2 For many, the 
defiant power of our human spirit is where we find our quintessential seeds 
of hope for a better and more humane future. 
 Through a phenomenological lens this paper investigates three 
experiences endemic to the human condition; the state and human experience 
of being hopeful, hopeless, and indifferent.  Furthermore, these phenomena 
will be explored as a continuum of human experience. Frankl’s classic works 
on meaning and the Buddhist teachings of The Four Noble Truths serve as 
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the theoretical foundations of my three major premises: 1) to be hopeful is a 
natural human phenomenon with spiritual implications; 2) a hopeless 
situation often although not always serves as an impetus for human hope, and 
3) indifference, hope’s near enemy, may be the greatest way to diminish 
humanity and human dignity. To provide a contextual understanding of this 
continuum the following questions are addressed: What are hope, 
indifference, and hopelessness? What part does spirituality play in one’s 
hopefulness, hopelessness, and indifference? Is it possible to sustain or learn 
these? How does one change her place on the continuum? And why is hope 
worthy of further dialogue?  
 
2. Being: a Phenomenological Perspective 
 Phenomenologists are interested in the essence of one’s subjective 
lived experience, directly within the context of one’s conscious being in the 
world. Being then is a part of each phenomenon I mention on my continuum. 
If one describes herself as hopeful, indifferent, or hopeless, she is describing 
her way of being in her lived world. Heidegger,3 in his classic philosophical 
work, offers a more detailed discussion on being-in the world which far 
exceeds the limited intentions of this paper. Heidegger, however, renowned 
for his rigorous and arduous philosophy on being, also included among his 
personal readings the works of Zen masters.4 
 This is worthy of one’s attention because all practicing Buddhists 
place an emphasis on meditation, and the practice of meditation in the Zen 
tradition is intended to bring one closer to full awareness of being, whatever 
that moment of being is – sitting crossed-legged in the lotus position in a 
temple, driving a car, cutting vegetables for a meal, or whatever. Beingness 
here is about full attention and for the enlightened person this being becomes 
a way of life. I specifically connect Heidegger’s writings with classic Zen 
teachings because Heidegger spent the better part of his philosophical 
pursuits attempting to address the question, what does it mean to be in the 
world? In referring to the monumental Japanese scholar and Zen master D.T. 
Suzuki, Heidegger stated, “If I understand Dr. Suzuki correctly, this is what I 
have been trying to say in all my writings”.5 In Suzuki’s collected writings, 
Zen Buddhism, the opening chapter begins with the following: 
 
Zen in its essence is the art of seeing into the nature of 
one’s own being, and it points the way from bondage to 
freedom. By making us drink right from the fountain of 
life, it liberates us from all the yokes under which we finite 
beings are usually suffering in this world...This is what I 
mean by freedom, giving free play to all the creative and 
benevolent impulses inherently lying in our hearts. 
Generally we are blind to this fact, that we are in 
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possession of all the necessary faculties that will make us 
happy and loving towards one another.  All the struggles 
that we see around us come from this ignorance...when the 
cloud of ignorance disappears, the infinity of the heavens is 
manifested where we see for the first time into the nature 
of our own being.6 
 
3. The Continuum 
 I place the state of indifference in the absolute centre with a 
quantitative and sole value of zero.  Hopelessness would begin to the left of 
zero with negative one and would continue for infinity. Hope begins to the 
right of zero with positive one and also continues for infinity. While such an 
image is much to concrete and simple for the true meaning I wish to convey I 
find it appropriate that both hopelessness and hope have infinite qualities and 
indifference remains at the stagnant mid-point with no apparent potential for 
movement. Obviously, the place that seems most attractive is anywhere to 
the right of zero in a state of hope. But even a hopeless state has some kind 
of energy or concern. I see the place of indifference as having none of these. 
 Furthermore, I have referred to indifference as hope’s near enemy 
because on my continuum it falls closer to hope than does hopelessness. 
Generally enemies that are near us can cause more destruction and harm as 
opposed to our enemies that are far in distance. Because the beginning of 
hopelessness appears at a greater distance from the beginning of hope and 
continues in an opposite direction it could be called, hope’s far enemy.         
 I have shared this image of a line with several colleagues and some 
have suggested a different shape to represent the content of each 
phenomenon. For instance an inverted triangle and a spiral have been 
mentioned. While I am not particularly wedded to the image of a line as my 
continuum, my initial thought was that it was the simple and easiest way to 
explain my ideas, hence thus far in the development of my thinking I have 
remained with this image. 
What is hope? 
 To have hope is to have a human quality that illuminates meaning 
and decency regardless of the situational outcome. I define hope as an inner 
desire, wish or knowing that is often unexplainable and has the potential to 
improve the situation or future ones for the benefice of others. Where this 
desire, wish, or inner-knowing of hope comes from is not always clear or of 
import to the knower, yet the knower knows that somewhere within the 
deepest fibre of her being hope exists and can even flourish.  
 Vaclav Havel, the former leader of the Czech Republic states that 
hope is  
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…a dimension of the spirit, an orientation of the heart.  It 
transcends the world that is immediately experienced and is 
anchored somewhere beyond its horizon.  It is not the 
conviction that something will turn out well, but the 
certainty that something makes sense regardless of how it 
turns out7 
 
 Inherent in both our definitions is belief in potentiality and meaning.  
I use the word belief to mean a thought that holds value, meaning, or 
significance. Belief is often associated with theological or religious meanings 
and here my intention is to broaden the definition of hope in a way that 
transcends specific religiosity.  Nonetheless, like Havel, I imply a general 
spiritual overtone in my definition. 
 
4. The Etymology of Spiritus and Pneuma 
   The word spirit and its derivative, spiritual, come from the Latin 
spiritus, which holds as one definition, the breath of life. Breath is often 
associated with breathing in. Moreover, the Latin spiritus, can trace its 
origins to the Greek, pneuma. I once was taking a graduate course from a 
catholic priest who noted pneuma emphasized both the inhalation and 
exhalation of breath. In artful and poetic language the priest described the 
beginning of human life as God’s exhalation of breath or spirit in rhythmic 
motion with human inhalation of that same breath or spirit. The priest noted 
that the significance of this circuitous rhythm offered a more complete 
understanding of life’s breath because it placed an active role on both God 
and human kind. A breath is not complete if it is only exhaled. It must also 
be inhaled. Also according to the priest the image lacks richness if it only 
accentuates God’s exhalation thereby placing the human being in a passive 
role. In other words, the human inhalation has equal import and completes 
the circularity of the breathing process.  One could argue then, that all human 
beings are spiritual in the sense that we all breathe in and out the breath or 
spirit of life. This spirit within each of us is what I suggest is the rudimentary 
seed for hope and vivifies that quality of potentiality I mentioned a moment 
ago. Through connecting Frankl’s work to this concept I will further 
emphasize an interrelationship between one’s hopefulness and spirituality. 
 Perhaps it is no coincidence that all Buddhist meditators are first 
encouraged to place their conscious attention on their breath, and to simply 
follow their natural breathing pattern by counting their breaths. It is believed 
that one’s concerted attention on the breath can eventually bring one to full 
awareness of the present and ultimately to the state of enlightenment. 
 
5. What is Hopelessness? 
 I define hopelessness in comparison with hope.  Quite simply, 
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hopelessness is an utter lack of hope. In this human experience one is full of 
emotions and feelings of anguish and despair. Where having a sense of hope 
may be unexplainable, one can usually articulate precisely why one is in a 
hopeless state.  Something very bad has happened to them or to someone or 
something they care about. Often there is an overwhelming sense that 
nothing humanly possible can be done to ever assuage this feeling or 
circumstance. When one is hopeless, one is also suffering. One could 
conclude that there is a deep intensity to hopelessness. It is not lacking in 
emotions or feelings, as I suggest of indifference, but rather it is thoroughly 
fraught or laden with them. 
 A common question asked in the state of hopelessness is why? Why 
did this happen? Specifically, why did this happen to me? These questions 
are almost always not helpful in the final resolution of the situation and are 
often directed toward one’s personal God, who or whatever that may be. This 
question why, can also be paralyzing because there are few if any solid 
answers. Furthermore, this why question places a focus on events of the past 
and nothing can be done to recreate one’s history. According to Frankl 
however, one does have some choice about how one responds to the current 
situation, thereby impacting one’s future. By comparison, those who feel 
hope seem less apt to ask the why question. For them, why does not matter so 
much, rather they seem to move beyond why to how they might make 
meaning in life. Moreover, one who is indifferent does not have awareness or 
care to even ask the question. Interestingly enough, it is often a hopeless 
situation which precipitates one’s movement to a state of being hopeful. 
Frankl’s research and writing seems to affirm this. 
 
6. Frankl’s Message of Hope 
 While Frankl does not offer a detailed explanation or definition of 
what he means by spiritual, he does imply that one’s inner life is a base for 
one’s hope. He writes: 
 
As the inner life of the prisoner tended to become more 
intense, he also experienced the beauty of art and nature as 
never before. Under their influence he sometimes even 
forgot his own frightful circumstances. If someone had seen 
our faces on the journey from Auschwitz to a Bavarian camp 
as we beheld the mountains of Salzburg with their summits 
glowing in the sunset, through the little barred windows of 
the prison carriage, he would never have believed that those 
were faces of men who had given up all hope of life and 
liberty. Despite that factor–or maybe because of it–we were 
carried away by nature’s beauty.8 
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 Frankl suggests that through a deepened inner life the prisoners 
were able to transcend their physical predicament of despair and instead 
bring their attention to the current moment where they could see and 
appreciate the stunning beauty of snow capped mountains. Through this 
description of personal experience Frankl implies that human beings often 
appear to have a natural or inherent predilection to be hopeful creatures even 
during times of despair because we seem to have the capability to rise above 
our own potential for no immediate or explainable reason.     
 Additionally he notes that survivors of these concentration camps 
who were able to find meaning in their suffering and forgive their offenders 
were also able to live more fully once they were liberated. Frankl intimates 
that prisoners who sustained their hope and maintained their sense of 
spirituality were better equipped to withstand the atrocities of the camps. 
Those who lost hope were among the first to perish either by the hands of the 
SS Soldiers or because of their own physical and emotional demise. 
 Here I do not mean to suggest that all individuals who had some 
sense of a spiritual life survived the camps because history tells us this was 
not the case and Frankl himself admits that “...the best of us did not return”.9 
But according to Frankl, if one did not have this, if one was unable to find 
some kind of meaning in their experience no matter how horrible, the person 
was almost certain to die. 
  In the preface of the 1984 edition of Man’s Search for Meaning, 
Frankl explains his purpose for writing his classic work:  
 
I simply wanted to convey to the reader by way of a 
concrete example that life holds a potential meaning under 
any condition, even the most miserable ones. And I thought 
that if the point were demonstrated in a situation as 
extreme as that in a concentration camp, my book might 
gain a hearing.10 
 
 I might add that in 1984 his book was in its 73rd printing and had 
been published in 19 different languages. Those statistics suggest that 
millions of people around the globe have read Dr. Frankl’s words and for me 
those numbers render a sense of hope simply because they imply that some 
people appear to have an interest in learning from past tragedies.  
 
7. What is Indifference? 
 Where hope and hopelessness are full of emotion, indifference lacks 
it. Where hope and hopelessness often demand some kind of human action, 
indifference stifles it. Where hope and hopelessness are heartfelt, 
indifference has no heart. Where hope and hopelessness epitomize our 
deepest humanity, indifference diminishes it.  Its qualities are carelessness, 
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thoughtlessness, mindlessness, feelinglessness, and perhaps even, 
humanlessness. It is this diminished human state that creates the potential for 
personal and global catastrophe because indifferent people standby idle and 
do nothing, often with callousness and cowardice. Therefore, I suggest that 
one’s state of indifference is an ignorant intersection of vacuity and 
numbness which reveals itself most conspicuously as apathy.    
 
8. A Connection to Buddhist Thought 
  All Buddhists acknowledge the Buddha’s teachings of the Four 
Noble Truths: there is suffering in life, suffering comes from our resistance 
to the natural flow of life, or our cravings; our sufferings can cease; and the 
Eightfold Path may lead to our individual awakening.  The Buddhist path of 
enlightenment is an active one through meditation and embracing the 
everyday ordinary moment. Buddhism teaches that the only true reality is the 
present and that building our conscious awareness of this reveals the Buddha 
that exists in each one of us. Seeing the Buddha in ourselves allows us to 
behold the Buddha in others. From the works of Frankl and others, it is 
indeed difficult to imagine a Buddha in figures like Hitler, some of the SS 
Soldiers, Idi Amen, and Judas to mention only a few.  
 While I am not certain if most Buddhists would describe themselves 
as hopeful, I think most would agree that their way of life offers the potential 
for hopefulness. Similar to Frankl, Buddhists recognize that life is suffering 
and while they have no control over this they do have a choice as to how they 
respond to that suffering through a full presence of the current moment.  
 Some still may find it inappropriate that I have connected the 
phenomenon of hope with Buddhist thought since hope often is associated 
with futuristic tendencies. According to Buddhism, the future is an illusion.  
It is not real or certain and thinking about it only distances one from the 
current moment. For Buddhists thinking or desire for a certain kind of future 
can lead to attachment which manifests further suffering. Nonetheless the 
Buddha’s message is one of intentional liberation and freedom from 
suffering, as well as compassion, and loving-kindness.  For some, these too 
have futuristic qualities and I suggest that living with the intention to free and 
liberate oneself and others from suffering offers a more meaningful and 
hopeful life.  
 
9. The Fading of Hope 
 Several years ago I heard my father make a cautious analogy that 
there is the potential for good or evil in most lived experiences. In his effort 
to impart some of his wisdom my dad asked me to remember that there is a 
little bit of Judas and Jesus in all of us.  To demonstrate his point he then 
shared a poignant story regarding a legend about Leonardo De Vinci’s 
painting, The Last Supper. Then as now, famous artists employed living 
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persons to model as figures in their paintings. The legend says the first 
person De Vinci painted in The Last Supper was the figure of Jesus. 
Evidently he found a handsome young man to model because of his 
pulchritude, innocence, and exquisite face. Several years later as De Vinci 
was completing his masterpiece, he was challenged to paint his last figure 
Judas, because he could not find a person whose face depicted the harsh and 
vitriolic character he believed Judas to be.  Finally someone mentioned there 
was a criminal in a nearby prison that was of despicable character with an 
equally hateful face. De Vinci received permission to visit the prisoner’s cell 
for several months as he completed his painting. The legend says that the two 
never spoke until De Vinci completed his work and was preparing to leave 
the cell for the last time. As De Vinci was clearing his artistic materials the 
prisoner is said to have asked the question, “Leonardo do you know who I 
am?” De Vinci is reported to have said, “Of course I don’t know you. I just 
met you a few months ago when I began painting you in this cell.” The 
prisoner replied, “Leonardo, I am the man you painted several years ago as 
Jesus.” 
 I do not know if the legend holds any truth, but my father’s story 
has left a lasting impression on me: one’s potential for anything is very real. 
If there is any truth to the legend we can only imagine that something 
happened to the once graceful young man that allowed him to choose a dark 
and acrimonious path. I might suggest that something caused his hope to fade 
in himself and in others, and the result was his own personal tragedy. His 
placement on my continuum had changed over time and experience.  
 
10. Placement on the Continuum 
 Placement on the continuum is not a progressive pattern like many 
developmental stage theories where final stages represent more sophisticated 
levels of growth. One’s personality and disposition coupled with life 
experiences, societal, environmental, and familial influences all affect one’s 
placement. As noted then by the example of De Vinci’s young model, one’s 
placement on the continuum can clearly change and fluctuate in intensities 
throughout one’s life, and I believe that it is possible and even probable to 
occupy each state at some point during our lives. For example, Frankl 
described himself as an optimist early in his classic work, yet through his 
own descriptions of concentration camp experiences he reveals his profound 
and fluctuating feelings of hopelessness. 
 What is significant about Frankl and so many others who have 
experienced tragedy and despair is that they do not remain in a state of 
hopelessness. According to Frankl, such people have an inner life and are 
able to see the meaning in all of life’s verities and therefore, the meaning in 
their suffering. In addition, I suggest that one who is indifferent lacks this 
inner life and personal awareness and therefore cannot appreciate all of life’s 
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meaning. For the indifferent person the way to move from the state of 
indifference is to develop a sense of personal awareness and self-knowing.  
 So a reasonable question to ask is how does an unaware person 
become aware of his being, his life, and his world? From my own 
experiences of working with dying persons and bereaved family and friends I 
can attest that some kind of tragedy or loss is often what shakes the very fibre 
of a person’s beingness and moves one toward a personal questioning of 
what is most significant and important in life. Such questioning can 
precipitate a profound awareness. 
 
11. How is Hope Sustained? 
 Hope, like enlightenment is not something one can direct oneself to 
have, rather hope is recreated and re-lived time and again, moment by 
moment, breath by breath. Hope is not sustained because hope does not have 
that kind of directionality. In offering advice to both his American and 
European students about success and happiness Frankl shares a similar 
sentiment that could also be said of hope. He states: 
 
Don’t aim at success–the more you aim at it and make it a 
target, the more you are going to miss it. For success, like 
happiness, cannot be pursued; it must ensue, and it only 
does so as the unintended side-effect of one’s personal 
dedication to a cause greater than oneself or as the by-
product of one’s surrender to a person other than oneself. 11 
 
12. Why Is Hope Worthy of Further Dialogue?  
 I return to Heidegger’s provocative question of what does it means 
to be. As a phenomenologist I see the answer as a subjective and intimately 
personal one. For many of us, perhaps we could say that our beingness is 
wrapped in some kind of unique hope and meaning. For me at least part of 
what it means to be is to hold hope for our world, for each other, and for our 
future. I see Frankl as suggesting that hope is worthy of further dialogue 
because it allows us to transcend our individual being to a cause greater than 
ourselves thereby illustrating the intrinsic dignity of human kind.  My 
intention is not to be overly optimistic or sentimental for even Frankl uses the 
term, “tragic optimism” yet he clearly states that all of life has meaning and 
every person holds “unconditional value”.12  
 Frankl’s message like the Four Noble Truths, is not erudite or 
illusionary. Rather it is ordinary and simple with indelible and penetrating 
insight that paves the juxtaposition of both good and evil and mercy and 
malevolence as potentialities of each moment. As noted earlier in the paper 
the potential to be hopeful is natural for all human beings, just as the 
Buddhists believe the potential to be enlightened exists for everyone. I have 
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attempted to connect these two ideas because both intersect with the 
phenomenon of a human breath and serve what I have referred to as the 
quintessential seeds of hope. The individual spirit or breath within each of us 
determines the choices we make and when we behave in hopeful ways or 
when we meet our far and near enemies of hopelessness and indifference.  
 
 
 
Notes 
 
1 A. Khema, The Four Highest Emotions. Shambhala Sun. May, 2001, p. 53. 
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The Scandalously Impure:  
Hope for Transcending Cultural Norms 
 
Ariella Linovski 
 
Abstract: In Judith Butler’s Antigone’s Claim, Butler makes a distinction 
between two uses of language to critique discourse, oppositional purity and 
the scandalously impure. Oppositional purity suggests a way of critiquing 
discourse without harming one’s self, while the scandalously impure implies 
that the critiquing of discourse might result in a scandal, a radical 
transfiguration of the law by refusing to operate within it. In this paper, I 
suggest that challenging pre-existing discourses from within can be equally 
dangerous as putting one’s self outside of discourses altogether, although 
there is less hope of reconstructing cultural norms. I use the example of the 
Free Muslims Coalition Against Terrorism, an organization of American 
Arabs and Muslims who disassociate themselves from “radical Muslim 
fundamentalists”, to illustrate the implications of oppositional purity, 
including its negative implications on individual’s civil liberties. Operating 
within the confines of the law, the Free Muslims Coalition accepts their 
position as a racial subject by failing to recognize that the symbol of the 
terrorist, the word terrorist itself, is related to a predetermined ethnic 
hierarchy. The theoretical framework of this paper critiques Lacanian thought 
because although it recognizes the function of language, it causes difficulty in 
conceiving a past and a future where the roles of terrorists have been or will 
be defined as inconsistent to the Free Muslims Coalition’s description. In 
contrast, Butler’s conceptualization of Antigone’s politics as scandalously 
impure, illustrates that reconstructing cultural norms is possible. Antigone’s 
reconfiguration of the institutions of kinship and gender provides hope in 
transcending structuralist universality, which assumes cultural codes can’t be 
altered. As such, I place kinship and terrorism alongside each other in order 
to demonstrate that adopting the language of institutions can be used to 
critique institutions themselves, thus widening the potential for challenging 
oppressive discourses.  
 
Key words: Judith Butler, Antigone, Sophocles, cultural norms, terrorism, 
gender, institutions, post-structuralism  
 
The Free Muslims Coalition believes that: 
 
Fundamentalist Islamic terror represents one of the most 
lethal threats to the stability of the civilized world. The 
existence of Islamic terrorists is the existence of threats to 
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democracy. There is no room for terrorism in the modern 
world and the United States should take a no-tolerance 
stance on terrorism in order to avoid another tragedy, along 
the lines of 9-11. With the added threat of biochemical 
weapons, the call to defeat terrorism has never been so 
urgent. 
 
This quote taken from the Free Muslims Coalition’s website is a clarification 
of their position towards terrorism. Is the Free Muslims Coalition, a group of 
American Arabs and Muslims, at risk for disassociating themselves from 
Islamic militant terrorism? Are they at risk of being labelled Anti-Islam by 
the Muslim community? 
In Antigone’s Claim: Kinship between Life and Death, Judith Butler 
makes a distinction between the uses of language and their different 
outcomes. Language can be used to either challenge the rule of the law or 
challenge the rule of the law by assuming sovereignty through radical means, 
thus replacing the law itself. Butler’s argument assumes however, that we can 
trace all networks attached to a given discourse to determine whether we are 
rebelling from within it or outside of it. Starting with her assumption 
however, I would like to suggest that challenging pre-existing discourses 
from within can be equally dangerous as putting one’s self outside of the 
discourse altogether, although there might be less hope for re-constructing 
cultural norms. In addition, I would like to support a second articulation by 
Butler, that not all forms of critique have the potential of re-constructing 
cultural norms.  Butler’s very notion that re-construction is possible however, 
transcends structuralist universality that assumes cultural codes can’t be 
altered, based on the premise that rules themselves are fixed. This raises a 
question, if Antigone were fully accepting the language of the state to 
challenge gender and kinship norms, what value would this act have? I will 
use the example of the Free Muslims Coalition to explore this idea. 
Butler writes of Antigone’s heroism that, “She speaks, and speaks in 
public precisely when she ought to be sequestered in the private domain.”1 
Similarly, the Free Muslims Coalition claims that they are speaking out in 
public against terrorism. They claim that they are being sequestered by the 
Muslim community but what would be the reason for threatening the Free 
Muslims Coalition? The Free Muslims Coalition argues that “the message 
disseminated by radical Muslims is that merely discussing Islamic terrorism 
is to be construed as an attack on Islam.”2 The Free Muslims Coalition 
addresses one discourse that they are challenging, the discourse of Islamic 
fundamentalist terrorism, but they begin with many assumptions which come 
from other discursive practices. 
In stating that, “terror represents one of the most lethal threats to the 
stability of the civilized world” and that “there is no room for terrorism in the 
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modern world and the United States should take a no-tolerance stance on 
terrorism,”3 The Free Muslims Coalition begins with a multitude of 
constructions that were developed through an authoritative discourse, not 
through natural law. This leads to a series of assumptions. The Free Muslims 
Coalition assumes that the United States is civilized and the Muslim world is 
not. They assume that the United States would otherwise be “stable” without 
the existence of terrorism. They assume force must be used by the state to 
control terrorism. They assume that this terrorism does not come from the 
state itself. They assume immediacy is necessary to prevent future suffering. 
And lastly they assume that there is a single type of terrorism, a radical one 
that is a threat to the United States. 
While this rhetoric comes from the Bush Administration’s post-
September 11th discourse, it should not be explained according to a Lacanian 
interpretation. A Lacanian configuration of terrorism would provide a similar 
outcome to Butler’s account of Lacanian kinship where the symbolic account 
of kinship is “severed from the social, thus freezing the social arrangements 
of kinship as something intact and intractable.”4 The relationship between 
terror and the state would be merely a function of language. This suggests 
there is no hope for a transgression of the current social relations of terror. 
Although the function of language is recognizable, it is difficult to conceive a 
past and a future where the roles of terrorists have been or will be defined as 
inconsistent to the Free Muslims Coalition’s description. 
According to Brigitte Nacos however in Mass-Mediated Terrorism: 
The Central Role of the Media in Terrorism and Counter-terrorism, terrorism 
was originally conceived in the 18th century as actions by the state against its 
citizens. For example, its usage was applied to the Reign of Terror during the 
French Revolution, when terrorism meant mass guillotining the nobility who 
were considered a threat to the state. During the 19th century this definition 
expanded to include violence against the state, such as the assassination of 
politicians by anarchists. It was only in the 20th century that terrorism came to 
mean political violence by non-state actors.5 This most recent definition of 
terrorism is how the Bush administration and the Coalition conceive it, not as 
merely a threat to the state but also as a threat to the mass public. But not any 
mass public, as the Free Muslims Coalition writes, “a threat to the civilized 
world.” The order of this civilized world is defined and controlled by an 
authority, an authority similar to Creon’s character in Antigone’s Claim. 
Creon attempts to maintain his definition of civilization by prohibiting the 
burial of Polyneices, who defied civilization by leading an army against his 
own brother’s regime in Thebes.6  
The Coalition adopts a 20th century definition of “terror” as a cause 
to call for action. Action would result in security, a hopeful feeling that the 
threat is controlled. Perhaps the Coalition’s intent is to reject the discourse 
that all Muslims are terrorists, but most evident is their attempt to distinguish 
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themselves from the bad apples.  Rejecting this claim will save them; rather 
than cause them to comply with the discourse of Islamic terrorism. 
Compromising sovereignty and civil liberties is well worth the sacrifice, as 
protection by the American state is guaranteed. Police protocols for 
interrogating suspects will save the Free Muslims Coalition along with other 
civilized Americans from the imminent threat of terrorism. 
The reality of what such state protection might entail is disregarded 
however. Codes for racial profiling, as identified by the American Civil 
Liberties Union7, the practice of searching for suspects who are DWB, 
driving while brown for example, does not discriminate between good 
Muslims or bad Muslims, let alone different religious or cultural groups at 
all.  Perhaps sacrificing civil liberties then, along with the willingness to face 
so-called threats is equally harmful to the Free Muslims Coalition as a 
statement which would refuse the existence of terror altogether. 
Operating within the confines of the law, the Free Muslims 
Coalition accepts their position as a racial subject, given their failure to 
recognize that the symbol of the terrorist, the word terrorist itself, is related to 
an ethnic hierarchy constructed by the law.  In addition to reinforcing the 
power of the ethnic majority, the state’s concern is with security rather than 
the protection of individual civil liberties.  The promotion of a “no tolerance 
policy” towards terrorism by the Free Muslims Coalition then results in the 
ethnic minority’s promotion of stereotyping, exploiting, abusing and 
committing acts of violence against themselves. Adhering to structuralist 
thought is particularly problematic here because the Free Muslims Coalition 
produces the state’s power and disallows themselves to have any individual 
capacity to dissent against it. 
But are these perceived consequences of the Free Muslims 
Coalitions statement, not a product of another discourse that assumes subjects 
have the power to control their own civil liberties? Does this idea of critique 
not come from a discourse which abides by the rules, or non-rules of radical 
feminist theory, post-structuralism or post-colonial theory? This aside, it 
cannot be denied that the Coalition’s adoption of state language may be a 
tactic for future rebellion and a means to eventually step outside of the 
discourse. For we can only see what is spoken and we can not predict the 
deed. Butler’s description of Antigone’s act as political is useful for 
understanding how one might adopt repressive language for the purpose of 
deconstructing norms.  Specifically, Butler writes that Antigone “absorbs the 
very language of the state against which she rebels, and hers becomes a 
politics not of oppositional purity but of the scandalously impure.”8  
Butler’s distinction between oppositional purity and the 
scandalously impure implies that there is a way of critiquing discourse 
without harming one’s self, oppositional purity. In contrast to oppositional 
purity, the scandalously impure suggests that the critiquing of discourse 
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might result in a scandal, a radical transfiguration of the law by refusing to 
operate within it. According to Butler then, Antigone’s politics are not 
noteworthy because she merely opposes the state from within its acceptable 
discourse, but rather, her rebellion, her self-desubjectification is a politically 
sovereign act that defies norms of gender and kinship. 
Antigone rejects her gender and kinship roles through language in 
two ways: by not denying her act of burying her brother and by not claiming 
it either. Butler argues that Antigone refuses to be forced into denial through 
the other’s language.9 While Antigone refuses to be forced into denial, the 
Free Muslims Coalition flat out denies any affiliation with terrorism. Perhaps 
Butler would view the Free Muslims Coalition as a form of oppositional 
purity and as such, having minimal potential to change the Bush 
Administration’s construction of terrorism.  If this is the case, would it be 
possible to redefine terrorism, while refusing to be part of it or admitting to it 
altogether? It seems this would be unachievable, unless the language of 
authority was used to change conceptualizations of the terrorist. 
While Butler does not explain the consequences of oppositional 
purity, she explains the consequences of Antigone’s scandalous impurity. Not 
only is Antigone’s gender role reversed as an outcome, but so is Creon’s, as 
indicated by Butler.10 Creon becomes unmanned when speaking to Antigone 
and Antigone becomes manly for asserting herself. Butler thus argues against 
Hegel’s argument that Antigone’s deed represents kinship and Creon’s deed 
represents the state because Antigone and Creon both experience a change in 
gender roles. More specifically, the way the characters are gendered are in 
relation to each other and are co-dependant on one and another. The 
characters’ genders are both malleable, and if Creon’s manliness would be 
fixed as a representative of the state, then his manliness would not be 
displaced in the play. This is not the case however and gender becomes 
radically independent of sex and dependant on power instead. 
Butler’s examination of Antigone’s masculinity and Creon’s 
unmanning is demonstrative of Butler’s argument in Gender Trouble: 
Feminism and the Subversion of Identity, that “man and masculine might just 
as easily signify a female body as a male one and woman and feminine a 
male body as easily as a female one.”11 Similarly, it is conceivable that 
terrorism might just as easily signify the state as it might Muslims, and 
democracy might as easily signify Muslims as it might the state. In 
Antigone’s claim, Butler’s choice of language is an attempt to broaden such 
possibilities of signification. Butler’s choice to use “unmanning and manly” 
for example, avoids the implication of unmanliness and femininity as binary 
opposites, where each word is culturally linked to only one out of two types 
of bodies. Avoiding this binary allows Butler to avoid the assumption that 
Creon is feminine when being unmanned. Instead, it asserts that another 
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gender might exist altogether and that it is indeed possible for each person to 
have multiple genders. 
Meanwhile, the Free Muslims Coalition works within a binary 
identity of being Muslim. That binary identity is to be a terrorist or not to be 
a terrorist. There is no suggestion that every person might in fact be a 
terrorist in some way, that no Muslims are terrorists, or that terrorism is a 
discursive or cultural means by which Muslims are produced. In other words, 
just as Butler suggests that gender is a discursive practice that produces sex, 
the way we know Muslims can only be understood as a result of our 
knowledge of terrorism. 
To value the Free Muslims Coalition’s rejection of terrorism is 
unsettling because it is ultimately self-destructive. Its tragedy is that it 
doesn’t challenge oppressive law, (from the limited portion of the discourse 
that is observable to us) and it produces a Muslim identity that can be only 
understood by its relationship to terrorism. As the end product, the Free 
Muslims Coalition faces “a social death,” what Butler describes as “the status 
of being a living being radically deprived of all rights that are supposed to be 
accorded to any and all living human beings.”12 While Antigone ultimately 
faces death for operating outside of the boundaries of gender and kinship, it is 
a death that is welcomed based on principle. In addition, it is comforting to 
know that her deed and her language rejected the constraining institutions of 
kinship and gender. If then, both modes of opposition, oppositional purity 
and the scandalously impure, result ostensibly in tragedy, the tragedy which 
has the potential to re-configure structural norms in the process seems to be 
no tragedy at all. 
 
Notes 
 
1 J Butler, Antigone’s Claim: Kinship Between Life and Death, Columbia 
Press, New York, 2002, p. 4 
2 Free Muslim Coalition Against Terrorism, Our Positions: Terrorism, 2007, 
last viewed on August 23, 2007 
http://www.freemuslims.org/issues/terrorism.php 
3 Free Muslim Coalition Against Terrorism, op. cit.   
4 Butler, Antigone’s Claim: Kinship Between Life and Death, op. cit.,  p. 14 
5 B Nacos, ‘Mass-Mediated Terrorism in the New World (Dis)Order,’ Mass-
Mediated Terrorism: The Central Role of the Media in Terrorism and 
Counter-terrorism, Rowman and Littlefield, Lanham, 2002, p. 17 
6 Butler, Antigone’s Claim: Kinship Between Life and Death, op. cit.,  p. 6 
7 American Civil Liberties Union and the ACLU Foundation, Racial 
Profiling: Old and New, last viewed on August 23, 2007 
http://www.aclu.org/racialjustice/racialprofiling/index.html 
Ariella Linovski 
______________________________________________________________ 
57 
 
8 Butler, Antigone’s Claim: Kinship 8 Butler, Antigone’s Claim: Kinship 
Between Life and Death, op. cit.,  p. Between Life and Death, op. cit., p. 5 
9  Butler, Antigone’s Claim: Kinship Between Life and Death, op. cit., p. 8 
10 Butler, Antigone’s Claim: Kinship Between Life and Death, op. cit., p. 10 
11 Butler, ‘Subjects of Sex/Gender/Desire,’ Gender Trouble: Feminism and 
the Subversion of Identity, Routledge, New York, 1990, p. 6 
12 Butler, Antigone’s Claim: Kinship Between Life and Death, op. cit., p. 73 
 
 
Bibliography 
 
 American Civil Liberties Union and the ACLU Foundation. Racial 
Profiling: Old and New. Last viewed on August 23, 2007 
http://www.aclu.org/racialjustice/racialprofiling/index.html 
 Butler, J., ‘Subjects of Sex/Gender/Desire.’ Gender Trouble: 
Feminism and the Subversion of Identity. Routledge, New York, 1990. 
 Butler, J., Antigone’s Claim: Kinship Between Life and Death. 
Columbia Press, New York, 2002. 
 Free Muslim Coalition Against Terrorism. Our Positions: 
Terrorism. Last viewed on August 23, 2007 
http://www.freemuslims.org/issues/terrorism.php 
 Nacos, B., ‘Mass-Mediated Terrorism in the New World (Dis) 
Order.’ Mass-Mediated Terrorism: The Central Role of the Media in 
Terrorism and Counter-terrorism. Rowman and Littlefield, Lanham, 2002. 
 
Author’s Note  
Ariella Linovski is an MA candidate at York University’s Communication 
and Culture programme in Toronto, Canada and is currently a visiting 
graduate student at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem where she is 
conducting research on the Israel-Lebanon War of 2006. 
 
The Rationality of Hope 
 
Nancy Mardas Billias 
 
Abstract: Kant followed Aristotle in the conviction that what distinguishes 
humanity from other animals is our capacity for rationality. Thus, Kant 
frames the fundamental concerns of philosophy as three central, rational 
questions. The critiques of judgment and of pure and practical reason treat 
these questions as parallel. However, only the first two are, properly 
considered, rational. In fact, the relationship between the questions is 
paradoxical, a point which Kant does not address. I argue that what actually 
qualifies us as human are three primarily non-rational modes of being: faith, 
hope, and love. That is, our identities are formed by what we believe, whom 
we love, and what we hope for.  Badiou maintains that “hope is the name of a 
subject which remains,” that which perdures beyond desubjectification, 
betrayal, and falsehood, in the “event” of a unique ongoing presence: not the 
‘free,’ ‘rational’ myth of the Kantian/modern individual, but an 
interdependent, transcendent desire. It is my hope that this reframing may be 
of some use in the post-modern conversation concerning the possibility of 
ethical agency.  
 
Key words: Badiou, Kant, rationality, ethical agency, identity formation, 
desubjectification, freedom 
 
 
 As we know, Immanuel Kant followed Aristotle in the conviction 
that what distinguishes humanity from other animals is our capacity for 
rationality. This capacity gives humans a unique value, for Kant, and thus 
renders us worthy of respect. Kant frames the fundamental concerns of 
philosophy as three central, rational questions: 
 
What can I know? 
What ought I to do? 
What may I hope? 
 
 The critiques of judgment and of pure and practical reason treat 
these questions as parallel. However, only the first two are, properly 
considered, rational. In fact, the relationship between the questions is quite 
paradoxical, a point which Kant does not address.  It is this distinction on 
which I would like to focus today.  
The first two questions establish and then justify the limits of 
reason. They set the boundaries of cognition and then provide their raison 
d’etre. In so doing they hew to a strictly Aristotelian and progressivist 
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understanding of the world: the purpose of knowledge is action, aimed at a 
more effective manipulation of the environment by the individual on behalf 
of society. 
But these two questions alone do not begin to answer ontological or 
metaphysical questions, the ‘why’ questions. Why are things the way they 
are? Why is there evil? Why should knowledge motivate us to action, and 
why should one desire the betterment of society? Kant famously attempts to 
answer these questions in the second formulation of the Categorical 
Imperative: “Always treat humanity, whether in your own person or that of 
another, never simply as a means but always at the same time as an end.” 
This principle is, of course, merely a restatement of Aristotle’s understanding 
of happiness (as an end in itself). In this formulation, Kant does not move 
beyond Aristotle in any substantive way. The principle of ‘the end in itself’ 
is, for Aristotle and Kant, both compelling and satisfying. Things are the way 
they are because for them to be otherwise creates too many logical 
inconsistencies. Things are as they are by virtue of the demands of reason. 
Logically, there must be an Unmoved Mover. Equally logically, there must 
be a goal which is worth pursuing for its own sake. Reason demands that 
there be a parallel between the life of the cosmos and our own life. Thus, 
reason demands that we fall in with the principle of the end in itself in our 
own lives and actions.  
And yet Kant cannot stop there, for he must take into account 
somehow both the reality of evil and the event of Christianity. So he must go 
beyond reason, and ask the third question. Thus he begins to wrestle with the 
problems of moral activity in the context of religion. While he makes a 
valiant attempt to argue for religion as a rational necessity and moral 
impetus, most notably in Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone, and the 
Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, ultimately, I think, most 
contemporary scholars would admit that Kant fails to satisfactorily square the 
phenomenon of metaphysical longing with a rational standpoint. And this is a 
major flaw in Kant’s otherwise beautiful philosophy. 
For whether it is rational or not, hope we do. This paper is part of a 
larger project in which I want to argue that what actually qualifies us as 
human are three primarily non-rational modes of being: faith, hope, and love. 
That is, our identities are formed by what we believe, whom we love, and 
what we hope.  These three modes of being neither begin nor end in rational 
cognitive processes, but they do result in much or even most of our moral 
activity. I would like to think a bit more about how and why this is so, and its 
implications for ethical agency today. 
To help me with this task, I turn to the contemporary French 
philosopher Alain Badiou. Strikingly, Badiou has chosen to swim against the 
currents of post-modern philosophy by concentrating on questions of 
ontology, ethics, and universal truths. First, a word on three of Badiou’s most 
Nancy Mardas Billias 
______________________________________________________________ 
61 
fundamental terms: being, event, and counting-for-one. Like any post-
modernist, Badiou speaks primarily not in terms of abstract meta-concepts 
like God or Being, but rather in terms of ‘what is’ and ‘ multiplicities.’ For 
Badiou, ‘being’ is what is, phenomenologically and/or conceptually, what is 
currently unfolding in the realm of time and space. Being is not a unified 
whole, but a multiplicity of possibilities, only one of which is apparent and 
possible at a time. As Jared Woodard helpfully points out,  
 
Multiplicities are organized in sets, which in turn compose 
a “situation”.  A situation can be anything from the type of 
cloud cover in Beijing last Friday to the state of affairs 
immediately preceding the French Revolution.1 
 
Bypassing Heidegger’s paradox, Being need not be thought of as having or 
expressing consciousness but rather as containing elements which may be 
conscious. Humans, for example. Within the multivarious phenomena of 
multiplicities, events occur. As Woodard succinctly explains:  
 
An event is an unexpected occurrence that exposes an 
element of a given situation that that situation had 
previously refused to consider. More specifically, by 
exposing the void on which every situation (and indeed all 
of being) is founded, the event reasserts those elements 
which being had previously consigned to the void.2  
 
That is, an event – which may happen with reference to a rational concept 
(like a moral imperative) or a non-rational occurrence (like a hurricane) – 
brings about a new reality, a new shaking-together of the elements in the sets 
(think of a kaleidoscope). The idea that the situation ‘previously refused to 
consider’ that element does not imply rationality or will on the part of the 
situation, rather that the situation was previously lacking that factor, which 
could thus not be considered. For Badiou, being is continually occurring 
against the backdrop or background of the void – the zero which forms the 
basic differentiation between what currently is and what is not.  Thus being is 
founded on the premise of not-being. (This is in fact quite Aristotelian, too, 
but I’m not going to go into that here.) 
Any element that currently exists within the multiplicity of being is 
a factor which must be considered in the cognition and appraisal of the 
situation as it is now and as it may possibly be in the future, in terms of the 
situation’s relation to truth. An event, by contrast, is something else, it is 
“supernumerary – it exceeds the count.”3 An event is a new element, a new 
creation that holds within itself new possibilities for being. (Thus one plus 
one does not equal two, it equals more than two: it equals both the process of 
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the addition of the two units and the product of the new unit of two. If you 
think this is merely a matter of semantics, think of marriage.)  
Counting-for-one, though, has an ethical dimension. While it is 
possible for non-conscious elements to evoke or give rise to an event, only 
conscious beings can participate in truth-events, events that have significance 
beyond the possibilities they imply. Counting-for-one is biased on the side of 
being, against the void. It is also biased, as it were, on the side of truth. Thus, 
as I have argued elsewhere, in Badiou’s system an action that promotes more 
potential for action is inherently more ethical than an action that forecloses or 
prevents potentiality. 4   
For Badiou, counting-for-one is essential to subjectivity. Badiou 
calls the subject the ‘locus’ of truth, a finite instantiation of truth. The 
process of truth, Badiou writes, brings about the subject (his term is 
‘induces’). As a truth that has some transcendent unique presence comes into 
being, the subject is realized, begins to count-for-one. Thus, for Badiou the 
subject is both the one who acts in an event and the one acted upon for whom 
the event has a uniquely transcendent significance – this is what separates the 
subject from the non-conscious elements of a situation. A cloud cannot 
count-for-one even if it heralds the beginning of a catastrophic hurricane that 
will have tremendous significance in the lives of thousands of subjects, for 
the cloud itself cannot participate in the awareness of that significance (it is 
thus removed from truth, though not from reality). Counting-for-one is the 
prerogative of the subject, in the original Latin meaning of that term, that 
which makes a request of the subject and thus distinguishes it from the rest of 
what is, by virtue of the subject’s response to that request, its proclamation to 
being; as Levinas put it, ‘me voici,’ here I am.  
The process of the subject takes place, like everything else, in 
relation to the void. Since  
 
every event happens only as the exposure of the void of a 
situation, or what that situation refuses to count, the event 
is inherently polemical. Besides the inherent resistance of 
the situation itself, Badiou speaks of subjects who are not 
faithful, who therefore fall away from subjectivity.  There 
are three possible modes of de-subjectivation, which 
Badiou names as the three sources of Evil: simulacrum, 
betrayal, and disaster.5 
 
To Badiou’s way of thinking, the subject is always at risk of being erased as 
it struggles its way into being. The forces of resistance (both internal and 
external) may overwhelm and annihilate it at any moment. It may even erase 
itself, through what Nietzsche might have called falling in with the herd, 
what Sartre might have called inauthenticity, what Badiou terms infidelity. 
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Faithfulness to a situation requires an openness, a willingness to be 
vulnerable to the possibilities inherent in the situation, and to its risks. 
 I said at the outset that faith was one of the three non-rational modes 
of being that, in my opinion, serve to distinguish humanity from other forms 
of being. Leaving aside the question of love (which will have to wait for 
another occasion), I would like to conclude by looking at the interplay 
between faith and hope. And by faith I also want to leave out any question of 
deism or theism, focusing instead, as Badiou does, on the question of ethical 
agency. 
What, then, of hope? What place does hope have in building an 
understanding of being, truth, and the subject? And what do these questions 
have to do with my initial quarrel with Kant? Badiou maintains that “hope is 
the name of a subject which remains,” that which perdures beyond 
desubjectification, betrayal, and falsehood, in the “event” of a unique 
ongoing presence. The first-century writer of the Letter to the Hebrews tells 
us that “faith is the reality of things which are hoped for, the evidence of 
things not being seen."6 The Greek term υποστασισ (hypostasis) literally 
means “what lies beneath;” it is the term Aristotle uses to denote the reality 
beneath the appearance of things.  The term, therefore, means the 
fundamental substance of the subject which exists in potentia beneath the 
appearance of the present situation. 
Bear in mind that Badiou sees "faith, hope, and love" (especially 
with reference to Saint Paul) as a direct parallel to Lacan's formulation of 
psychic truth, the scheme of the real, the imaginary, and the symbolic. For 
Badiou, the real is that which threatens to break in on us from without, into 
our carefully constructed conceptual framework – often a disaster. The real is 
that which we cannot control, and which submerges us in the grip of need.  
The real is the present, and is all about the individual. The symbolic is the 
province of the past, of history, of narrative, of language and community. 
The symbolic is about desire, love, and ultimately, about society. The 
imaginary belongs to the present, and as such is the most complex of the 
three (none of which, of course, exist independently of one another; it is their 
interaction that Lacan  - and, ultimately, Badiou - sees as producing the self). 
The imaginary is about the acknowledgment of a fundamental lack or 
absence, rooted in the primal narcissistic wound of recognition that one is 
separate from the mother. Hence, for Badiou, it is easy to see how the 
imaginary is the understanding of the void; that separation or lack which 
brings the subject into being.  There is no true ‘thou’ in the imaginary; there 
is no conception of ‘we,’ only a conviction of the fantasy that I am defined 
overagainst the other who is not-me, and with whom I endlessly strive to 
reunite myself, even as I understand that fulfilment of this impossible fantasy 
would mean the death of my individual subjectivity.  
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Badiou draws a direct parallel between Paul, Lacan, and his own 
philosophy: 
 
PAUL  BADIOU LACAN 
Faith  Event  Real 
Love   Truth  Symbolic 
Hope  Fidelity  Imaginary  
 
Much more needs to be said to explain the significance of this parallel, but 
time is running short. Let me sum up by saying that for Badiou, hope does 
not have to do with looking to the future. Rather, it is that activity of the 
present by which the subject responds to the demand of the situation. It is, he 
says,  
 
the subjectivity of a victorious fidelity, fidelity to fidelity, 
and not the representation of its future outcome. Hope 
indicates the real of fidelity in the ordeal of its exercise, 
here and now.7 
 
Hope, then, is a substance that provides the foundation for the 
subject. It is ethical because it consists in my having to deal with the 
phenomenon of the other in my here-and-now, whether I like it or not, as the 
one who is not-me and who demands a response from me. Hope does not 
make an appeal to me on epistemological or axiological grounds; rather, it 
says “here I am, what are you going to do about it in order to prove that you 
are here too? What evidence of your unseen ‘self’ can you provide?” 
 Badiou’s hope is not that different from Nietzsche’s revaluation of 
value. Badiou too wants to move beyond good and evil, beyond the 
constricting duality of alterity towards a new form of subjectivity altogether. 
Hope, Badiou maintains, is an activity of transcendence, specifically the 
transcendence of alterity (which also serves a purpose in the Lacanian 
economy). This is the only understanding of ethical agency which Badiou 
feels makes sense in the post-modern era. We can neither maintain nor 
jettison the subject. Instead, we must see it for what it is: a unique fragment 
of the ever-changing flow of being. Understanding the subject as an ethical 
agent in this way allows what was lacking in Kant: a way to bridge the gap 
between the rational and non-rational questions of philosophy, and a 
compelling reason why - phenomenologically and psychoanalytically – I can 
know that what I should do is hope.  
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2 Ibid. 
3 Loc. Cit. 
4 See my article “Terrorism Within and Without,” in Territories of Evil, 
forthcoming from Rodopi Press. 
5 Woodard, op. cit., 5. 
6 Literal translation of the Greek. 
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Hope and Reason:  
The Desire of Immortality in Spanish Philosophy 
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Abstract: In this article I compare the idea of hope in the philosophy of 
Immanuel Kant and in the Spanish philosopher Miguel de Unamuno. First I 
defend the idea that hope performs one important role in the Kantian moral 
philosophy. Although pure reason is unable to demonstrate the existence of 
God and the soul’s immortality, the practical use of reason postulates the 
existence of both. This is because humans are also concerned about the 
consequences of their actions and hope to achieve the highest good.  
 Miguel de Unamuno is one of the most important Spanish 
philosophers about hope. In the second part of my paper I explain his 
conception of hope. Front the Kantian approach, Unamuno says that reason is 
opposed to hope. Humans have one essential desire of immortality, which 
arises from instinct, while reason is sceptical about the immortality and the 
existence of God. This antagonism between reason and hope is what 
Unamuno calls the “tragic sense of the life”. 
 
Key words: Hope, Reason, Highest Good, Immortality, God, Desire, Tragic 
Sense of the Life.  
 
1.  Hope and Reason 
 Hope has been a main subject of reflection throughout the history of 
the Philosophy of Religion. In this paper I want to deepen the relation 
between two approaches on hope: the Kantian one, and hope in the theory of 
the Spanish philosopher Miguel de Unamuno. 
 To understand the role of Kantian hope, first we should clarify the 
Kantian concept of morality. Kant defends a deontological morality as 
opposed to theological ones. So, Kant stresses that the moral rightness of our 
actions doesn’t depend on the obedience to external orders, but on the 
obedience to the categorical imperative, which is within our reason.1 This 
imperative doesn’t say to us what to do, but whether the things we want to do 
are moral or not. On the one hand, the categorical imperative orders us to 
consider others as moral beings, not only as means for us. On the other hand, 
this imperative shows us how to maintain our moral autonomy. If we obey 
external rules, such as clerical orders, we aren’t autonomous. We only 
maintain our autonomy, our liberty, following the categorical imperative, the 
moral rule inside us. For instance, one churchman can say to us: “you should 
help your friends if you want to go to Heaven”. This is a hypothetical 
imperative, because the source of the action is external:2 we obey the norm to 
obtain something, here Heaven. However, Kant maintains that, and it’s the 
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important subject here, humans must obey the norm by itself and not seek to 
obtain external aims to maintain autonomy. If we obey something to obtain 
another thing we are heteronymous, not autonomous, because we then place 
our will in the natural order. We have to remember that Kant separates 
drastically the moral and natural. The natural order is subject to the 
Newtonian system of laws. So, the natural order is subject to necessity. All 
the events are the consequence of others. Here liberty doesn’t exist. However, 
the moral order is different. This is the order of liberty. But this order is 
subject to the categorical imperative, which orders us to act out of respect to 
the law, not according to external cause.3 If one person helps his friend 
because of the promise to achieve Heaven, the source of the action is external 
from him. He doesn’t actuate by himself. Thus, his will is subject to the 
natural law not to the moral rule, and he looses his autonomy.  
 As it follows from the Kantian approach, we shouldn’t pay attention 
to the consequences of our acts. To attend to the consequences is to submit 
our will to the natural law. We must follow the categorical imperative 
always, without considering its consequences to our happiness. So, we should 
help people always because this is our duty, not to go to Heaven or to achieve 
the other’s friendship.   
 But the Kantian moral deliberation has one problem. It’s difficult to 
be indifferent to our behaviour’s consequences. It’s difficult for one person to 
behave morally, to be a virtuous, when he or she is unhappy doing it.4 In 
Modernity to be virtuous and to be happy are different things. In Ancient 
Greece, the virtuous or the wise (sophos) is the happy one because he or she 
is the person who knows what to do.5 However, in Modernity usually the 
virtuous are not happy. This problem is present among, for instance, Jewish 
scripture and in the Enlightenment. For instance, it appears in the Bible, in 
the book of Job. In Modernity it is developed by philosophers such as 
Leibniz. Kant also treats this question in his works about morals and 
philosophy of religion, such as the Critique of Practical Reason or Religion 
within the Bounds of Mere Reason.   
 So the question is: why be virtuous if I would be happier if I were 
bad? The concept of hope appears here to answer this question. Hope links 
the moral with happiness and religion. Although Kant excludes happiness 
from the categorical imperative, he isn’t indifferent to it. He understands that 
the virtuous has a desire for happiness. The virtuous doesn’t behave to be 
happy, but according to the categorical imperative itself. However, the 
virtuous also wants to be happy. So, Kant speaks about “the highest good”, 
that is, the proper proportioning of happiness, to accord with the measure of 
the virtue each person acquires in willing right moral actions.6 The realization 
of the highest good consists in the connection between virtue and happiness 
and it is one requirement of the practical reason. But this connection has two 
main problems. The first problem is that the virtuous can’t achieve happiness 
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alone. As I said above, the perspective on our actions in terms of their causal 
efficacy within a space-temporal framework is the propoer domain of the 
theoretical use of reason. If one action implies happiness it is one part of the 
causal process of the natural world, but the rightness of the action doesn’t 
seem to have a role to play in such causal process. We thus seem unable to 
meet in full the demand of practical reason, that we make the highest good 
(which necessarily includes happiness) the object of our willing. The second 
problem is that even the sustained moral effort of a lifetime doesn’t seem 
sufficient  for us to form the good will operative in our moral efforts into a 
“holly will”, the term Kant uses to designate the attainment of complete 
human moral perfection.7 We thus seem unable to meet in full the demand 
that practical reason, in the categorical imperative, makes upon us to be 
moral. 
 With respect to the requirement that we attain the moral perfection 
of a holly will, Kant holds that we are justified in affirming that we will have 
an unending and enduring existence after death, outside the framework of 
spacio-temporal causality in which to continue the task of seeking moral 
perfection. He holds a similar view with respect to the requirement that the 
highest good be the object of our willing. Even though our moral actions 
don’t seem to have the efficacy required in a spacio-temporal framework to 
produce the happiness that is necessary of the highest good, we are justified 
in affirming that there is a supreme cause of nature (i.e., God) that will bring 
this about, not merely for ourselves, but for all moral agents. So, the soul’s 
immortality and the existence of God are the two postulates of practical 
reason.8 
 Two other issues appear here. First, we should distinguish the 
Kantian approach about God within the Critique of Pure Reason to his 
approach in the Critique of Practical Reason. In the former, Kant denies the 
possibility of demonstrating the existence of God by the arguments of 
Ontotheology, such as in the ontological argument of Saint Anselm of 
Canterbury.9 Kant acknowledges that our reason has the tendency to expand 
beyond its bounds, but it’s impossible to know anything beyond the spatio-
temporal dimensions. So, we are unable to affirm the material existence of 
God. 10 However, the practical postulation of the existence of God doesn’t 
imply the possibility to make it an object for theoretical knowledge.  
 Secondly, the two postulates don’t pretend to be a reason to follow 
the moral rule. The human must obey the categorical imperative by itself, not 
by its consequences. If we follow the categorical imperative because we 
believe that God will assure our immortality, then we are heteronymous 
because the source of the action is our desire of immortality and not the 
moral rule alone. The Kantian approach is otherwise. We must follow the 
categorical imperative by itself even if we think that it’s impossible to prove 
the existence of God and the highest good. The idea is that if we follow the 
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imperative by itself we are legitimated to believe in the achievement of the 
highest good in other life. This is clear in the beginning of the first Preface of 
Religion within the Bounds of Mere Reason. He says that morality doesn’t 
need an external aim to guide the will. However, morality can have a relation 
with that external aim, not as the foundation of the will but as the 
consequence of the will. The representation of the external aim shows the 
happiness that we can achieve if we obey the categorical imperative.11 But, I 
repeat, this representation doesn’t work as the source of our behaviour, rather  
as the consequence that we can hope if we follow the moral rule by itself. 
 So, we can see the role of hope in Kant: hope links the moral with 
the desire for happiness. The virtuous can’t be happy by alone, so he or she 
hopes to have an immortal soul to achieve full happiness and virtuosity. And 
the being that can realize this is God. Thus the virtuous person postulates also 
the existence of God as the being that can assure the link between virtue and 
happiness, the highest good. Hope is not only compatible with the reason, but 
even a necessary component of practical reason. The postulates of practical 
reason are one proof of hope. Maybe the virtuous person is unhappy now but 
obeys the moral rule and hopes to achieve the highest good. For that reason, 
he or she postulates the existence of God and the immortality of the soul.  
 Also, religion is not the basis of the moral, but one representation 
linked to it. The representation of religion is one consequence of human hope 
to be fully happy and virtuous. One is not indifferent to the consequences of 
moral behaviour. One is virtuous and wants to be happy. So, as a virtuous 
person, he or she can hope to achieve deserved happiness through his or her 
behaviour. However, the Kantian idea of religion differs from the historical 
religions. Kant sees a significant negative feature in the concrete, historical 
character of the human reception of religion through revelation. It is subject 
to one dynamic of corruption. Kant articulates in Book Four of Religion 
within the Bounds of Mere Reason his strongest criticism of the organizations 
and practices of Christianity that encourage what he sees as a “religion of 
counterfeit service to God”. Among the major targets of his criticism are 
external ritual, superstition and a hierarchical church order. In distinction 
from this conception, the Kantian idea of religion consists in the 
representation of one ideal of virtue: to follow Jesus Christ. This ideal can be 
realized in the moral content of the Bible.  All the virtuous persons form the 
“moral commonwealth”, not a historical and hierarchical one. He rejects any 
form of historical church, such as the Catholic or Lutheran Church. This is 
also the only way we can find one form of religion “within the bounds of 
mere reason.” The historical religions are irrational because they don’t 
defend the moral message of the Bible but rather the material power of their 
leaders. Hope consists here in the desire of the virtuous commonwealth to 
achieve moral perfection, the highest good, while obeying the categorical 
imperative.   
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 So, we can find one answer to the third question that Kant makes in 
his Critique of Pure Reason: “what may we hope for?” Hope consists in the 
desire to achieve the highest good. One has the expectation to achieve it 
because he or she obeys the moral rule. For this reason, one postulates the 
existence of God and the immortality of soul. Finally, hope is linked to the 
moral and to reason. 
  
2.  Hope against Reason 
 However, this is not the only approach to the relation between hope 
and reason. We can find a different approach to this one. Other philosophers 
understand that this relation between hope and reason is one of confrontation, 
rather than conjunction. Here the most representative thinker is the Spanish 
philosopher Miguel de Unamuno.  
 Miguel de Unamuno (1864-1936) is one of the most important 
philosophers of the last century in Spain. He was the main member of the 
“Generation of 98”. This was a group of Spanish writers and philosophers 
concerned about the agonic situation of Spain after the loss of the colonies of 
Cuba and The Philippines in 1898. Unamuno was influenced by Kierkegaard 
and is considered one of the founders of the existentialism. Like Kant, 
Unamuno was a religious person. Although he was Catholic, he maintained a 
peculiar faith far from orthodoxy. His main subjects of thought were religion 
and philosophy. He also wrote a lot of novels, such as Peace in War (1879), 
Abel Sanchez (1931), and poetry such as, The Christ of Velazquez (1928). 
Hew as also very political. 
 The chief characteristic of his life was contradiction. He supported 
different opinions about some subjects, such as religion or politics. For 
instance, he supported the right and the left in politics, and he maintained 
faith and doubt in religion. This element of contradiction of his life is 
essential to understanding his work. His novel Saint Manuel Good, Martyr is 
about one priest that maintained the faith of his parishioners while he didn’t 
believe in God. Also, in Aunt Tula he describes a woman that brought up the 
children of her dead sister, but she was a virgin; that is, Tula is mother and 
virgin like the Lady Mary.   
 The philosophy of Miguel de Unamuno is characterized by 
contradiction too. Here the main contradiction remains in the antagonism 
between reason and life. Unamuno argues that what characterizes the human 
being is not language or thought, but sense. The human being has two main 
instincts too. The first is one of preservation. This is the instinct that manages 
knowledge. Unamuno defends the idea that we don’t know the world as it is, 
but we only know what we need to live. So, language and reason are only 
products of the society used to solve its problems. The second instinct is one 
to continue existing. This second instinct is more important than the former 
because it contains the chief human concern, the desire of maintaining being 
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forever. His main influence here is Spinoza and the conatus. The human 
being not only wants to preserve his or her life in each moment, as other 
animals can do, but her or she wants to persist in being forever. The human 
being doesn’t want to end his or her own existence.12 
 This second instinct has to face up to one fact: death. As Heidegger 
said, “the man is the being that lives for the death”. Against the position of 
Heidegger we find to Unamuno. He says that the fact of death doesn’t annul 
the instinct of immortality. Rather, this phenomenon opens the door to hope. 
Although humans are aware of death, they hope to still exist after that 
moment. And it’s the instinct, the sense, that leads one to believe in personal 
immortality. Thus Unamuno speaks about the “hungry of immortality”,13 
because the source of this belief is sense, not reason. A person wants wants to 
be convinced of his or her own immortality, because he or she needs it to 
live. 
 According to Unamuno this instinct of immortality was expressed in 
several forms throughout history. Against the common opinion, the former 
expression of this instinct wasn’t to believe in a future life after the death. 
This is so because the belief in a future life appeared, at least in the West, no 
more than four centuries before Christ. For instance, people from the Middle 
East around five centuries before Christ didn’t believe in the other life. This 
can be supported if we look at the Bible. In the Book of Genesis God says to 
Adam: “You are powder and you will be powder.”14 That is to say: you come 
from the earth and you will return to the earth; there is not another life. Also, 
when one Biblical celebrity dies, the Bible doesn’t say that he resuscitates 
and he goes to Heaven with God. Really, he is buried and no more because 
there is neither Heaven nor other life. The Legend of Gilgamesh, circa the 
second millennium before Christ, is one Babylonian text that neglects the 
existence of other life after death too. Then, in the culture of Middle East the 
only forms of immortality, that is of hope, present were to live a lot of years, 
and then live on in the memory that other persons have of us after our death. 
For this reason the most important celebrities of the Bible, like Adam or 
Abraham, lived several centuries and had many children. 
  The idea of immortality arrived to the West from Asia around the 
fourth century before Christ. Since this belief was expanded, the concept of 
hope had a different meaning within religion. Now it incorporated the idea of 
a new and a better life after the current one. From this moment hope was 
understood as the desire to live that new life. And for this reason appeared 
the belief in the soul’s immortality. It is on this belief that Unamuno focuses 
his theory, and also on the belief in God as the guarantor of our personal 
immortality in another life. Immortality is the main subject of his book 
Tragic Sense Of The Life In Man And In Peoples (1912). An important 
subject within this work then is the existence of God. This is his most 
important philosophical work. 
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 Unamuno maintains that immortality is the main problem that 
philosophical reflection is concerned about. As a consequence, one of the 
philosophical questions for Kant, “what may we hope for?” becomes the 
main subject of philosophy. Philosophy is after all one means to solve our 
chief concern, our desire for immortality.15 So, the relation between 
philosophy and hope is essential. Philosophy has the function of justifying 
our desire for immortality. 
 The chief point here is that the philosophical reflection about hope 
arises not from reason, but from feeling. But if philosophy arises from sense, 
where is reason in Unamuno’s philosophy? I said before that reason isn’t 
essential to the human, and that it carries out one function, to solve problems. 
So, reason arises from sense, but more precisely from the imagination. And 
the source of the imagination is our desire to still exist. Reason has the 
function of rationalizing this desire. The problem is that reason is skeptical of 
our desire for immortality.  
 Reason’s skepticism is shown by Unamuno through a relationship of 
antagonism: the antagonism between reason and life. He says, “The life is 
irrational and the reason is counter-vital”.16 This is one chief point that 
underscores the confrontation between Kant and Unamuno. First, we have to 
say that when Unamuno says that reason is counter-vital this doesn’t mean 
that reason is a suicidal faculty. The chief point here is that when Unamuno 
speaks about life, he referees not to the current one, but to the eternal life 
after death. This “life” is what our instinct desires, immortality. However, 
reason is skeptical about immortality, and thus it is skeptical about hope. But 
reason’s skepticism is vital, not epistemological. Reason is monist, that is to 
say, materialist: there is only the body. The idea of dualism, the conjunction 
of body and soul, the immortal soul, is one consequence of the belief in 
immortality. From a monist perspective, our consciousness dies with the 
body, so, we shouldn’t hope any form of life or happiness after death.17  
 According to Unamuno, there have been intentions to rationalize 
faith, for instance in Theology through the distinction between the irrational 
and the counter-rational. The former is the absurd and the latter is what can 
be reasoned. But this had two consequences: first, the people that don’t 
rationalize their faith believe all without thinking about it. In theology and 
philosophy this phenomenon is named “the coal merchant’s faith”. But the 
people that pretend to rationalize their faith lost it. As Martin Luther said, the 
intention to rationalize faith leads to atheism. It’s impossible to find reasons 
for belief in immortality. All the rational intentions fail to demonstrate the 
soul’s immortality.  
 So, reason and life maintain one antagonism. Our sense leads us to 
believe in immortality and in God, while reason gives us arguments about the 
irrationality of this belief. And this antagonism between life and reason is the 
“tragic sense of the life”.18 It’s a sense, because belief in immortality is a 
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sense and not a reason, and it’s tragic because posits an experience of 
contradiction inside us: we want immortality, but reason says that this is 
impossible. 
 Therefore, in spite of the skeptical arguments of reason, desire is 
stronger than reason because people want to believe in order to satisfy their 
desire for immortality. This is the strength of hope. For this reason Unamuno 
rejects reason as the essential faculty in human beings. Sense is stronger and 
if reason were prior to sense it would imply destroying the most important 
human instinct. This priority of sense over reason is shown by Unamuno in 
one clear sentence: “We don’t hope because we believe, but we believe 
because we hope”.19 That is to say, we don’t hope for immortality because we 
have one coherent set of rational beliefs; rather, we articulate our beliefs to 
satisfy our hope for immortality. The prior is the sense, the hope, and this 
leads us to believe. It’s our “hunger for immortality” that leads us to believe 
in God, not our reason. To understand this we have to quote one play of 
words in Spanish. Unamuno says that “creer es crear”, in English, “to 
believe is to create”.20 Our hope, our desire for immortality leads us to create 
our beliefs and our knowledge, as we said above. This hope leads us to create 
what we need to believe. But if it is so, to believe in God means to create 
God. Our beliefs are our creations. They have reality for us, but they aren’t 
real by themselves.  
 Finally, we can find some connections between Kant and Unamuno. 
First, both think that religion is one individual representation and that 
representation arises from our hope – this is the question about the 
consequences of our actions. The human desires immortality because this is 
the only way to achieve perfection. Kant thinks that immortality gives us our 
complete virtue and happiness; Unamuno maintains that immortality carries 
out our essence, the desire to exist forever. So, hope performs a chief role for 
both philosophers. Second, both conceive God as the guarantor of hope. 
According to Kant, God is the guarantor of the achievement of the highest 
good, the linking between virtue and happiness. Thus, we need to postulate 
its existence. According to Unamuno, God is the guarantor of human 
immortality. One hopes for immortality, and for this one believes in God. 
One needs God to assure it.  
 But the difference between Kant and Unamuno remains in the 
relation between the belief in immortality and reason. Although the former 
rejected the arguments for the existence of God in his Critique of Pure 
Reason, he defends the postulations of God and the soul’s immortality in his 
Critique of Practical Reason as one part of practical reason. In its practical 
use, reason is not skeptical about the existence of God; rather, it postulates 
God’s existence.  However, Unamuno has a different approach. He starts 
from the antagonism between reason and immortality. Far from postulating 
immortality, reason neglects it because reason is monist. With regard to God, 
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it is our desire for immortality that leads us to believe (to create) in God. The 
human believes in God because he or she needs God. To believe in God is to 
want its existence. Also, to postulate the existence of God is against reason 
because, as Kant demonstrates, reason can’t find arguments to demonstrate 
its existence. 
 If the theory of Miguel de Unamuno is correct, we could explain the 
failure of secularization in the West. In spite of the advancements of the 
sciences and atheist theories in Philosophy, Sociology or Psychology, the 
religions still continue within our societies. Perhaps it is because of the 
human desire for immortality expressed by hope. 
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In Between Hope and Despair:  
Notes on the Dialectic Hermeneutics of ‘Being’ 
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Abstract: If ever the dialectical relation in-between hope and despair has 
been one of the most designative questions within critical continental 
philosophy, existentialist and hermeneutical readings of ‘being’ should be 
mentioned as the complementary point of interests on the very perception of 
‘thinkability’ and ‘Reality’ within this query. Dialectical interpretation of 
hope and despair, accordingly, can not be separated from its reflexive 
dynamics on the understanding of ‘the political’ today. This paper posits its 
major emphasis on three critical questions: (i) The question of the 
thinkability and Hegelian ‘necessity’ of hope and despair within the 
dialectical identification and alienation of ‘selfness’ and ‘otherness’, (ii) 
Critical ‘perception’ of subjective-objective Reality in the course of modern 
‘human condition’, (iii) Possible contributions of the ‘thinkability of despair 
and hope’ on the agonistic and hermeneutical reinterpretation of today’s 
politics. Via the critical reading of Kant, Hegel, and Bloch’s perspectives on 
the ‘thinkability’ and ‘reality’ of hope and despair, this paper intends to 
interpenetrate such categories within the dialectic entirety of ‘being’. 
Accordingly, this paper aims to provide a hermeneutical reinterpretation of 
hope and despair with reference to the conceptions of ‘weak thought’, ‘weak 
identity’ and ‘hermeneutic politics’. 
 
Key words: Dialectics, Hermeneutics, Transcendence, Alterity, “Weak 
Thought”, Weak Identity, Hermeneutic Politics, Hegel. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Hope and despair have provided a critical realm for questioning 
human existence since the very emergence of philosophical questions on 
various aspects of ‘being’. From Plato and Aristotle to contemporary political 
philosophy, questioning hope and despair has been associated with a wider 
assessment of understanding the nature of the human condition or mostly a 
critical interpretation of being and consciousness in the “world-process”. 
Thinkability of both hope and despair, in this regard, can be seen as a 
fundamental point of departure in enhancing not only the existential reality 
but the daily ontology of human experience.   
 With regard to individual, social or political praxis of the Self in 
modernity, hope and despair can be seen as interpenetrative categories of a 
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dialectical tandem. Being associated with the perpetual questions of 
transcendence, immanence and alterity, the thinkability and reality of hope 
and despair has been closely related to an interdisciplinary framework. Yet, 
from the perspectives of philosophical anthropology to critical 
psychoanalysis and from continental analytical philosophy to contemporary 
political theory, hope and despair have been mostly conceptualized under the 
dichotomies of object vs. subject and theory vs. praxis.  
Through a critical emphasis on these Janus-faced dichotomizations 
and dealing with the meaning of being in the modern human condition, this 
paper intends to reinterpret the negativity of the hope-despair relation by 
going through a quasi-dialectical hermeneutic understanding of selfness, 
otherness and the world. The following sections will posit three main 
argumentations. The first section will deal with a critical interpretation of 
Kant, Hegel, and Bloch’s philosophical positions on the reality and 
thinkability of hope and despair. The second section of the paper on the other 
hand, intends to discuss quasi-dialectical hermeneutics of hope and despair 
with reference to their dialectical and interpenetrative characteristics. The 
final section of the paper, accordingly, will emphasize the possibility of 
applying dialectical and hermeneutical reinterpretation of hope and despair to 
the praxis of today’s politics. 
 
1. Three Systemic Questions of Hope and Despair: Thinkability, 
Reality and Negativity  
Within the major manifestations of continental  and analytical 
philosophy, the foundation of hope and despair has been correlated to not 
only physiological or emotional grounds but also psychological or rational 
postulates. As both a particular and universal apparatus of becoming, hope 
and despair can be seen as crucial categories of enhancing subjective or 
objective reality through the dialectical syntax of the self, other and the 
world. Because the self-referentiality of being can be mediated through hope 
and despair, the thinkability of such contradictory processes has been 
immanently relative and particular. Parallel with the questions of reality and 
thinkability, determining the human condition or enhancing the question of 
ought have also been critical while treating hope and despair. 
Within continental and analytical philosophy, the claim of negativity 
depends on a grand system. According to the dialectical tandem of such a 
grand system, although hope and despair constitute the confronting sides of 
the negativity, the necessity argument for reflection inevitably provides an 
interpenetrative basis. Should we posit negativity and interpenetrative 
necessity as the fundamental postulates of identification or alienation in 
enhancing selfness and otherness? Then, the differentiation of Dionysian and 
Appolonean auras has become a critical motive of the thinkability and reality 
of hope and despair. Accordingly, a study of hope and despair can be best 
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characterized vis-à-vis the “Is-ought problem”. Below, the positions and 
arguments of three leading figures - Kant, Hegel, Bloch - on the systemic 
theorization of human intentionality will be discussed.     
Kant’s emphasis on hope is strongly interconnected with his 
argumentations on reality, morality, virtue, happiness and absolute autonomy 
of the “self-being” (das Selbstsein). Considering the “ought-problem” of 
human-hope, the impartiality of the Kantian categorical “transcendent 
abstraction” is overturned by the employment of the morality claim. Yet, on 
the other hand, Kant’s transcendence argument as “the presentation of the 
possibility of an a priori understanding of being from the unified ground of 
the self”1 inaugurates a main feature for his categorical understanding of 
becoming through the process of absolute reason and certainty. Accordingly, 
Kant’s theory of hope includes both speculative and practical forms of 
reasoning. In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant combines such speculative 
but practical bases with three major questions: “What can I know? What 
ought I do? What may I hope?”2 All of these questions are intimately related 
to a broader area of interest in Kant’s theory of hope: “What is man?” 
Besides his interest in the relation of hope to the universal idea of 
human nature, Kant posits morality as the constructive basis for not only 
hope but happiness. Through the category of virtue, as a constitutive 
condition for the “hope for happiness”, Kant provides an ethos of absolute 
human satisfaction: the summum bonum of humanity. In the Kantian 
perspective, therefore, while happiness constitutes the object of human-hope, 
virtue symbolizes the ethical ground for its justification.  
 
Inasmuch as virtue and happiness together constitute the 
possession of the highest good for one person, and 
happiness in exact proportion to morality (as the worth of a 
person and his worthiness to be happy) constitutes that of a 
possible world, the highest good means the whole, the 
perfect good wherein virtue is always the supreme good.3 
 
“The realm of ends” underlines the Kantian ideal world.4 Human 
hope as the moral basis for happiness and virtue as its justification corpus are 
both indications and postulates of a “universal realm of ends”. In this 
universality claim, there lies Kant’s argumentation of “autonomous being” as 
an ideal theoretical and practical postulation of the maxims of life. 
Because the reason provides “the world of experience” and virtue 
justifies the “hope for happiness”, in a Kantian understanding, thinkability 
and reality of hope and despair necessitates simultaneously mentioning but 
separating two sides of the individual-being: “‘natura archetypa’ as an 
intelligible realm of purely rational beings alone and a ‘natura ectypa’ as a 
realm of rational beings existing in the sensible world.5 The differentiation of 
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individual being in Kant’s perspective reminds one of Hegel’s critique of 
“unhappy consciousness” which implies the doubled and contradictory being. 
Hegel’s Phenomenology of Mind, depends on the mutual and 
interpenetrative determination of the subject and the object. At the very idea 
of such determination, there lies Hegel’s systemic approach on both 
knowledge and recognition.6 Contrasting to Faust’s dialectical correctional 
motion, Hegel’s sphere of “systemic knowledge” underlines the dialectical 
perception of the thing and being with regards to the realm of systemic 
certainty. Unlike the “unhappy consciousness” which implies the 
“consciousness of self as a divided nature, a doubled and merely 
contradictory being,”7 Hegel’s “superior knowledge of Being-For-Itself”8 
necessitates an open and ongoing process of realization and becoming 
without satisfaction or without the fulfilment of the meaning.   
 
The hope of becoming one therewith must remain a hope, 
i.e. without fulfilment, without present fruition; for 
between the hope and fulfilment there stands precisely the 
absolute contingency, or immovable indifference, which is 
involved in the very assumption of determinate shape and 
form, the basis and foundation of the hope. By the nature of 
this existent unit, through the particular reality it has 
assumed and adopted, it comes about of necessity that it 
becomes a thing of the past, something that has been 
somewhere far away, and absolutely remote it remains.9 
 
Hegelian dialectics can be seen as a system of synthesizing universal 
and particular permutations or “moments” in the development of the 
consciousness. The Hegelian system approach constitutively depends on the 
process of “negation” within the contingency of the “world-process” of 
being. Neither the categories of hope nor despair or fear in Hegelian 
dialectics, therefore, can be separated from the course of the realization or 
recognition of consciousness through negation. Though the process of 
negation is abstract and universal, the moments of development and 
articulation are essential, particular, and immanent in Hegelian dialectic of 
being. Underlining “formative activity” and “negativity”,10 and similar to his 
“systemic knowledge” argument, Hegel’s consideration of hope and despair 
or fear inaugurates the dialectical interpretation of being through not only 
“self-certainty” but “essential reality”. Though the cyclic tandem of the 
subject and object in Hegel’s “sense-certainty” constitutes the dialectical 
postulate of “meaning”, Hegelian considerations of hope comprise a 
historical assumption while fear or despair implies the interpenetrative 
permutation of necessary formative activity in dialectical negation.  
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The last figure to be mentioned here is Ernst Bloch. In The Principle 
of Hope, unlike Kant’s and Hegel’s argumentations, Bloch argues for an “all-
embracing conception of reality putatively determined by the future rather 
than by the past” and insists on the “Front” or “Nova” of the future which 
implies the “categorical imperative of change” within the utopian tradition.11 
For Bloch, therefore, transcendent categories of Front, Novum, Ultimum and 
Horizon determine the designative postulates of not only the human 
experience but the “real possibility” of change. Thus, in Bloch’s perspective, 
while the real underlines the “process” or the corpus of dynamic 
relationships, being posits the dialectical and moving locus of becoming.12 
For Bloch, thinking inaugurates an interpretation of “venturing 
beyond” which “activates the tendency which is inherent in history and 
which proceeds dialectically”.13 Unlike the zone of nothingness which is 
characterized through passivity, Bloch’s “real venturing” indicates a “new 
relationship between the ego and the world…through the notion of a ‘natural 
subject’”.14 Accordingly, in Bloch’s argumentation of “Not-Yet-Being” 
(Noch-Nicht-Sein), “anticipatory consciousness”, underlines the not-yet 
conscious interpretation of the future postulates of being. Criticizing Hegel’s 
position, he argues that the Front of the historical articulation of the human 
condition is pertained to the postulate of “anticipatory consciousness”. The 
Front of the human condition for Bloch, accordingly, is not only related with 
“self-apprehension” but “corresponds to exact anticipation; concrete utopia as 
objective-real correlate”.15  
Therefore, the reality of hope according to Bloch reveals the 
ongoing existence in motion under the framework of the New. Thinkability of 
hope as an active process of being underlines the converse side of the fear 
and despair which are equalized to the passivity of nothingness in Bloch’s 
perspective. For Bloch; “‘emotion of hope’ (Affect des Hoffens) precipitates 
activity that opens, broadens and frees; we are to throw ourselves into what is 
becoming (ins Werdende) and not merely be passively thrown in ‘What Is’ 
(ins Seiende)”.16 
  
2. On the Quasi-Dialectical Hermeneutics of Hope and Despair: A 
 Critical Perspective on Self, Other and the World 
The question of the consciousness of being has been associated with 
not only the ideality or thinkability but the reality of hope and despair. 
Differentiating from the Cartesian paradigmatic declaration of consciousness 
and Nietzsche’s “Dionysian vision of the will to power and the eternal return 
of the same”,17 this section will discuss a critical synthetic understanding of 
hope and despair by designating those not only as main points of interest in 
tracing hermeneutic consciousness within the dialectic syntax of the Self, 
Other and the World, but also for the Lacanian symbolic reflection on the 
human condition in modernity.  
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Quasi-dialectical hermeneutics of hope and despair can be expressed 
as an attempt for synthesizing theoretical and practical positions and a 
potentia for the dialectical interpretation of res extensa and res cogitans. 
Therefore, both reductions through immanent substantiality or transcendent 
objectivity are rejected vis-à-vis the irreducibility-of-being. In this view, the 
perception of thing and being does not solely depend on the context of 
objectivity or conversely on substantive-subjectivity. 
Hope and despair, as “expectant emotions”18 in Bloch’s words, 
symbolize an interpenetrative and dialectical Gestalt, a dialectical syntax of 
realization and thinkability of identification and differentiation through 
consciousness. The dialectic of hope and despair/fear, hence can be 
characterized as an active process of subjectification, an ongoing agency of 
being ‘I’ and being ‘we’ and an interpenetrative-hermeneutic explanation of 
consciousness as ‘I am’ and ‘we are’. Hope and despair can be understood as 
not only the Front of the knowledge of the Not-yet-being, but as the Horizon 
of hermeneutic understanding of particulars and universals within the 
Heideggerian how-question of “being-in-the-world”.    
Quasi-dialectical hermeneutic readings of hope and despair posit an 
emphasis on two interrelated questions: the is-ought problem and the ideal-
real cleavage. From this view, the understanding of “What is” is correlated 
with the subjective and immanent reality of not only the temporal-being but 
the not-yet-being. The consideration of “ought-to”, on the other hand, 
necessitates a form of abstraction and transcendence through thought and 
ideality. Because both the subjective-objective perception of reality and the 
ideality or thinkability of hoping-in-the-world is effectuated within a 
hermeneutic circle, ideal-real duality disappears within the dialectic context 
of hermeneutic dependability.  
Unlike Kantian dualization of human nature vis-à-vis “natura 
archetypa” vs. “natura ectypa”, or Hegel’s determination of reality through 
history, or Bloch’s utopian conceptualization of reality in the future, here 
systemic reinterpretation of reality symbolizes the critical locus of dialectic-
contingency for overturning the subject-object dichotomy through 
hermeneutic consciousness. In this view, neither subjectivity nor objectivity 
of human hope and despair can be separated. For hermeneutic consciousness, 
identification and alienation can be practiced through abstract and categorical 
idea-form or through contextual and substantive determination. Neither 
categorical nor essential permutations are commensurable. Rather, the 
relation of immanent essentiality and transcendent abstraction is synthetic 
and dialectically interpenetrative. Therefore, in-between hope and despair, 
there stands the dialectic negation. With reference to the ideality-reality 
question, hope can be posited as a potential for universal ideality or 
transcendence - like beauty -, while despair implies the substantive and 
particular category of immanence. In this view, hope can be seen as a 
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constitutive emotional character for thought and ideality. On the other hand, 
fear or despair can be primarily considered as an identity based emotional 
postulate for both identification and alienation through the perception of the 
substantive-reality of being.19 Yet, both hope and despair/fear are effectuated 
through identification and differentiation within the construction of Selfness 
and Otherness in the Cosmos of being.  
Hope and despair are formed within the dialectical syntax of ethnos, 
demos and cosmos of the praxis of being. Ethnos implies the aesthetic nature 
or (intra-subjective) particularity and sensuous existence, or in Lacanian 
terms an initial phase of reality before reflection, alienation or alteration 
begins.20 Although identification and differentiation of the Self exist in a 
relatively heteromorphic structure, its intra-subjective nature surfaces before 
“self-alienation” through abstraction and transcendence in which the Self 
encounters the ‘Other’ (in Demos) inter-subjectively. On the other hand, 
objectifying components of subjective experience in Demos can be 
characterized as inter-subjective components of being that are fundamentally 
structuralized in disengagement, transcendence and abstraction. Finally, the 
Cosmos, in which hope and despair are effectuated interpenetratively, implies 
a trans-subjective synthesis of both particular and universal permutations 
within the existential form of ‘being-in-the-world’. This cosmological realm 
can be called as the “life-world” in Husserlian terms, and characterizes the 
dialectical synthesis or irreducible Gestalt of agency and Ego, or, in general, 
the dialectical structure of Subject’s becoming. Hereby, as the last stance of 
quasi-dialectical hermeneutic analysis, the sphere of Cosmos consummates 
not only the intra-subjective immanent essence but also the inter-subjective, 
transcendent and objectified abstraction, and inaugurates the 
incommensurability of both particulars and universals within the dialectic 
and reflexive syntax of hope, despair and being. 
 
3. Towards a Hermeneutic Politics of Being: Weakening Thought 
or Weakening Identity? 
Hermeneutic interpretation of being is a multiple process which can 
not be detached from the co-existent nature of the Political and accordingly 
necessitates “an act of interpretation that is confirmed in dialogue with other 
possible interpretations”.21 After designating hope and despair as 
interpenetrative postulates of being in the previous section, the main interest 
of this section is to deal with the differentiation of two sorts of politics -
politics of thought and identity politics- and discuss the possibility of 
weakening both thought and identity in politics by going through the 
hermeneutic consciousness of being. Such hermeneutic interpretation of 
being, on the other hand, necessitates not only a fundamental critique of 
modernity with respect to the concept of absolute-objectivity, but also its 
counter-politics demanding the total rejection of any sort of ideality, 
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abstractive-thought or universal Idea vis-à-vis the canonization of the 
particular substantiality of the Body by concrete subjectivism of the res 
extensa.      
The socio-cultural essence and abstract political analogue of 
modernity by its symbolic structure inaugurates the dualization of the praxis 
of being. As a reflection of the separation of ratio and body, politics in 
modernity reflects a dual ethos of power. On the one side of this duality, 
particular references of being are seen as essential postulates. On the other 
side, the political depends on categorical abstraction. The reflection of power 
is essentially explicit in the first postulation while it is implicitly effectuated 
in the later model.  
As a constitutive structure of identity, hope and despair/fear are 
separated in both permutations of the Political. From the perspective of a 
categorical stance, nothing but the absolutely rational and universally 
objectified consciousness of the self is (to be) in practice. Essentialist politics 
of the body, contrarily, is based on the total rejection of all sorts of 
categorical abstractions and posits its emphasis on the substantive and 
particular reality of embodied-subjectivity. Therefore, neither categorical nor 
essentialist consciousness are hermeneutic. Moreover, both particularist and 
universalist perspectives on the Political are antagonistic in their very idea 
rather than being agonistic.  
In modernity, present entities of “to-have” are constructed within the 
temporal logic of the domination of nature. Universal abstraction of the 
essence of being in this process has been associated with the objective and 
rational experience of the being within the realm of res cogitans. Therefore, 
weakening identity is one of the major postulations of modernity. For the 
sake of the categorical or the universal, modernity has excluded the res 
extensa from the Political. In other words; “the forgetting of 
Being…transforms itself into Being’s wakening/exhausting, into Being’s 
dissolutive destiny, or, into modernity equated with the ‘long good-bye’ to 
Being”.22 
In Heidegger’s terms, “hermeneutics as the self-interpretation of 
facticity” is a response to the further meaning of the “how of factical 
Dasein” in modernity and necessitates the consideration of the “self-
encountering of Dasein”.23 Hermeneutic thinking is beyond both categorical 
thinking of universalism and genealogical thinking of particularism. 
Similarly, hermeneutic reality is a critical response to both foundationalist 
argumentation of universal objective-truth and essentialist postulation of 
substantive/genealogical-reality. Accordingly, hermeneutic politics refers to 
the weakening of both thought and identity within an attitude that every 
moment affirms a hermeneutic process. Therefore, hermeneutic concepts of 
weak thought and weak identity necessitates underlining the inner circle of 
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the political process or the ontological boundaries of social projects which 
depend on a conformist postulation of disengaged totalization in modernity.  
For Levinas, “totalization is the history of humanity qua realization 
of rational universality in mores and institutions,…in which nothing remains 
other for reason”. Conversely, for the quasi-dialectic hermeneutic thinking of 
totality, “total presence of being to itself, or self-consciousness…is the reality 
in its concretization and most complete determination”.24 Hereby, 
hermeneutic totality is to be differentiated from the Enlightenment projection 
of totality which has been designative in the construction of the Political and 
the public sphere. Unlike the Cartesian mechanistic version of the world or a 
Cartesian understanding which symbolizes a “moving from the simple to the 
complex, without the consideration of the light that the totality sheds on the 
comprehension of the simple”, hermeneutic totality represents a mutual 
presupposition of the synthesis and depends on the recognition of 
Heidegger’s “hermeneutic circle” in which “the whole and the parts 
determine one another…there are, in the understanding of the totality, 
progressive jumps”.25  
The conflictual nature of social projects, relations or situations not 
only results in contingency but within the framework of “discordant 
intersubjectivity” in which situatedness of the experience “lends itself to 
negativity and contradictoriness”,26 and gives a contingent characteristic to 
both historical and socio-political experiences. Considering the confrontation 
of difference and cohesion within the course of public intersubjectivity in 
today’s democratic politics, both hope and despair/fear can be seen as the 
constitutive features of hermeneutic negation and postulates of political 
potentia for dialogical democracy. Therefore, the dialectic negation of hope 
and despair/fear entails the interpenetrative meaning of both particulars and 
universals for politics within hermeneutic contingency of being-in-the-
ethnos/demos/cosmos. 
Hope and despair/fear are accumulated through being-in-the-ethnos 
or being-in-the-demos interpenetratively. Being-in-the-cosmos, on the other 
hand, implies a singular syntax of both subjective and objective becoming 
and reality. Within this process, particular and universal intention of the I is 
self-referential and in motion and includes both identification and alienation. 
Therefore, hermeneutic interpretation of the ethnos and demos of hope and 
despair/fear would be only possible by not excluding the cosmos of hope and 
despair/fear. In this regard, hermeneutic and dialogical consideration of hope 
and despair/fear can be obtained through the irreplaceable singularity and 
totality of being.  
For quasi-dialectical hermeneutics, the totality of being resembles 
the interpretation of the particular “sense datum” and the universal 
intersubjectivity of the relationship with the other, or “thinking-of-the-
other”.27 This reflexive process depends on self-referentiality and forms the 
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intention of the I. Accordingly, the totality of being or the singularity of the I, 
implies multiplicity between the reason and substance of being. Hermeneutic 
politics refers to this hermeneutic circle of being and becoming. It depends 
on multiplicity and justifies the unity of both difference and cohesion in 
modern democratic politics. Therefore, considering the hermeneutic 
conception of the being, “the totality cannot be reduced to a kingdom of 
ends”28 or to any genealogical expression of the substantive nature of being.  
Main ideas introduced in this study can be assembled within the 
critical spectrum of ‘hermeneutic politics’ which has become an alternative 
framework within the contemporary revisionism of the theories of difference 
and democracy. At the centre of this contemporary interest on the 
reinterpretation of politics, there lies the question of finding a way between a 
politics of difference/identity and the ideal of public impartiality through 
equal respect politics. According to this paper, hermeneutical study of hope 
and despair/fear may broaden our gaze on this reinterpretation through the 
systemic reading of Selfness and Otherness within the cosmos-of-being. 
Hermeneutic understanding of hope and despair/fear, hereby, can be best 
interpreted as an expression of the dialectic moving of being in the “Fusion 
of Horizons”.29 I conclude that within the framework of hermeneutic politics 
a dialectic syntax of hope, despair/fear and being accumulates in the 
interpenetrative potentia for the disappearance of “the abyss between res 
extensa and res cogitans,”30 which has arisen as the primary ideal source and 
potential discourse of restructuring today’s democratic politics in light of 
dialogical agonism rather than antagonism.    
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The Phenomenology of Hope 
 
Tanim Laila 
 
Abstract: Hope is a characteristic that is intrinsic in the minds of all human 
beings; consequently, human beings are able to express and communicate 
hope in a manner that is unique to other beings. The profound prevalence of 
Hope in man allows them to strive for survival in dire circumstances. Hope 
implies a certain level of perseverance. Often in a crisis, communities who 
are of a certain Faith, religion or spiritual guidance apply their hope in the 
Divine to find peace and calmness. Human history has unfolded major 
success of leaders, communities and individuals: none of which would have 
been possible without the trace of Hope in those accomplishments. Hope has 
the power to heal and it guides humans through trials and tribulations and 
gives a sense of optimism in the midst of darkness. This paper attempts to 
define and elaborate the concept of hope and its many dimensions. It will 
discuss the sources of hope that human beings are inclined towards. Through 
examples, it illustrates how hope gives a sense of profound meaning to life 
and existence and displays its contrasting exceptionality with other beings.      
 
Key words: Islam, motivation, faith.  
 
1. The Omnipresence of Hope 
 Hope is a characteristic that is intrinsic to the minds of human 
beings irrespective of race, religion, gender and ethnic origins; consequently, 
human beings are able to express and communicate hope in a manner that is 
unique to other beings. This attribute given to humankind differentiates them 
from other species, and therefore, hope is a natural discourse of emotions that 
humans most conscientiously evaluate as a means of optimism and success.  
If we adopt the notion of survival as the main strife for human 
beings, then it is Hope that is at the essence of that need to survive. Whether 
it be a success in overcoming distress and obstacles or hope for achieving 
something, hope prevails as the most tangible of sentiments. Hope is a form 
of positive anticipation that keeps the soul afloat amidst grief. When we as 
human beings, realize that we are not the owner of our fate, the source of 
hope is often found in Faith and a higher Being. If we believe in the fall of 
Adam and Eve, then we must also interpret hope to be a means of salvation 
towards the reconciliation of Adam and Eve, and thus, the birth of human 
civilization.  
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2. Driving Achievements & Overcoming Distress 
 
Hope is the companion of power, and mother of success; 
for who hopes strongly has within him the gift of miracles. 
--Samuel Smiles  
 
Human history has unfolded countless successes of leaders, 
communities and individuals: none of which would have been possible 
without the element of Hope in those accomplishments. As mentioned earlier, 
this derives from the intrinsic attribute that is unique to humans. Hope spurs 
creativity, the desire to innovate and discover. Hope has the phenomenal 
power to give strength in weakness. It is this very quality amongst 
characteristics such as patience, compassion, and forgiveness that allows us 
to be rational beings given the power to exercise free will through 
conscience.  
The profound prevalence of hope in humans allows us to strive for 
survival in dire circumstances. It seems as though that the need to survive is 
so strong that hopefulness is the sole remedy from the fear of being extinct. If 
we speculate on the behaviour of war victims, we often find that those are the 
people that hope and work most for a better future. Thus it seems as though 
that the more calamitous a situation is, the more that hope thrives in those 
individuals to overcome these hardships. Therefore, Hope implies a certain 
level of perseverance. Often in a crisis, communities who are of a certain 
Faith, religion or spiritual guidance apply their hope in the Divine to find 
peace and calmness. In first world nations, there has been an inclination to 
turn towards psychology and psychiatry as an outlet for discontent and is 
viewed by many as a more concrete and scientific approach to building a 
sense of hope. Regardless of the many channels, whether it is Divine Faith or 
Science that are exercised to achieve contentment, Hope plays a powerful 
role in establishing that goal.  
 
3. Essence of Religions 
Hope is inherent in Religion. Humans can never be really fulfilled if 
they believe that after this almost-too-small-a-period called life everything 
will end. We need, almost demand, another life, an after-life where we will 
reap what we sow. All religions be it Hinduism, Judaism, Christianity, 
Buddhism or Islam, originated with a divine covenant that generated hope 
leading to building confidence in the minds of its followers from ancient to 
the modern eras. Hope inspires its followers to believe that even if the whole 
world embraces a lie, some higher force will nurture the truth in you. 
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4. Hope and Islam 
Islam emerged and was bestowed to humanity in a time when there 
was a need to revive social, political and economic justice in societies that 
had been devoid of all three. So it is of no coincidence that when the Prophet 
Mohammad (SAW) brought the message of Islam and its inherent practice of 
justice, non-discrimination and equality for women, slaves, the poor and the 
disadvantaged of society, it was a revolutionary change that contradicted the 
ancient cultures and traditions of Arab tribes. It thus gave these oppressed 
groups a sense of hope, optimism and a rightful place in society.  
The religion of Islam takes a systematic and comprehensive 
approach towards the nurturing of hope. Islam looks at the root causes of 
hopelessness and comprehensively addresses these issues. It engenders and 
encourages values that kindle the torch of hope and keep it ablaze. 
Accountability, Forgiveness, Compassion, Moderation in words and practices 
are embedded in the fundamental teachings of Islam. 
Islam recognizes the differences among people and enjoins respect 
for the beliefs and values of different races and religions. Belief in the 
Prophets of other religions is an article of faith in Islam. The unity of the 
Creator and of humankind, call for love, patience, peace, justice and equality- 
these are the essence of all the religions which came through the Holy 
Prophets and Messengers of Allah starting from Prophet Adam (AH), 
Prophet Nooh (Noah) (AH), Prophet Ibrahim (Abraham) (AH), Prophet Daud 
(David) (AH), Prophet Musa (Moses) (AH), Prophet Isa (Jesus) (AH), and 
the last Prophet Mohammad (SAW). Islam not only recognizes all the 
Messengers but makes no discrimination between them. The Holy Quran 
says: 
 
The Messenger Mohammad (SAW) believes in what has 
been sent down to him from his Lord and so do the 
believers. Each one believes in; (a) Allah, (b) His Angels, 
(c) His Books and (d) His Messengers. They say We make 
no distinction Between one and another of His Messengers. 
We hear and obey, oh! Lord and seek your forgiveness 
(Quran: Surah Al-Baqarah:Verse 285). 
 
Islam attaches great importance to the concept of pardoning of sins 
by Allah thereby offering hope for the repentant sinner.  
 
Allah, the Almighty, has said:  O Sons of Adam, who have 
transgressed against themselves (by committing evil deeds 
and sins)! Despair not of the Mercy of Allah: verily, Allah 
forgives all sins. Truly He is Oft-Forgiving, Most Merciful. 
(Quran: Surah Az Zumar: Verse 53). 
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Islam engenders a system of life that encompasses the social, 
economic, political, judicial, and military aspects of a community. The 
concepts and practices of Islam are designed to systematically institutionalize 
hope in communities. 
 
A. Social Hope. Justice is the pre-condition of peace among people, 
irrespective of creed, faith and colour. The Quran ordains: “Let not hatred of 
a people incite you to act unjustly”. Forceful conversion from other faiths is 
strictly prohibited in the Quran: “There is no compulsion in religion”: “For 
you, there is your religion and for me, mine.” These sublime ideals and 
injunctions of the holy Quran were realized by Prophet Mohammad (SAW) 
and his faithful companions in addition to messages of fraternity, justice and 
peace to all regions of the world, thereby making this world a unique abode 
of human civilization attaining the pinnacle of glory.  
Security, especially for the Muslim women, is guaranteed in Islam 
as per the code of the Holy Quran and the Prophet’s last sermon. The Islamic 
dress code, particularly that of modesty in appearance, is yet another aspect 
of security for the Muslim women as it protects their selfhood, generating a 
hope that they are safe anywhere they remain. 
 
B. Economic Hope. Zakat and waqf, two major sectors of Islamic 
endowments as implemented by Prophet Mohammad (SAW) and his virtuous 
companions, form the basis of an economic system which ensures economic 
hope through financial security and human dignity. Such funds are not only 
used to provide charitable assistance to the poor, but also as capital to start a 
business spurring gainful employment and economic progress.  
Islamic banking enables all parties in a financial transaction to share 
the risk, profit, or loss of the venture. Depositors in Islamic banks can be 
compared to investors or shareholders who earn dividends when the bank 
makes a profit or lose part of their savings if the bank posts a loss. The 
rationale is to link the return in an Islamic contract to productivity and the 
quality of the project, thereby ensuring a more equitable distribution of 
wealth, generating hopes for the economically disadvantaged. 
 
C. Political Hope. The principles of universal brotherhood and doctrine of 
equality of humankind represents one of the very great contributions of Islam 
to the social uplift of humanity. Miss Sarojini Naidu, an Indian Poet speaking 
about this aspect of Islam says, “It was the first religion that preached and 
practiced democracy; for in the mosque, when the minaret is sounded and the 
worshipers are gathered together, the democracy of Islam is embodied five 
times a day when the peasant and the king kneel side by side and proclaim, 
God alone is great.” Another example on men’s equality is witnessed in Hajj 
where men of all of all races, colour and ranks meet together in Makkah, as 
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members of one divine family, clad in two simple pieces of white seamless 
cloth without pomp or ceremony, repeating “Here am I Oh Almighty at thy 
command; thou art one and alone; Here am I.” Thus there remains nothing to 
differentiate the high from the low and every pilgrim carries home the 
impression of the international significance of Islam.  
It is this same democratic spirit of Islam that emancipated women 
from the bondage of men. Sir Charles Edward Archibald Hamilton says 
“Islam teaches the inherent sinlessness of man. It teaches that man and 
woman have come from the same essence, posses the same soul and have 
been equipped with equal capabilities for intellectual, spiritual and moral 
attainments.”  Islam came as the defender of the weaker one, women, to share 
the inheritance of their parents. It gave women centuries ago the right of 
owning property. Prophet Mohammad (SAW) in His last sermon proclaimed 
that “Women are twin halves of men. The rights of women are sacred. See 
that women maintained the rights granted to them”.  
 
D. The Quran as an Embodiment of Hope. To claim oneself a Muslim is not 
sufficient without doing something for it. Islam is not the sum-total of 
worshipers and worship services attended. It has its own philosophy, socio-
economic and political structure for the economic emancipation of the people 
and spiritual salvation in the Hereafter. The Quran has about 300 verses on 
economics, 300 on law, ethics and morality, 800 on science and technology 
and above 1000 on history making it a comprehensive guide for humanity. 
 
E. Scientific Hope. Pursuit of science and reason is of paramount importance 
in Islam. The Quran says:  
 
There are signs in the heavens and earth for those who 
believe: in the creation of you, in the creatures God 
scattered on earth, there are signs for the believers; there 
are signs for people of sure faith, in the alternation of night 
and day, in the rain God provides, sending it down from the 
sky and reviving the dead earth with it, and in the shifting 
of winds, there are signs for those who use their reason. 
(Quran: Surah Al Jathiyah: Verse 3-5). 
 
Prophet Muhammad (SAW) reinforced these teachings, 
emphasizing that understanding comes through scientific endeavour. “An 
hour’s study of nature is better than a year’s prayer”, the Prophet declared. 
He directed his followers to listen to the words of the scientist and instil unto 
others the lessons of science’. In his time, China was considered a far off but 
scientifically advanced civilization. So he urged his followers to go in quest 
of knowledge even to China’. And the Prophet made the essential distinction: 
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the revealed Book, as well as his own teachings, were exhortations, an 
invitation to reason and study what exists and can be discovered not scientific 
pronouncements in and of themselves. 
 
5. The Greatest Gifts from the Creator  
The presence of hope and the right to choose are perhaps the two 
greatest gifts that our Creator has bestowed on us. Whereas all other beings 
on earth follow a cycle of life and death without individual hope or choice, 
humans have been given this opportunity on earth. The omnipresence of 
hopefulness in all human beings is proof that hope is not only an important 
means of survival, but also gives meaning and substance to life itself. Hope 
has the power to heal and it guides humans through trials and tribulations and 
gives them a sense of optimism in the midst of darkness.  
 
6. Writer’s Recommendations 
A. Recognize Hope. Concerted effort should be made towards recognition of 
the all-important role of hope. Its power to move individuals and 
communities to overcome distress and achieve the impossible should be 
acknowledged with appropriate importance and emphasis. 
 
B. Education on Hope. Due importance ought to be given to the thorough 
study of hope. Its sources and origins should be meticulously examined in 
addition to ways and means to keep the torch of hope burning. This also calls 
for analyzing, upholding and propagating the teachings of leaders and 
personalities who gave hope to millions over the period of human history. 
 
C. Internationalization of Hope. There is no denial of the fact that the World 
Today needs hope. This leads us to the important corollary that Hope needs 
to be told to the World. Collective effort should be made towards 
internationalization of hope. The United Nations may play the unique and 
pioneering role of declaring World Hope Day and thereby instil a sense of 
importance and urgency on the conceptualization of hope in countries round 
the globe. 
 
 Why write about hope? There are a million things to write about, 
talk about and discuss. There is fuel to be discovered, there are genes to be 
duplicated, there are crimes to be solved, why spend time talking about 
something that is apparently so innate, so basic? Because we need to be 
reminded of hope. Hope needs to be remembered. We have hope. No matter 
how many wars have been fought, no matter how many lives have been 
mistaken for non-existence we have to remember that we have hope- to 
change it all. Hope can be our saviour because it is the last thing to die. 
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Post-Foundational Hopes for Eco-Social Transformations 
in an Era of Globalization and Global Climate Change 
 
Whitney Bauman 
 
Abstract: Many ideas of hope have roots in our religious traditions.  In the 
Euro-West, ideas of hope have been shaped by the Christian tradition in 
particular.  In this paper I argue that most of these ideas of hope are 
“foundational” understandings of hope.  That is, they are visions of hope for 
a better future that are made certain through understandings of a deity that 
will ensure that “everything will be alright” or, on the other hand, through an 
understanding of a lost, pure nature that we can somehow save or re-gain.  
This paper explores what happens to these ideas of hope when foundations in 
our understandings of God are challenged through globalization, and 
foundations in our understandings of nature are challenged through the 
process of global climate change.  In order to maintain hope for a better 
planetary future, I argue that we need a concept of hope that emerges from 
the planetary present worlds, rather than concepts of hope that are based upon 
(false) foundations in the future. Using the work of Ernst Bloch, Gilles 
Deleuze and Felix Guattari, and Bruno Latour, I argue that a post-
foundational, planetary hope will be more useful in motivating actions to 
mitigate the damage done by global climate change. 
 
Key words: Planetary, Spivak, Deleuze, Guattari, Latour, Bloch, Death of 
Nature, Death of God, Environmental Ethics. 
 
In the future much more than the simple defense of nature 
will be required; we will have to launch an initiative if we 
are to repair the Amazonian ‘lung’, for example or bring 
vegetation back to the Sahara.1 
 
 Claims about the “Death of God” and the “Death of Nature” suggest 
that secure foundations for ontology and epistemology in need of simple 
defense, such as “God-Given” or “Natural,” do not describe accurately the 
experience of being human in the evolving planetary process of which we are 
a part. The contemporary ‘cultures’ of post-modernity, brought on by the 
forces of globalization that began at least with the European era of 
exploration, is now matched by a contemporary, post-modern understanding 
of ‘nature’ brought about in part through the false modern, colonial 
assumptions about nature as “pure” and separate from culture. It is clear that 
foundations in both God/Culture/Thought and Nature/Material/Physical, have 
caused violence to human and earth “others.”  Furthermore, hope based in 
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these “secure foundations” as “god-given” or “natural,” can aide in the daily 
thwarting of responsibility for our deeply embodied contexts. Through doing 
so, we are taken “out of the depths” of the evolving grounds in which we 
live.2 Hope that is not tied to eco-social contexts then, serves to perpetuate 
foundational thinking.   
 Through closing off the future in a single vision, such hope can 
quickly become apocalyptic certainty (Catherine Keller) and aid in the 
process of assimilating differences into its own understanding of a unified 
“better” future.3 This type of hope is a colonizing hope that must assimilate 
all “others” into its own reality. In this brief chapter, I argue that re-locating 
Ernst Bloch’s understanding of open-ended hope into a framework of 
ecological (“The Not-Yet-Become”) and social/cultural (“The Not-Yet-
Conscious”) contexts, may provide us with a version of hope that opens us 
onto the “others” of the world, and provides grounds (rather than eternal 
foundations) for working toward a different future while leaving the future 
(and our understandings thereof) open to adaptations as our ecological and 
social contexts require. This post-foundational understanding of hope, then, 
may mitigate violence toward the “other” that results in some acontextual, 
utopian visions of hope, and re-insert “hope” within the natural-cultural 
(Donna Haraway)4 worlds that we as human beings inhabit.  In concluding, I 
argue that a postfoundational hope finds fertile grounds in Latour’s concept 
of “the collective”5 and in Deleuze and Guatarri’s understanding of “the 
rhizome.”6 From these grounds, hope becomes an emergent phenomenon that 
engages both past and future horizons of thought from the present “grounds” 
of change/natality that we experience in the world.  Because it is not “out of 
this world,” because it is not secured through eschatology or eternal origin, it 
opens us onto the many possibilities of our meaning-full present historical, 
ecological, and cultural contexts. Human beings, as eco-social, meaning-
making creatures, can thus begin to take responsibility for how our visions of 
hope shape the worlds in which we live.   
 
1. Foundationalism: Hope as Apocalyptic Certainty 
 From at least the time of Hume (in recent Euro-western memory) 
the problems of foundational thinking in the West have become more and 
more apparent.  Descartes’ Clear and Distinct thoughts and the subsequent 
critique of them began the dismantling of the attempts to place foundations 
for knowledge in either Ideas or Matter.  Both divine revelation and natural 
law proved unstable in a world that was increasingly becoming pluralistic 
through exploration in the era of colonization. It is important to remember 
that Descartes wrote his Meditations only after extensive travel and 
observations of cultures and systems of thought different from his own. 
Furthermore, contact with human and non-human others set off reflection in 
the West about what human “nature” was, or what the “state of nature” might 
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be. Too often, the response was a foundational one: human nature is defined 
by the Euro-Western image and all “others” must be assimilated, silenced 
and/or “backgrounded”.7  The same was true for the different non-human 
natures encountered by the colonizer: whether seen as wasteland or paradise,8 
natures had to be brought into the European understanding of “nature” or be 
destroyed, backgrounded, etc.9  
 I argue, along with others, that the foundational understandings of 
God, Truth, and Nature in the Christian West—the one, True, God, created 
all of the world out of nothing—accompanied by the hope that this God 
would fulfil the promise of a New Kingdom from the future—Christian 
Eschatology—provided a hope that became a source of strength for 
colonizing human and earth others. In other words, despite what theologians 
such as Jürgen Moltmann10 or Wolfhart Pannenberg11 suggest still today, 
hope based upon such certain foundations indeed does become certainty.12   
Through having this type of certainty, based upon a past origin and future 
end that is “out of this world” the believer never has to pay attention to the 
claims of human and earth others.  Rather, he/she mimics the omniscience, 
omnipotence, and omnipresence of the God he/she claims and believes to 
worship. The believer brings into embodiment, through hope in the certainty 
this type of foundation offers, the colonial attitude that wreaks havoc on 
human and earth others.  
 The problem is that genealogy and teleology claim to see too far 
into the past and too far into the future than is possible.  We can never get out 
of the present point we are in to see a clear future or discern the definite 
past.13  In this emerging, evolving, nature-culture, there is only so far we can 
see, smell, taste, hear, and touch.  This is precisely the implication of being 
contextual creatures. We can see, hear, taste, smell, and touch nothing 
beyond a certain point of the evolving spectrum of life. Foundations become 
a way of making certain and universal a specific contextual affirmation of 
the experiences of one people or even one person.  If we were to 
acknowledge the limits to human horizons, in the sense I am describing here, 
then uncertainty and openness would replace the logic of domination that 
accompanies foundational thinking. In other words, rather than supporting 
one’s experience as Universal—through mistaking limit for foundation—the 
nothingness beyond our experiential horizons would open our 
epistemologies, our desires, and our hopes onto the mystery of that which is 
beyond our own limited conceptual and experiential capacities.  
 Though both past origins and future certainties lead to colonizing 
and violent understandings of hope, I deal in this paper with only the future 
aspect.14 Often the not-yet future is thought of in the same way as the distant, 
mysterious past: in a final, certain, foundational way.  That is, too much is 
said past the experiential nihil of our horizons. This nihil, which theologian 
Gordon Kaufman refers to as mystery,15 is precisely not no-thing, it is 
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everything but not any one thing: the beyond which our language and 
concepts cannot go; the mysterious grounds of creatio continua. This nihil 
provides no foundation; rather it is an experiential description of what it is 
like to be becoming in an always embodied, always evolving nature-culture. 
What is needed is a recognition that we act daily from these contexts out of 
faith and hope, rather than certainty.16 
 Faith and hope are, as Paul Tillich and many other theologians and 
philosophers have noted, the opposite of certainty. Why, then, do so many 
people give up faith and hope for certainty in thought-systems? If faith is 
only tied to reason and certainty, then hope becomes subjective and 
anthropocentric. If, rather, faith as the grounds from which we live takes 
place, then hope for the future becomes hope for planetary becoming. Only 
with this sort of hope do we begin to envision the radically different ways 
that continuing creation can become.  
 
2. Ernst Bloch: Not Yet Conscious, Not Yet Become 
 Ernst Bloch’s The Principle of Hope is an effort from within a bio-
historical moment to articulate this radically open future.17  His 
understandings of the “Not-Yet-Conscious” and “Not-Yet-Become” are 
helpful for understanding the way in which nature (the Not-Yet-Become) and 
culture (the Not-Yet-Conscious) describe a future that can be understood as 
emergent. Bloch famously critiqued western thought and philosophy 
especially for being trapped in the past.  For Bloch, “previous philosophers 
went about” philosophy describing the future from the past “with their form, 
idea of substance posited as being finished, even postulating Kant, even 
dialectical Hegel.”18 That is, reality was already fully formed in concepts 
when these philosophers approached a description of reality.  In such a way, 
these philosophers approach the world as if their ideas shaped it ex nihilo 
from a foundation.  The transcendent point re-capitulates the evolving 
process of reality into its own terms, in this way reifying all of life into static 
categories.19  Bloch argues that these philosophies never have room for 
newness, for the “not-yet” because everything that “arises” is described from 
the past: the future is cut through the application of concepts to the natural-
cultural worlds as if that world were nothing outside of these concepts.  Thus, 
the only form of “hope” here is found in the certainty of the past: the new is 
written, dictated, and understood from the past and is thus not really anything 
new.  
 Bloch’s critique is waged at future as futurum, or that which comes 
from the past.  Hope for change, for the future, from this perspective is hope 
that the past will remain the same, or worse, certainty in a concept that 
remains eternally “true.”  For Bloch, “Only with the farewell to the closed, 
static concept of being does the real dimension of hope open.”20 
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 In refuting the “past-thinking” dominant at the turn of the 20th 
century, Bloch articulates a relational understanding of both knowledge and 
“nature.”  “The supposed ‘nature of man’, in the sense rigid research into 
basic drives understands it, has been cross-bred and broken up hundreds of 
times in the course of history … all definitions of basic drives only flourish 
in the soil of their own time and are limited to that time.”21 Both our 
“natures” and our histories exist together in context.  It is from this context 
that we can stand and look backward and forward toward the horizons of our 
present experience.  “The conscious field,” writes Bloch, “is so narrow, and 
on all sides it shades off into darker edges and dissolves.”22  However, 
beyond those edges is not empty “nothing;” rather it is in the meeting of 
these edges of experience and consciousness that newness emerges; newness 
is released into the evolving world.  Bloch describes our awareness of it as a 
meeting of mind and matter: “The kindling place of inspiration lies in the 
meeting of a specific genius, i.e. creative propensity with the propensity of a 
time to provide the specific content which has become ripe for expression, 
forming and execution.”23 There is then a meeting of human consciousness, 
human culture, and human history, with the evolving natures in which we 
live.  Bloch truly thinks nature and culture together and in the process creates 
a space for real hope for the not-yet future.   
 This future is not totally acontextual nor is it re-discovery. Bloch 
does not reject futurum for its binary opposite, adventus. The spectrum of 
“the new” in Western thought has oscillated between these two extremes 
which, similar to the binary of universalism and relativism, are both 
acontextual. Bloch’s newness is emergent, in that it breaks open extant, 
static, categories we have for thinking of “life”, “reality”, “nature”, “culture,” 
and also contextual, arising out of and for contexts.  This continuously 
creative process, not determined by any preordained future, but contextual 
and open toward the “Not-Yet-Become”, provides a space for thinking with 
the evolving nature-cultures in which we live.  It provides a place where 
humans are really at home in the world, and, like all other life, are faced with 
an open-ended future.  This is precisely not holism, because the future is 
open, there is nothing that contains the whole; rather there are mysterious 
edges beyond which we cannot see but from which, in contact with which, 
newness emerges.  Thus it becomes much more difficult, even if more 
exciting, to articulate a vision of hope toward which we can move.  This 
vision must be one open to change.  This vision for the future, a birth pang of 
the not-yet-conscious, must be tested by the not-yet-become. The birth of 
newness, of a new creativity, of future coming out of the continuous creation 
is never clear-cut.  “All beginnings are difficult … all the more difficult in 
fact because the newness into which the productive pioneering effort goes is 
essentially also a newness of the matter in and for itself which is coming 
up.”24  
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 This understanding of “newness”, much like in the philosophy of 
science discussions of emergence, moves beyond the old spectrum of eternal 
return and discontinuous novelty. A major feature of this move is that hope 
becomes a function of contact between the ever-emergent “not-yet-
conscious” and “not-yet-become.”  Hope arises out of contexts and is 
therefore precisely not authoritarian and certain nor naïve and without 
context. Through our contact with emergent newness, the edges of our 
knowing and sensing, we can begin to trust that things are not “just this way” 
or “just that way.”  Rather, things are ever open toward the future, toward 
genuine possibility. Bloch calls this “contact” with the “not-yet-conscious” 
and “not-yet-become” the utopian function.  “The utopian function is … 
transcendent without transcendence.”25  It is always from within the process 
that we hope toward the future and work toward that hope and not from a 
transcendent space of removal, or from a future already determined by the 
present/past.   
 With this sort of hope, we recognize the possibility of failure, and 
the possibility that our visions will have to change when they are too far 
removed from the “not-yet” becoming. For it is precisely with, rather than 
against, the present that we hope.  This open-ended understanding of the 
future of creation suggested through Bloch’s understanding of hope allows us 
to become within the evolving process of continuing creation.  In concluding, 
I would like to bring Bloch’s understanding of hope into dialogue with a few 
post-foundational understandings of the relationship between nature/material 
and culture/thought.  In part, this is important because the issue of global 
climate change more than any other in our time obliterates the distinctions 
between nature/culture, material/thought. Thus, if our motivating hopes have 
been placed in the foundation of one or the other, as an unchanging reality, 
we must begin to find new, non-colonizing sources for our strength/hope for 
change toward a better planetary future.  I end here, then, with a brief 
discussion of Donna Haraway’s understanding of nature-cultures, Bruno 
Latour’s understanding of the collective, and Deleuze and Guattari’s 
understanding of nomadic/rhyzomatic thought.  Bloch’s hope finds traction 
on the ground with these three thinkers in a way that I think could provide 
fruitful and hopeful reflections on how we might live into a future marked by 
the reality of global climate change.  
 
3. Grounds for Hope within evolving, open nature-cultures 
 Theologian Catherine Keller argues that what we need in place of 
“foundations” are “grounds” for thinking, grounds for hope, grounds for 
living together in the world.  Our epistemologies and ontologies do not need 
(and perhaps will never have) foundations in any sort of Ultimate Reality, but 
we can piece together grounds on which to stand, build, move, and live into 
the future.  As she notes, these grounds are always shifting—something I am 
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always reminded of living in the San Francisco, CA area. Yet, grounds are all 
we have.  
 In many important ways, global climate change is forcing us to 
realize that we are indeed a part of this planet.  What we can call 
‘anthropogenic’ and ‘natural’ forcings of changes in the climate and eco-
systems are no longer, if they ever were, clear-cut.  This also means, much 
like the insight that all history is interpretation—the hermeneutic circle—that 
we can never get beyond culture to some sort of pure nature.  In other words, 
there is no one idea of “nature” to save, defend, or champion.  Rather, as part 
of nature, we exist as what Donna Haraway calls “natural-cultural” beings.26  
As such, we can never get beyond either side of the continuum. The two 
terms co-construct our reality as human beings.  This has radical implications 
for epistemology, ontology, and ethics that I think are highlighted in the 
works of Bruno Latour, and Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guatarri.   
 Latour’s concept of “the collective” also collapses nature-culture 
together.  In fact, he wants to get rid of these concepts altogether.  He writes, 
“I use the word [collective] only to mark a political philosophy in which 
there are no longer two major poles of attraction, one that would produce 
unity in the form of nature and another that would maintain multiplicity in 
the form of societies.”27 What he is getting at is the way in which these two 
terms have been sources of violence and colonization.  The collective, brings 
these two terms together in an on-going process of continuous creation: the 
collective brings together information into a present, from the past, and for a 
future.  It includes animals, plants, molecules, atoms, chemicals, stars, ideas, 
imaginations, etc.  All of life can present “claims” to the collective.  Claims 
that are ignored by the collective serve to destabalize it in the future, to open 
it up toward change.  In this way, nature becomes as political as anything 
else.  Nature has a say in the ongoing process of continuous creation of which 
we humans are a part.  
 Similarly, the concept of “the rhizome” in Guatarri and Deleuze’s 
work serves to trip up epistemologies and ontologies based upon foundations.  
Instead of a teleology or genealogy of ideas and materials, we should think of 
ourselves as parts of a rhizome: no origin and no end, only creative thrusts or 
off-shoots that lead in new directions. “Making a clean slate, starting or 
beginning again from ground zero, seeking a beginning or a foundation—all 
imply a false conception of voyage and movement.”  A rhizome is “always in 
the middle, between things, inter-being, intermezzo.”28 Thus, there is no 
possibility that a transcendent hope can “save” us through providing “right” 
thought and action; rather, as human beings, we must constantly “think on 
the go” as “nomads” in the rhizome.  This brings us to reflect on the ever-
emergent offshoots that can emerge from the rhizome without claiming one 
way as the way.  In other words, hope becomes hope in the “not-yet,” in the 
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unknown of the future possibilities that human beings might co-create with 
the “not-yet” of life. 
 Hope from within this reworking of nature-culture, the collective, 
and the rhizome, is not the secure type of hope provided by foundations.  
Rather, it is hope in the present, continuously emerging, with each new 
possibility for life to live into different directions.  Hope literally emerges 
from the grounds on which we stand.  This is good news in light of the fact 
that our grounds will be changing in the future as a result of global climate 
change.  The more we hold onto old foundational hopes, the more we will be 
disappointed and give into despair when there is less and less “pure” nature 
to save, conserve, or preserve.  From this post-foundational hope, we can 
begin to act as “partners” with rather than arbiters of the natural-cultural 
worlds we hope to live into.29  That is, we move in many directions toward 
many constructions of what our worlds might become; but always open to the 
claims that the non-human thought-world has upon our ideas.  This “hope” 
opens us onto our eco-social contexts, and injects meaning into each and 
every moment of becoming. In this way, it provides motivation through the 
recognition of possibilities for change toward living with the rest of the world 
rather than outside of it. 
 
 
Notes 
 
1 Felix Guattari, The Three Ecologies, trans. by Ian Pindor and Paul Sutton, 
Continuum Press, London, 2000, p. 66 (emphasis mine). 
2 The metaphor of “grounds” vs. “foundations” used throughout is taken from 
Catherine Keller, “Talking Dirty: Ground is Not Foundation” in EcoSpirit: 
Religions and Philosophies for the Earth, Fordham University Press, New 
York, 2007, pp. 63-76.  This edited volume was the product of a conference I 
participated in at Drew University in October 2005, “Ground for Hope: Faith, 
Justice, and the Earth.”  
3 See Catherine Keller, Apocalypse Now and Then: A Feminist Guide to the 
End of the World, Beacon, Boston, 1996. 
4 See, eg: Donna Haraway, Simians, Cyborgs, and Women: The Reinvention 
of Nature, Free Association, London, UK, 1990, p. 150. 
5 Bruno Latour, The Politics of Nature: How to Bring the Sciences into 
Democracy, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 2004.  
6 Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia, trans. by Brian Massumi, University of Minnesota Press, 
Minneapolis, MN, 1987, pp. 3-25.  
7 Val Plumwood describes this process of “backgrounding” and the overall 
“logic of domination” well in: Val Plumwood, Feminism and the Mastery of 
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Nature, Routledge, New York, 1993, p. 60; cf: Val Plumwood, 
Environmental Culture: The Ecological Crisis of Reason, Routledge, New 
York, NY, 2002.   
8 A good analysis of both views can be found in Carolyn Merchant, 
Reinventing Eden: The Fate of Nature in Western Culture, Routledge, New 
York, NY, 2003. 
9 In other words, colonized lands were made to mimic the colonizers 
understanding of what “nature” looks like.  See, eg, Carolyn Merchant, 
Ecological Revolutions: Nature, Gender, and Science in New England 
University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, NC, 1989. 
10 See Jürgen Moltmann, Theology of Hope: On the Ground and the 
Implications of a Christian Eschatology, SCM Press, London, UK, 1967.  
Interestingly, Moltmann’s own “theology of hope” was very much influenced 
and inspired by Ernst Bloch.  However, I argue that he misses the radical 
point of the “not-yet” in his affirmation of ex nihilo creation (foundational 
origin) and eschatological kingdom (future certainty).  
11 See Pannenberg, Revelation as History, Macmillan, New York, NY, 1968; 
cf: Wolfhart Pannenberg, Systematic Theology, 3 vols, Eerdmans, Grand 
Rapids, MI, 1991-1998, vol 2, ch. 7, part 3; and vol. 3, ch. 15.  
12 Both argue that hope is not certainty, but neither delivers on this 
proclamation in the end. Recourse is made to the certainty of God’s future 
(already fully formed) and/or to the foundation in the One, True, God, 
Creator and Redeemer.  Thus, hope becomes certainty that this God will 
save. Even the argument that the future is God’s and human beings can’t 
know the future still translates into something like: God secures the future, 
and we know something of it because it has been revealed by the same God.  
In other words, hope is certainty. 
13 This is one of Gadamer’s great insights about hermeneutics in his Truth 
and Method.  See especially Part II.II.  
14 My dissertation, “From Creatio ex Nihilo to Terra Nullius: The Colonial 
Mind and the Colonization of Creation”, Graduate Theological Union, 
Berkeley, CA, 2008, deals with the problem of “origins” in the understanding 
of creation as creatio ex nihilo.  
15 See Gordon Kaufman, In Face of Mystery: A Constructive Theology, 
Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1993; cf: Kaufman, In the 
Beginning … Creativity, Fortress, Minneapolis, MN, 2004.  
16 This acting and deciding and knowing in uncertainty is nothing new, it is 
only recognized now.  See, e.g., David M. Lodge and Christopher Hamlin, 
eds., Religion and the New Ecology: Environmental Responsibility in a 
World of Flux, University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, IN, 2006, p. 
16: “Taking action in the face of uncertainty is the normal condition of 
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human decision making.” Thus, the “problem of action” in post-foundational 
thinking becomes the recognition that acting is and always has been in 
conditions of uncertainty. 
17 I should justify my use of Bloch, who drew from the metaphors of Joachim 
of Fiore.  Bloch’s understanding of Fiore was not totalized; he didn’t map it 
onto the world, rather it was the principle of existing toward an unknown 
future that Bloch capitalized on.  Likewise, I should note that there has been 
feminist critique of Bloch’s “hope” for falling into the white colonizing 
mentality of frontier. I take those critiques to heart, but try to re-narrate  
Bloch’s “hope” from within the context of evolving nature-cultures.  See, 
e.g.: Catherine Keller, Apocalypse Now and Then: A Feminist Guide to the 
End of the World, pp. 120-126. 
18 Ernst Bloch, The Principle of Hope, trans by Neville Plaice, Stephen 
Plaice, and Paul Knight, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1986 ed., p. 6. 
19 Bloch sees Marx here as the first true philosopher in a long time; as one 
who thinks with openness that he suggests is required to be response-able to 
the world in which we live.  
20 Bloch, Principle of Hope, 18. 
21 Ibid., 68-69. 
22 Ibid., 114. 
23 Ibid., 124. 
24 Ibid., 129. 
25 Ibid., 146.  Again, Bloch notes here his high esteem of Marx: “The very 
power and truth of Marxism consists in the fact that it has driven the cloud in 
our dreams further forward, but has not extinguished the pillar of fire in those 
dreams, rather strengthened it with concreteness” (146). 
26 Donna Haraway, Simians, Cyborgs, and Women: The Reinvention of 
Nature, Routledge, New York, NY, 1991, pp. 150ff. 
27 Bruno Latour, Politics of Nature: How to Bring the Sciences Into 
Democracy , Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 2004, p. 59. 
28 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, p. 25. 
29 Carolyn Merchant develops a notion of “partnership” ethics in Reinventing 
Eden.  Similarly, Val Plumwood works out an ethic of “negotiation” with the 
rest of the natural world in Environmental Culture. 
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 Is Hope Culture Bound? 
 
Siavosh Naderi Farsani &Mohammad J. Abolghasemi  
 
Abstract: M.J.Abolghasemi and S. Naderi Farsani develop a theory on 
culture and cognition in 2004. Based on that theory all human beings living 
in different societies and cultures understand subjective and objective 
phenomena through five distinct windows: science, philosophy, religion, 
myth, and mysticism. These windows based on that theory are five different 
glasses that people depending on some determined variables have been 
wearing from the very beginning of the human history. Thus, to examine a 
concept such as "hope" under such theoretical framework, one expects people 
living in a society dominated with each of the above Meta- paradigms or 
worldviews to approach a concept such as "hope" differently both in theory 
and practice. In short, this article emphasizes that a concept such as "hope" is 
culture bound, since any culture is originated with a particular and 
dominating worldview and, also, any worldview has its own system of 
meaning construction. The article responds the following questions: 1. What 
is the Place of a Worldview in a Culture? 2. Do hope and the act of hoping/or 
the predisposition to hope differ from culture to culture? 3. What are those 
variances and what accounts for them? 4. How is hope differently instantiated 
among cultures? 5. What are those instantiations? 
 
Key words: Concrete culture, cognitive culture, worldview, meta-paradigm, 
Ontology, Teleology, anthropology, axiology, hope, despair  
 
 “Hope” can be viewed from different macro or micro perspectives. 
We are going to approach it from a macro stance such as a worldview. It is 
from this place that we recognize why Francis Bacon declares: “Hope is a 
good breakfast, but a bad supper."1 Or why in a religious culture  ‘hope’ is 
considered as a religious duty for the pious and  “despair” as a sign of 
heresy.2  From this point of view we can also explain and even predict why in 
some societies “hope” is dominant whereas in some others it is displaced by 
“despair “. 
 Every culture is originated with a particular and dominating 
worldview and, also, any worldview has its own system of meaning 
construction. Thus any mental entity or any manifestation of such conceptual 
entities is the outcome of a worldview or meta-paradigm that is in fact the 
heart of that culture3.  Damen, L. in 1987 in this respect defines culture as 
humankind's primary adaptive mechanism: 
 
Culture: learned and shared human patterns or models for 
living; day- to-day living patterns. These patterns and 
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models pervade all aspects of human social interaction. 
Culture is mankind's primary adaptive mechanism.4 
 
 However, Kluckhohn, C., and Kelly, W.H., in 1945 view culture as 
a potential guide for behaviour. 
 
By culture we mean all those historically created designs 
for living, explicit and implicit, rational, and irrational, 
which exist at any given time as potential guides for the 
behaviour of men. 
 
Culturally speaking, all concepts in general and a concept such as 
“hope” in particular are generated thorough a system of meaning construction 
that itself is produced based on the macro dictates of various macro beliefs of 
a worldview. At the same time, a worldview via its epistemological, 
anthropological, ontological, teleological, theological and praxiological 
presuppositions controls a culture.5 That is why we consider culture as the 
most prominent variable as far as a concept such as hope is concerned.  
 
1. What is the Place of a Worldview in a Culture? 
 Worldview is a term for what is also called Cognitive Culture. This 
is the mental organization in each individual's mind of how the world works. 
Expressions of commonality in individual worldviews make up the cultural 
worldview of the group. This leads to the social culture, the way people relate 
to one another in daily activities, and how they cooperate together for the 
good of the group as a whole, called the society.6 Webster defines worldview 
as “a comprehensive, esp. personal, philosophy or conception of the world 
and of human life.” 
 Weaver in 2003 believes worldview is the head of a culture. He 
adds: 
 
This comprehensive philosophy is ultimately founded upon 
four institutions7. These four institutions are the elements 
of all-rational, intelligent thought. All deep, intellectual8 
thought is rooted in one or more of these four concepts: 
Religion, Politics, Economics, and Science. An individual’s 
worldview is based entirely upon his inclusive perception 
of these four concepts and upon his personal understanding 
of how society is best served by this perception. 
 
 In his article on the philosopher Wilhelm Dilthy in The 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, H.P. Rickman writes: 
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[T]here is in mankind a persistent tendency to achieve a 
comprehensive interpretation, a Weltanschauung, or 
philosophy, in which a picture of reality is combined with a 
sense of its meaning and value and with principles of 
action... 
 
F. Heylighen in 1996 advocates the same idea and believes that a 
worldview prepare such a framework through which the members of any 
society define reality and see a vision for their lives. He says: 
 
What we need is a framework that ties everything together, 
that allows us to understand society, the world, and our 
place in it, and that could help us to make the critical 
decisions which will shape our future. It would synthesize 
the wisdom gathered in the different scientific disciplines, 
philosophies and religions. Rather than focusing on small 
sections of reality, it would provide us with a picture of the 
whole. In particular, it would help us to understand, and 
therefore cope with, complexity and change. Such a 
conceptual framework may be called a world view. 
 
Some intellectuals concentrated on the integration of worldview as 
the necessity of modern societies for decades. The Belgian philosopher Leo 
Apostel in 1925-1995 and his colleagues have devoted their lives to the 
development of such an integrating worldview. In their treatise Worldviews: 
From Fragmentation To Integration in 1994 they define a worldview as 
follows:  
 
A worldview is a system of co-ordinates or a frame of 
reference in which everything presented to us by our 
diverse experiences can be placed. It is a symbolic system 
of representation that allows us to integrate everything we 
know about the world and ourselves into a global picture, 
one that illuminates reality as it is presented to us within a 
certain culture.  
 
Dr Ray Lubeck in 2007 adapted David K. Naugle view 9 and 
believes that the relation between culture and worldview accounts for all 
elements, components and institutions of a society such as education, policy, 
economy, communication, law, language and so on. He declares: 
 
A worldview is the perspective from which I look at and 
make decisions about all the areas that make up my life.  A 
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worldview is made up of all the things that I assume are 
true, and which seem to me to be common sense.  Every 
person accepts certain beliefs which they cannot prove, and 
these beliefs will colour and shape the way that we view 
everything else in life. 
 
 James W. Sire, in Discipleship of the Mind, defines worldview as 
“... A set of presuppositions... that we hold ... about the makeup of our 
world.” 
 Funk in 2001 notes: 
 
The meaning of the term worldview … seems self-evident: 
an intellectual perspective on the world or universe. Indeed, 
the 1989 edition of the Oxford English Dictionary defines 
world-view as a "... contemplation of the world, [a] view of 
life”. 
 
 The OED defines Weltanschauung10 as “... [A] particular 
philosophy of life; a concept of the world held by an individual or a group.” 
Ken Funk studies worldview both in the context of the universe and 
in the context of the self and finally believes: “A worldview is the set of 
beliefs about fundamental aspects of Reality that ground and influences one's 
perceiving, thinking, knowing, and doing.” 
After reviewing worldview elements and definitions presented by 
many investigators of the field such as Leo Apostel in 1930, and Funk in 
2001 and others, Abolghasemi and Naderi in their book Culture Recognition 
in 2005 make the relation between culture and worldview more clear and 
advocate that to study any concept such as “hope” both in theory and 
practice, one should at first probe the seven vital elements of worldview that 
any member of any society may presuppose including ontology, 
epistemology, anthropology, axiology, teleology, theology, praxiology and 
other building blocks providing responses to macro questions of ones 
worldview.  
Referring to figures 1 & 2 at the end of paper, we believe members 
of a society based on their worldview presuppositions provide a system of 
meaning construction that controls all their abstract and concrete affairs 
including hope both in theory and practice. Thus based on such a conceptual 
framework all domains of life such as economic, political, recreational, 
educational and religious institutions and systems are cognitive culture 
oriented. 
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2. Do Hope & The Act of Hoping / or The Predisposition to Hope 
 Differ from Culture to Culture? 
 When a worldview is considered as the heart of a culture and while 
any system of meaning construction is driven from a worldview, as a 
consequence we expect different cultures dominated by different worldviews 
to manifest “hope” and also “the act of hoping” differently. 
 To scrutinize this difference in various concrete cultures, we need to 
observe different cognitive cultures carefully. After studying many cultures 
and also sub cultures in Iran, the Middle East, and some other parts of the 
world, we developed a view on culture and cognition in 2004 based on which 
all human beings living in different societies and cultures understand 
subjective and objective phenomena through five distinct windows: science, 
philosophy, religion, myth, and mysticism. These windows based on that 
view are five different glasses that people, depending on some worldview 
oriented variables, have been wearing from the very beginning of human 
history. Thus, to examine a concept such as "hope" under such theoretical 
framework, one expects people living in a society dominated with each of the  
above Meta paradigms or worldviews to approach "hope" differently both in 
theory and practice. In the following discussions we probe the concept of 
cognitive culture in more detail and show how “hope” and any “act of 
hoping” is already culture bound. 
 Through deep discussions at the Hope Conference we, nevertheless, 
arrived at a conclusion that a predisposition and potentiality to “hope” is 
universal, innate and shared equally by all humans all around the world. 
Some believe it is a biological capacity in the brain, others advocate it as a 
sort of energy that God has granted to all humans. We believe it is however 
the very machine of worldviews that manipulates this potentiality and 
predisposition.  
 
3. What Are Those Variances & What Accounts for Them? 
 Cultures are more than language, dress, food and customs. Michelle 
LeBaron in 2003 says: 
 
Cultural groups may share race, ethnicity, or nationality, 
but they also arise from cleavages of generation, 
socioeconomic class, sexual orientation, ability and 
disability, political and religious affiliation, language, and 
gender - to name only a few… Since worldviews contain 
and shape cultures11, working effectively across cultures 
requires some understanding of the soil from which 
cultures come - the seedbed called worldviews. 
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Our studies showed the analysis of a concept such as “hope” or “the 
act of hoping” proves some cognitive as well as concrete variances in a target 
culture. As a culture consists of two significant layers: worldview or 
cognitive culture and objective manifestations or concrete culture and as it is 
shown in figure 2 (below), a concrete culture includes the economic, 
educational, … and political systems and social institutions of a society but 
the heart of a culture is worldview that is the system of meta beliefs that 
controls and also shape the concrete systems of culture such as economy, 
policy, education, and religion. 
Therefore, the concept of “hope” or “the act of hoping” in any 
culture includes some worldview oriented variances, and also some concrete 
culture variances. We study, however, only cognitive culture variances in this 
paper. At the time being, some of the cognitive culture variances will be 
discussed. 
 
A. Teleological Variances. That which fulfils material and spiritual needs of 
human beings is the controversial question of intellectual circles for all ages. 
Two classic examples of opposing views are found in Aristotle and Lucretius, 
the former a supporter of teleology and the latter a supporter of what is now 
often called philosophical naturalism, or accidentalism. Aristotle says: 
“Nature adapts the organ to the function, and not the function to the organ.”12 
Yet Lucretius believes: “Nothing in the body is made in order that we may 
use it. What happens to exist is the cause of its use.”13 
Plato14, argues that it is error to fail to distinguish between the 
ultimate Cause, and the mere means by which the ultimate Cause acts.15 
Democritus’ teleological view is rejected by Aristotle saying: “Democritus, 
however, neglecting the final cause, reduces to necessity all the operations of 
nature. Now they are necessary...”16 
Extrinsic finality and Intrinsic finality are two other classification of 
teleological views of a cognitive culture.  The former consists of a being 
realizing a purpose outside that being for the utility and welfare of other 
beings. For instance, minerals are "designed" to be used by plants which are 
in turn "designed" to be used by animals. The latter consists of a being 
realizing a purpose by means of a natural tendency directed toward the 
perfection of its own nature. In essence, it is what is "good for" a being. For 
example, physical masses obey universal gravitational tendencies that did not 
evolve, but are simply a cosmic "given." Similarly, life is intended to behave 
in certain ways so as to preserve itself from death, disease, and pain. 
Over-emphasizing extrinsic finality is most employed in mythical 
cognitive cultures and is often criticized as leading to the anthropic 
attribution of every event to a divine purpose that some consider it as 
superstition. For instance, “If I hadn't been at the store today, I wouldn't have 
found that $100 on the ground. God must have intended for me to go to the 
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store so I would find that money.” Or, "We won the game today because of 
my lucky socks." Such abuses were criticized by Francis Bacon,17 
Descartes,18 and Spinoza.19 At the same time, intrinsic finality, while more 
subtle, provides the basis for the teleological argument for the existence of 
God and or some supernatural force, and its modern counterpart, intelligent 
design. 
The rationale of teleology was explored by Immanuel Kant in his 
Critique of Judgement and, again, made central to speculative philosophy by 
Hegel and the various neo-Hegelian schools. According to Jean-François 
Lyotard in 1979 teleology and "grand narratives" are eschewed in a 
postmodern attitude. Teleology may be viewed as reductive, exclusionary 
and harmful to those whose stories are erased.20  Against this, Alasdair 
MacIntyre has argued that a narrative understanding of one's self is liberatory 
in understanding one's capacity as an independent reasoner and also in 
understanding one's dependence on others and on the social practices and 
traditions in which one participates. 
Morteza Motahari (1980) believes that a scientific worldview is not 
able to present a reliable and hopeful foundation for the teleological element 
of worldviews, consequently for members of a scientific community for 
whom something like the big bang theory is the dominant source of their 
teleological knowledge may tend to nihilism, since they see themselves 
doomed among two inevitable and pre-determined fates. For members in 
such a society life begins without any meaningful purpose at their birth and 
ends miserably at their death. At the same time a religious cognitive culture is 
pregnant with hope since for members in such a society life begins 
purposefully and will never end by death. However; the pioneers of scientific 
and empirical thought such as Backen and Hume attacked such a religious 
hope as superstition and invited members of society to avoid it. Since a 
cognitive culture or meta paradigm accounts for the future of world in 
general and the ultimacy of society and man in particular, and their macro 
presuppositions may construct hope and any act of hoping or in reverse it my 
destroy the hope and displace it with despair, different cognitive cultures are 
expected to approach hope or act of hoping differently. 
The substance of teleological cognitive cultures include beliefs 
about purpose in the universe, life, society and human beings. People tend to 
know what the end of the universe is, and where it is going and whether it is 
accidental or based on a design.  
 
B. Ontological Variances. Ontology in a worldview can be defined as the 
beliefs about the ultimate nature of Reality. By such a definition one believes 
that the universe consists, for instance, solely of matter, energy, and 
information or there is something outside the material universe. In a naturalist 
or materialist worldview there is no place for Mind, God, Spirit or any super 
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natural power. On the other hand, in an idealist Meta paradigm, reality is 
ultimately non-material and it is spiritual in nature. For such an ontological 
view there is a supernatural power outside and above nature as creator, 
designer, and guiding the whole universe. Moreover, there is a moral order to 
the universe: good is not only desirable but possible, achievable, perhaps 
even inevitable. 
Under such a conceptual framework the meaning construction of 
‘hope’ and any preparation for the act of hoping is already controlled by the 
ontological variable of the worldview and one expects variances of hope and 
any act of hoping in these different cultures. Based on the Motahari view the 
sphere of hope production in the former is limited, while the latter view 
offers a vast possibility for hope manoeuvre.21 
Furthermore, there are two other important questions that must be 
answered as the ontology of a worldview is getting formed: 1) What is Truth? 
and 2) What is the ultimate test for truth? Regarding the first question there 
are three major theories with respect to truth: Correspondence, Coherence 
and pragmatic. Selecting any of these has impacts on the meaning 
construction in general and the concept of hope and any act of hoping in 
particular. Funk in 2005 declares: 
 
If you subscribe to the correspondence theory of truth, you 
believe that truth corresponds to what really is, that there is 
a direct relationship between true knowledge in your mind 
or brain and what actually exists outside yourself. If you 
believe that such a strict definition of truth is unrealistic, 
you may believe that truth is merely that knowledge which 
is internally consistent. That is the consistency theory of 
truth, whose archetype is mathematical logic, where 
consistency is a necessary condition for any proposition to 
be considered valid. If you are a pragmatist, you hold to the 
pragmatic theory of truth: truth is what works. Whether or 
not knowledge corresponds to external reality and whether 
or not it is consistent with other knowledge is immaterial. 
What counts is that what you believe to be true leads to 
valued ends. If it works for you, it is true for you, though it 
might not be true for someone else. 
 
 We studied different cases falling in each of the three truth 
categories. We observed significant variances of hope and any act of hoping 
while controlling other variables through homogenizing the influencing 
factors of the studied cases. 
To know what the ultimate test for truth is, a worldview claims to offer valid 
bases for knowledge based on which motor engine of meaning construction 
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one uses as well as where the conceptualization process starts. Ken in 2005 
says: 
 
You may hold that some authority - some book or person 
or organization - holds the keys to truth: whatever he/ she/ 
it says is true. As an empiricist, you may hold that truth is 
discovered only by empirical inquiry. If you were a 
rationalist you would say that truth is found through valid 
inductive and deductive reasoning. On the other hand, you 
may believe that you know the truth directly through 
intuition or even revelation. 
 
This ontological view is expected to play a great role in the quantity 
and quality of “hope” and any ‘act of hoping”. Therefore, we can 
differentiate types of “hope” and any “act of hoping” under categories such 
as reason22, revelation23, empiricism and observation24 mystic experiences25, 
and also mythical authorities26. We can also rely on books, persons, and 
organizations as some authorities representing each of the above worldviews. 
 
C. Anthropological Variances. In the context of worldview the term 
anthropology does not mean usually the study of human culture and human 
artifacts but it refers to some beliefs about human beings. These ideas are 
formed in response to some anthropological questions of a worldview 
including: What is a human being? What is his/her place in the universe? 
Does he or she have free will? What ought he/she to or not to do? Is the 
human being basically good or evil? 
These questions play some vital roles in relation with human 
meaning construction systems in general and hope conceptualization and also 
acts of hoping in particular. An anthropological view may presuppose human 
being merely as a cosmic accident or just one step in the directionless chain 
of evolution. From another anthropological stance of a different cognitive 
culture the human may also be considered as an evolutionary step, that step 
may nevertheless be a very important one on the path to some valued end. A 
religious and theist worldview may see the human being as the gem of God's 
creation or even a creature created in God’s own image. At the extreme, even 
a worldview may consider the human as a part of God or even a god 
him/herself. Each of the above ideas grows different seeds of hope on the 
same ground. Though the land is unique for all the cases, the quality and 
quantity of seeds turns out to be different; therefore, hope products are 
expected to wear various dresses and colours. Some may be fruitful and 
delicious while the rest may never have enough potential to grow or if they 
grow, they may produce fatal and Poisonous fruits.  
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To know if the human has free will, anthropological stances of 
different cognitive cultures presuppose various responses based on which 
deferent seeds are produced for various hope manifestations. Some may 
presuppose no will for humans and consider them as mere mechanisms in 
nature, slaves to instincts and conditions or events beyond their control. 
Perhaps humans are puppets of God, acting out a script that they had no part 
in writing. However, other worldviews offer different anthropological views 
including such views where humans do have the ability to think and act with 
at least partial freedom though there may be constraints, imposed by the laws 
of physics and biology or the guidance of God. Through the anthropological 
presuppositions of few worldviews the free will of human being is denied and 
thus leaves big questions for cultural researches, such as how one can expect 
the production of “hope” and “acts of hoping” in a society whose members’ 
will is already killed by its anthropological prescriptions. 
What humans ought to do is another pillar question of one’s 
anthropological stance. Moreover as different prescriptions of these kinds are 
observed at the worldview layer of various cultures, one expects various 
manifestations of hope in the related cultures. The anthropology of a 
cognitive culture may lead members of a society to believe that they have no 
obligation to anyone or anything beyond themselves or it may require them to 
have a responsibility for the well-being of the universe in general and Man in 
particular. A religious anthropology may oblige the followers to believe in 
love, obey, hope and even enter into communion with God. 
At the same time the question of whether the human being is 
basically good or evil works as another component of one’s anthropology in a 
given cognitive culture. This question is fundamental to one’s view of 
humanity. Based on an anthropological presupposition, one may consider 
humans to be fallen and fundamentally sinful and also continually striving 
against their evil nature. Other views may presuppose the human being to be 
basically good and only in need of the environment and the opportunity to 
express that goodness. Maybe even more common is the anthropological 
belief that the human is basically neither good nor evil, but morally neutral 
from birth. According to this view, whether or not one follows a path of good 
or evil depends on external influences and strength of will. It goes without 
saying that choosing each of the above views produces a different seed of 
hope or even despair to be grown in a related culture. 
 
D. Axiological Variances. It is impossible to overstate the importance of 
axiological aspects of any cognitive culture in determining one’s behaviour. 
Ken in 2005 says: 
 
It is the foundation for all of your conscious judgments and 
decisions and therefore the basis for all purposive thought 
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and action. Although some acts are reflexive or instinctive 
and cannot therefore be ascribed to conscious reference to 
your beliefs about value, any action based on even the most 
cursory reflection has its foundation in your standards of 
what is good or bad, right or wrong. 
 
 To identify the relation between the axiological variable of a 
cognitive culture and any concept such as “hope” or any “act of hoping” is 
difficult. Funk in 2005 wrote, “Virtually all elements of your worldview, 
from your epistemology to your anthropology, are intimately related to your 
axiology and it is your beliefs about the value of things that are the proximate 
cause for most of your behaviour.” He also believes that the axiological 
beliefs of one’s worldview are presupposed as a response to some questions 
such as: What is value? What kinds of value are there? Is value objective or 
relative? Is value absolute or relative? What is the source of value? What is 
the highest good? 
 Leo Apostel in 1994 in his well-known treatise Worldviews: From 
Fragmentation to Integration obviously explains the evaluation component 
of worldviews in cultures and concepts such as “happiness”, and other ideas 
of these kinds. He states: 
  
We do not live in a "neutral" world. We admire, love or 
value certain aspects of the world, while we detest and hate 
others or find them irrelevant. We enjoy, and we suffer. 
Some aspects of reality are holy, others profane. A 
worldview does not only make reality intelligible, but also 
provides a means of evaluating this reality, as it is 
expressed in different cultures. 
 
Bart De Moor in 1994 and others under the worldview topic tried to 
know what happiness and suffering is for feeling and/or conscious beings and 
what increases or decreases happiness and suffering. Hellemans S. in 1994 
and his well known colleagues also under the same subject believe these 
questions cannot be put aside. Whether the answers are negative/positive, or 
agnostic they are still answers, and they do suggest that the question of 
meaning makes sense.  
Leo and others in 1994 believe: 
 
An answer to such questions will be more universal, and 
consequently more objective, if individual systems of value 
can be integrated into a more global value system. For 
example, questions about marriage and sexuality or about 
parent-child relations vary greatly from one culture to 
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another. But there are no cultures where these questions are 
irrelevant. A worldview can neither put forward one set of 
values as the norm in all cases, nor consider the evaluative 
element of human existence as insignificant. Worldviews 
will differ insofar as they structure this evaluative element 
of human existence differently. For example, in more 
primitive societies, relations with one's own group will be 
highly valued, while this value is hardly present in the most 
industrialized groups of our society. 
 
4. How is “Hope” Differently Instantiated Among 
 Cultures & What Are Those Instantiations? 
As we discussed before, a worldview or cognitive culture is the set 
of beliefs about fundamental aspects of Reality that ground and influence all 
our perceiving, thinking, knowing, and doing in general, and hope 
construction and conceptualization in particular. Any worldview consists of 
epistemology, ontology, cosmology, teleology, theology, anthropology, and 
axiology, praxiology and other building blocks some of which of course 
couldn’t be discussed in this paper. Each of these subsets of worldview is 
highly interrelated with and affects virtually any concept or act such as 
“hope”. Hope is instantiated, as a result of macro dictates of any worldview 
presuppositions in world’s cultures. 
In a scientific worldview all components, prescriptions, and 
presuppositions derive directly from experience, observation and the related 
rationality and experimental reason. Any hope for any action or thought is 
already passed through experimental and observational filters. So in such a 
scientific community and culture “hope” is expected to be instantiated 
scientifically. That is to say the study of hope and any act of hoping must 
meet scientific methodology and its fundamental principles and evaluation as 
well as its meaning construction system. I asked Pia Trip, a German 
Physician, some questions as a way to detect her dominant worldview and 
also to identify her instantiations of hope dominated by her worldview. As I 
had already predicted through my knowledge of beliefs within the scientific 
worldview, she defined hope based on her observation, experience and a 
scientific methodology. Her actions and intentions regarding “hope” were in 
a circle dominated by the abilities and also potential limitations of science. 
Her agnostic attitude toward the ultimate nature of universe, in general and 
society and humans in particular confined her understanding of hope. 
The philosophical worldview on the other hand instantiates “hope” 
based on reason that is mostly manifested through inductive and deductive 
judgments. Some beliefs on fate and determinism and also the denial of 
human will are observed in some philosophical schools of thought and 
related communities in which a concept such as “hope” or any “act of 
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hoping” is already displaced to despair, hopelessness, and also nihilism. 
Generally speaking “reason” is the only building block of any thoughtful 
decision and action in a philosophical worldview. Hope and any act of 
hoping has no place beyond rationality though the history of philosophy 
offers a spectrum for the rationality of hope that at one point is absolute 
accessible hope and at the other point is absolute nihilism. 
In mythical worldviews, however, superstitions form the 
presuppositions of dominant worldviews and consequently the circle of 
“hope” and also its instantiations are based on the mythical authorities’ 
prescriptions. There can be found a direct relation between such a culture’s 
power to produce hope for bearing the difficulties, hardships, and also 
sufferings of life, and its cognitive cultural macro prescriptions. Antiquity 
holds many stories as instances for such a worldview.  
The mystic worldview, at the same time, introduces a different 
window for the members of its community to approach, define and explain 
reality. The circle of ‘hope” and any “act of hoping” enable the members of 
the related community to bear easily with the sufferings of life. At the time 
humans were exhausted with hardships and difficulties of the industrial age 
and also shortages of scientific methodology regarding both body and spirit 
of the human and his/her world, an increasing tendency toward this sort of 
hope all around the world emerged. 
However, the religious worldview variances of “hope” is studied in 
more detail as a way to see how hope is instantiated and what those 
instantiations are in such a culture. The Islamic worldview in Iran and its 
meta paradigm of Shia is scrutinized in this respect. Though we discussed 
only some conceptual cognitive culture or worldview variances in theory and 
postponed other related worldview variables to other papers and times, we 
scrutinize Islamic Shia variables regarding some variables of both cognitive 
and concrete Islamic culture. 
Besides Islamic scholar’s philosophical and rational achievements, 
there are many beliefs based on other Islamic reliable authorities such as the 
Quran and Ahlolbeit that dictate and inject hope not only in the minds of the 
pious but require the followers to increase their hope toward their material 
efforts. In fact the efforts of believers in this world is an indicator for being 
saved in the latter world.   
The following verses and narrations show that the Islamic 
worldview expect believers to coincide hope with good deeds. In 
Nahjolbalaghe27 Imam Ali in response to a Moslem that liked to be 
admonished said: “Never be like those who have hope for being saved on the 
day of resurrection without any effort at this world”. Prophet Mohammad (pbh) 
in this respect admonishes the Moslems to see “hope” only through the seeds 
they grow every day via their intentions and actions: “This world works as a 
farm in which some seeds are grown for the life after death”.28 This Hadith29 
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not only shows the theological and ontological variables of Islamic 
worldview, but it prescribes some rules for social activities of the believers. 
Furthermore, in Sahifeyeh Sajadieh30 Imam Sajad while praying says: “O, my 
lord having hope to any body except you is harmful and leads us to a fatal 
destiny”. Based on such a view the immortal source of “hope“ and “any act 
of hoping” is God as the omnipotent. Again, in Nahjolbalaghe31 Imam Ali 
relates, “hope” to social life of the Moslems: “What is the meaningless claim 
of those whose hope is not manifested in their behaviour?” In the same 
source32 Imam Ali admonishes Moslems to avoid any greediness in vain, and 
yet not to get hopeless. He says: “Man’s nature is in such an amenable 
position that if seeds of hope grow on its ground, greediness and vain wishes 
challenge him and if he gets hopeless, grief, regret and misery annihilate 
him”.  Finally, In Ghorarolhekam33 Imam Ali says: “The best behaviour is 
taking a moderate position between fear and hope”. 
Our brief investigation on the Islamic worldview and its impact on 
the hope production mechanism indicated that all reliable authorities embrace 
hope as long as it leads and coincides with good deeds and intentions. Some 
of the Quranic verses that advocate such an idea are collected as follow: 
 
Whoever hopes to meet his lord, he should do good deeds, 
and not join any one in the service of his lord34. 
 
But as to him who repents and believers and does good, 
maybe he will be among the successful35. 
 
…As for the land, my righteous servants shall inherit it36. 
 
Whoever does good whether male or female and …make 
him live a happy life, and …give them their reward for the 
best of what they did37. 
 
Surely those who believe and those who are Jews and the 
sbeans and the Christians whoever believe in Allah and the 
last day and does good-they shall have no fear nor shall 
they grieve38. 
 
Allah has promised to those of you who believe and do 
good that He will most certainly make them rulers in the 
earth as He made rulers those before them, and that He will 
most certainly establish for them their religion which he 
has chosen for them, and that He will most certainly, after 
their fear, give them security in exchange; they shall serve 
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Me, not associating aught with Me; and whoever is 
ungrateful after this, these it is who are the transgressors39. 
 
Only Allah is your Vali and His Apostle and those who 
believe, those who keep up prayers and pay poor-rate while 
they bow40. 
 
The above evidences prove that the Islamic worldview expects the 
followers to consider hope and good deeds coincidently. Mahdaviat is 
another religious instantiation of hope in the Islamic-Shia communities and 
culture. Followers of this believe that a spiritual saviour will appear at earth 
and put an end to all hardships of the oppressed and also destroy the arrogant 
rulers. We also collected some data reliable for Moslems on which they 
reason why any hope must coincide with some good deed. In a way they are 
considered as some inputs for the praxiology of Islamic worldview. 
 
…Whoever hopes to meet his lord, he should do good 
deeds, and not join any one in the service of his lord41. 
 
But as to him who repents and believers and does good, 
maybe he will be among the successful42. 
 
However, for a Moslem like any other human, three questions are posed 
in respect to hope: 1) Why shall we hope at all? 2) To whom shall we hope? 
and 3) How can we hope? The Islamic worldview offers many beliefs as 
reliable authorities for such questions. 
 
5.  Conclusion 
 People in all cultures share the same predisposition and potentiality 
to hope and any act of hoping. Yet the machine of worldviews and the 
ideological manipulations of the same innate predisposing of ‘hope” offer 
various productions both in quality and quantity. This paper was an 
endeavour to study hope from a deep stance such as worldview and its main 
variables such as anthropology, ontology, teleology, and axiology. It was 
emphasized that worldview is the headquarter and heart of any culture and it 
is the presuppositions and prescriptions of a cognitive culture or worldview 
that grow the seeds of hope or any act of hoping. Moreover we advocated 
that all humans from the very start point of their history define reality 
through five distinct windows: Myth, Religion, philosophy, science, and 
mysticism. It is evident that studying “hope” via each of these Meta-
paradigms will lead us to different systems of meaning construction that 
introduce different conceptual frameworks for their audiences. That is to say, 
any culture through dictates of its unique prescriptions and beliefs introduces 
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different uses of the same potentiality of hope. We also collected some data 
from authorities of Islamic worldview that grow the seeds of hope for its 
followers. Yet we never stand in a position to justify them.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Relation between Worldview and Macro systems in a society
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Figure 2. Relation between a Worldview and a Culture 
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6. Orville Boyd Jenkins, Last Updated 02 March 2006, 1993, 2001. 
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8. Philosophical. 
9. in Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2002. 
10. literally, a perception of the world. 
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14. 428/427 BC[a] – 348/347 BC. 
15. Plato, Phaedo 99bc. 
16. Aristotle, Generation of Animals V.8, 789a8-b15. 
17. "De Dignitate et Augmentis Scientiarum," III, iv. 
18. "Principia Philosophiæ", I, 28; III, 2, 3; "Meditationes", III, IV. 
19. Ethica, I, prop. 36 app. 
20. Lochhead, Judy,2000. 
21. For Furthe reading study: Morteza, Motahari, Islamic Worldview, Sadra 
Publishing, Tehran, Tran, 1973.  
22. philosophical worldview. 
23. religious worldview. 
24. scientific worldview. 
25. mystic worldview. 
26. mythical worldview. 
27. sermon 150. 
28. Hadith Mashhor (Famous Narration). 
29. Hadith is a Narration that is already said by Prophet or his family (Ahlolbeit). 
30. Sahifeyeh Sajadieh is a Prayer Collection of The Shia’s 4th Imam. 
31. sermon 160 (Nahjolbalaghe is a Sermon Collection of Imam Ali (pbh) as the first 
Imam of Shia’s). 
32. sermon, 108. 
33. no, 5055 (Ghorarolhekam is a Collection of Short admonishes of Imam Ali(pbh)). 
34. The cave,verse,110. 
35. The narrative, verse 67. 
36. The prophets,verse,105. 
37. The bee,verse 97. 
38. The food, verse 69. 
39. The light, verse 55. 
40. The food, verse 55. 
41. The cave, verse 110. 
42. The narrative, verse 67. 
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From Cure to Quality of Life: 
The Shifting Meaning of Hope at the End of Life 
 
David B. Feldman, Julia Kasl-Godley, Amirah Khouzam, 
Nicholas E. Pisca, Ana P. Cabrera, and Melody Donboli 
 
Abstract: A theme of life’s final chapter is hope versus hopelessness. 
Unfortunately, many physicians and laypeople equate hope at life’s end with 
hope for cure, leading to unfortunate consequences. A key reason that 
physicians may not discuss hospice is that they fear destroying patients’ 
hope. Thus, many seriously ill individuals who may prefer hospice receive 
this referral only shortly before death, others not at all. Limited research 
addresses a wider meaning of hope at life’s end. At diagnosis, patients 
usually invest hope in cure. This can lead to a “fighting spirit” and greater 
likelihood of cure. Unfortunately, many illnesses are not curable. Although 
some patients fall into hopelessness, others disengage from the goal of cure 
and seek other goals. Such new goals often concern quality of life - e.g., 
resuming hobbies, making amends with family, or improving one’s 
relationship with the divine. Although healthcare professionals can be 
important in aiding patients in “re-goaling”, the medical system is not well 
equipped for this. We use Snyder’s Hope Theory, which views hope as a 
goal-directed process, to widen the discussion of hope at life’s end. Through 
research, theory, and case material, we discuss how the meaning of hope 
shifts as patients approach death. 
 
Key words: End of life, terminal illness, death and dying, hospice, quality of 
life, hope theory, goals, re-goaling 
 
1. Introduction 
 Terminal illness confronts people with a variety of pressing 
concerns. The dying face a broad array of medical and practical issues, 
including the treatment of their disease, pain control, choosing a care setting 
or place to live, drafting a will, and combating symptoms of depression and 
anxiety. Despite the wide-ranging nature of these issues, there is one 
phenomenon that is woven throughout - the tension between maintaining 
hope and falling into hopelessness. Unfortunately, the nature of hope at the 
end of life is controversial and not well understood. Not all health care 
providers and behavioural scientists agree on what it is, how it functions, 
whether or not it is healthy, and how (or if) it should be fostered. In this 
paper, we will discuss the importance of hope in the last chapter of life, 
review the limited available research on hope during this time, and offer 
some directions for future investigation. 
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2.  The Importance of Hope at the End of Life 
 To understand the importance of hope during the last chapter of life, 
we must first discuss the complicated socio-medical context in which 
terminally ill patients find themselves. It is widely known that people are 
living longer. As a result of advanced medical technology, people are living 
with progressive and often debilitating illness for greater periods of time than 
ever before. For instance, one epidemiological study that followed 7,045 
healthy smokers and ex-smokers for approximately four years found that 
participants who eventually developed cancer were told about their disease 
on average a year or more in advance of passing away, depending on the 
particular type of cancer.1 
 A side-effect of this extended lifespan is that people have the 
possibility of choosing where and how they will die. On the one hand, 
patients can choose to pursue “traditional” disease-focused treatments that 
offer the possibility of more time. This is an excellent option as long as the 
treatments are likely to work, which they frequently do. Nonetheless, these 
so-called “life-prolonging” treatments too often do not extend life nor 
improve the quality of life. At times, they lead to side effects that can seem 
worse that the disease itself. It is well known, for instance, that chemotherapy 
can cause nausea, hair loss, and physical weakness. In severe cases, 
chemotherapy requires hospitalization, which may separate patients from 
their homes, friends, and families. Disturbingly, in the United States, about 
half of all patients with chronic illness die in the hospital, even though 
research has found that 70% of the general public wishes to die at home.2,3 
Moreover, when Benzein, Norberg, & Saveman interviewed patients with 
terminal illness, they found that the vast majority wished to live as normally 
as possible before they died, something that is rarely possible in the hospital.4 
 Thus, many patients choose to consider a different type of care: 
hospice. Focused on maximizing comfort, hospice care typically entails 
forgoing disease-focused treatments such as chemotherapy. Patients often are 
able to return home, where they are visited by nurses, doctors, social workers, 
chaplains, and other professionals, all of whom work together to maximize 
quality of life in whatever time is left. 
 As an illustration, consider the case of Sylvia, an 85 year-old 
widowed woman with metastatic breast cancer. Among other treatments, 
Sylvia pursued surgery and chemotherapy, neither of which worked. After a 
few months (much of which was spent in the hospital) her hair had fallen out, 
she was vomiting several times a day, was barely eating at all, and was so 
weak that she began using a wheelchair. She felt so miserable that her 
physician expected her to die within a couple of weeks; she reported wanting 
to die even sooner. Eventually she and her doctor determined that it was 
highly unlikely that continuing disease-focused treatment would extend her 
life and that hospice was the right choice for her. Because of the severity of 
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her symptoms, she was admitted to an inpatient hospice unit. On hospice, her 
chemotherapy was discontinued, she was given an individual room with a 
window, was invited to wear street clothes instead of a hospital gown, was 
offered a wig to cover her baldness, and received aggressive treatment for 
pain and nausea. Within a week, she was out of her wheelchair, participating 
in activities and demanding the keys to her car. Although this experience is 
not the norm, it also is not uncommon. In fact, it is the point of hospice. A 
recent study even found that patients with heart failure and certain types of 
advanced cancers live longer on average under hospice care than under 
disease-focused treatment.5 
 Unfortunately, many patients who may prefer a hospice approach 
receive this referral only days or hours before death, while others are not 
made aware of the option at all.6 Pestillo and Bass found that a large number 
of patients were admitted to hospice during the late terminal stage when they 
could not benefit fully from hospice services.7 Although the situation is 
improving every year, according to the National Hospice and Palliative Care 
Organization, the mean length time patients spend on hospice care in the 
United States was 59 days in 2005.8 The median length time on hospice, 
which is a more accurate depiction of the typical patient’s experience, was 
only 26 days. 
 If the benefits of hospice are so substantial and people often prefer 
the outcomes it affords, then we must ask why hospice referrals are as 
infrequent and late as they are. There is no shortage of opinion on the matter, 
especially from hospice providers. A survey of hospice staff, physicians, and 
volunteers attributed the principle perceived barrier to receiving hospice 
services to health care providers’ misconceptions about hospice.9 
Additionally, Mor, Hendershot, and Cryan, concluded that the lack of 
referrals from healthcare professionals was a major obstacle to early access to 
hospice services.10 
 What does any of this have to do with hope? One study attempted to 
identify the factors that led health care providers not to refer patients to 
hospice. Curtis and his colleagues asked the primary care physicians of 
patients with advanced AIDS to indicate why they sometimes do not discuss 
end-of-life care with patients, even when appropriate.11 Many physicians 
cited fearing that such a discussion would destroy patients’ hope. In fact, this 
was the second most cited reason behind only too limited a time during 
patient consultations to broach such a sensitive topic. 
 This is in stark contrast to the perception that hospice care providers 
have of the services that they provide. In fact, hope is a buzzword in the 
hospice community. A quick internet search reveals that the American states 
of Florida, California, Ohio, Kentucky, Wisconsin, Texas, Indiana, New 
Jersey, Michigan, and Maine all have at least one hospice containing the 
word “hope” in its title, not to mention a few scattered throughout England, 
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Romania, Russia, Mexico, and India. Obviously, primary care physicians and 
hospice providers have very different notions of what hope means. 
 
3. (Re-)Defining Hope at the End of Life 
 Within the medical realm, hope is often equated with hope for a cure 
or for continued survival.12,13,14 Thus, in the aforementioned study by Curtis 
and colleagues, physicians citing fears that discussing hospice would destroy 
patients’ hope most likely were referring to hope for cure.15 Using this 
definition, it is reasonable to fear that discussing hospice might take away 
hope. At the end of life, however, the challenge for patients is not to protect 
or maintain this type of hope, but to allow hope to evolve in new 
directions.16,17 Living with an incurable disease does not mean living without 
hope, it just means redefining it. 
 That hope can be redefined may seem obvious, but in our 
experience, this is not apparent to a great many health care providers. 
Consequently, using the hope-for-cure definition, some scholars have opined 
that hope should be discouraged in the terminally ill because of the 
unrealistic and false outcomes it connotes. Others, using a wider 
conceptualization of hope, believe that hope should be encouraged.18,19 We 
agree with Sullivan, who so eloquently writes, 
 
Hopelessness is not the absence of hope, but an attachment  
to a form of hope that is lost. If we are tied to a hope for  
survival that is ‘sinking into the deep blue sea,’ we will be  
unable to see the other forms of hope floating before us.20 
 
 Unfortunately, research on exactly what sorts of hope “float before” 
patients at the end of life is relatively sparse. The most common type of 
investigation involves in-depth qualitative interviews with terminally ill 
individuals and their families, the purpose of which is to identify what hope 
means as death approaches. Some of the components of hope at the end of 
life identified through these means include interpersonal connectedness 
through relationships with others; developing and working towards attainable 
aims and grieving the loss of goals that no longer are possible; emphasizing 
personal attributes and attitudes like determination, optimism, bravery, and 
composure; recalling uplifting memories; easing the fear of things like pain, 
dependency, and uncertainty; and viewing one’s situation with a sense of 
light heartedness and humour.21,22,23,24,25,26,27,28,29 Religion and faith in a 
higher being also can provide forms of hope linked to enlightenment or 
salvation, though research on the actual effectiveness of faith as a source of 
hope is mixed.30,31,32 
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4. Toward a Unified Definition of Hope at the End of Life 
 As informative as they are, a difficulty with the definitions of hope 
just discussed is that they are so wide-ranging. If one takes them at face 
value, it would seem necessary to conclude that hope at the end of life is 
equivalent to living a satisfying existence. At this point, hope loses much of 
its unique meaning. The challenge is to develop a definition that identifies 
what is essential about hope, disentangling it from other related yet distinct 
phenomena. Moreover, it is important that such a definition lend itself to 
quantitative measurement, because without such measurement we are unable 
to directly address physicians’ fears that discussing the end of life with 
patients will lower their hope. We believe that C. R. Snyder’s Hope Theory 
provides a definition fitting these criteria.33 
 According to this theory, hope includes three inter-related cognitive 
components: goals, pathways thinking, and agency thinking. In order to have 
hope, one first needs something to hope for - a goal. Goals are anything that 
an individual desires to get, do, be, experience, or create. According to Hope 
Theory, virtually everything that human beings do in any area of life is 
directed toward achieving some goal.34 Moreover, goals are conceptualised as 
the major source of emotion. People experience positive emotions when they 
perceive movement toward achieving goals and negative emotions when they 
perceive movement away from achieving them. 
 The second component of hope is pathways thinking. A pathway is a 
cognitive route to a goal.35 People engage in pathways thinking when they 
plan ways to reach their goals.36 It is important to note, however, that the 
beneficial effects of hope do not come from being able to generate actual 
pathways, but from the perception that such pathways could be created if 
desired.37 Like many beautiful things in life, hope is in the eye of the 
beholder. 
 The third component of hope, agency thinking, is defined as “the 
thoughts that people have regarding their ability to begin and continue 
movement on selected pathways toward those goals”.38 As in Watty Piper’s 
well-known children’s book, The Little Engine That Could, agency thoughts 
such as “I think I can,” empower individuals to pursue desired ends.39,40 
 During the last 15 years, empirical research has demonstrated the 
benefits of this variety of hopeful thinking. High-hope individuals 
accomplish their life goals more frequently than their low-hope counterparts, 
report lower levels of depression and anxiety, experience more life meaning, 
and may even enjoy lower blood pressure and cholesterol levels.41,42,43 Very 
little work, however, addresses the intersection of this theory of hope and 
terminal illness. 
 Nonetheless, this theory provides a useful framework for 
understanding the shifting nature of hope at life’s end. In other words, it can 
help us to understand the journey from everyday hope, through hope for cure, 
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to a redefinition of hope at life’s end. Normally, healthy individuals pursue a 
variety of goals in various areas of life.44,45 Under ideal circumstances, they 
are able to generate the pathways and agency necessary to pursue these goals. 
 Upon receiving a diagnosis of serious illness, however, people are 
forced to accept a new goal: cure. We believe that the goal of cure is so 
compelling, in fact, that it is almost always prioritized above all others. Thus, 
there is a narrowing of hope as it is invested almost exclusively in this single 
goal. Our modern medical establishment rightfully encourages this type of 
hope by offering patients numerous treatment pathways. Patients’ agency is 
bolstered by the promise of these treatments along with the encouragement 
and support of their medical providers, friends, family, and religious 
communities. 
 In addition to the aforementioned beneficial effects of hope, it may 
be that hope also has medically salutary effects. In one study, college-aged 
women were asked to write down what they would do should they be 
diagnosed with cancer.46 High-hope women were able to generate more 
possible ways to combat their cancer than low-hope women. When quizzed 
about their cancer knowledge, hopeful people also were better informed. 
Should cancer actually arise, all this presumably would lead to a “fighting 
spirit,” better utilization of care, and a greater likelihood of cure. 
 Of course, even with the most exemplary fighting spirit, cancer and 
other serious illnesses sometimes are not curable. Gum and Snyder suggest 
what happens in this case.47 In their experience, most people realize that their 
diseases are not curable as they watch every treatment pathway fail. Because, 
according to hope theory, the various components of hope reciprocally 
influence one other, their agency also falters and diminishes. Finally, feeling 
utterly hopeless about obtaining a cure, they may give up this goal altogether. 
At this point, some choose a care approach such as hospice, which focuses on 
comfort rather than cure. 
 It is a mistake to conclude that hope will not return, however. 
Although some patients remain hopeless, others perform the difficult task of 
“re-goaling.” Because this theory defines hope not by its content (i.e., what is 
hoped for) but by the thinking process that under-girds this content, it enables 
us to understand how patients may redefine the specific content of their hopes 
(i.e., their goals) without adopting a completely new conceptualization of 
how hope functions. Although the goal of survival may remain fundamental 
for some terminally ill persons, it can be supplemented with goals for 
comfort, dignity, legacy, intimacy, options, and decision-making.48,49 
 Of course, hospice providers and other health care professionals can 
be important in helping patients to make this shift. Because of their 
specialized training, mental health professionals are ideally suited to help in 
this way. Nonetheless, such interventions primarily require time and patience. 
Although the present medical system often focuses on treatment goals, we 
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suggest that providers involve themselves equally with patients’ life goals. To 
increase hope, patients can be encouraged and helped to find pathways and 
agency for accomplishing these life goals. 
 
5.  Present and Future Research 
 Obviously, there is much research to be done. Most of what has 
been presented in this paper is based on theory and clinical observation. 
Empirical research, especially of a quantitative nature, has trailed far behind 
speculation about hope at the end of life. To remedy this situation, our 
research team is presently performing a study related to the conceptualization 
of hope just discussed. We are approximately halfway through data 
collection. In the remainder of this paper, we will briefly describe this 
research. 
 Our study is presently underway at three sites: (1) an inpatient 
hospice care centre, (2) an outpatient (i.e., home) hospice program, and (3) an 
outpatient oncology clinic. In all of these settings, patients are verbally 
administered the study’s questionnaires, which include quantitative measures 
of Snyder’s conceptualisation of hope, current life goals, quality of life, 
physical symptoms, and anxiety/depression. Of note, the measure of hope 
assesses overall hope, thus disentangling it from hope for any particular goal. 
This avoids equating the phenomenon of hope with any specific goal content. 
 In short, we believe that individuals in hospice care will not have 
lower hope than individuals pursuing disease-focused treatment for cancer 
(i.e., participants drawn from the oncology clinic). Indeed, they may have 
higher hope. We put forth this hypothesis for one simple reason: Individuals 
undergoing disease-focused treatment will likely make “to be cured” their 
most important life goal. As mentioned previously, we believe that patients 
thus relinquish or downgrade the importance of other goals in their lives. In 
other words, they put all of their “eggs in one basket” where hope is 
concerned. Of course, if patients are seeing progress toward the goal of cure, 
hope should remain relatively high. However, given that patients in all three 
settings are selected because they have advanced cancers, those continuing to 
pursue disease-focused treatment generally should perceive that they are not 
progressing toward this important goal to their satisfaction. This should lower 
overall hope. For patients in hospice care, however, the goal of cure should 
be relinquished or at least downgraded in importance. Instead, they should 
begin to embrace a relatively large array of other goals. These more “do-
able” goals should serve as a source of redefined hope. 
 Unfortunately, there is not enough data to report firm results at this 
time; we have only surveyed about 15 patients in each setting. A preliminary 
look at our limited data indeed reveals a correlation between a higher number 
of goals and higher hope. Excluding goals for cure or extended lifespan, 
patients in hospice (especially home hospice) reported somewhat more goals 
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on average than patients in the oncology clinic. Some examples include to 
“resume my hobby of digital photography”, “spend as much time as possible 
with friends and family”, and “help other people with my disease”. 
Moreover, half of patients in the oncology clinic reported having the goal of 
cure or longer life, whereas less than a quarter of patients in the hospice 
settings reported this goal. Almost all patients who indicated having the goal 
of being cured or living longer rated this goal as their most important one. It 
is crucial to note, however, that due to our presently small sample size, this 
study is statistically underpowered. Thus, none of these results have yet been 
tested for statistical significance. They should be treated with great caution at 
this time. 
 
6.  Conclusion 
 In sum, we have argued that individuals nearing the end of life have 
much about which to be hopeful, when hope is construed as meaning more 
than simply cure. However, health care providers and patients themselves 
often wrestle with this concept, delaying appropriate referrals to hospice, and 
thus, limiting opportunities to complete or modify life goals, attend to 
unfinished business, or address practical matters that could improve overall 
quality of life. Using Snyder’s Hope Theory, we propose that hospice 
provides terminally ill individuals with the opportunity to re-goal or redefine 
the content of their hopes beyond cure, ultimately allowing for a more 
positive dying process. Should our preliminary data continue to be consistent 
with this conclusion, our next step is to explore factors that are associated 
with people who have difficulty re-goaling (i.e., low hope people) and to 
develop effective means of facilitating this process. To bring us back to the 
wisdom of Sullivan, “If we are tied to a hope for survival that is ‘sinking into 
the deep blue sea’, we will be unable to see the other forms of hope floating 
before us”.50 
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Theatre and Counselling: 
Factories of Hope and Resilience 
 
Edgar Rodríguez Sánchez 
 
Abstract: Some people live in a land of opportunities, whereas some other 
people just dream of a land of possibilities. Richness, poverty, health, illness, 
discrimination, pain, lack of education, injustice, trauma... These are some 
issues people have to deal with in their lives. What determines the strength 
with which someone faces unpleasant things in his/her life? In this essay, I 
examine how resilience can be an engine of change, a clearer window in 
which we can see a different reality. But resilience is understood not only as 
an inner strength, but also as a skill that can be developed. I explain how 
theatrical techniques used in the process of counselling can be beneficial for 
post-traumatic stress disorder, treatment of depression, multicultural 
counselling, development of social skills or labour or group counselling in 
order to generate a more resilient personality. I examine the works of 
Stanislavski’s, Brecht’s, Boal’s, and Ionesco’s in which theatre is understood 
as a way of learning to act (in both senses: acting and taking action) in hope 
and create new realities; beautiful and wonderful realities, all with the power 
of theatre, counselling, love and hope. 
 
Key Words: Resilience, Counselling, Theatre, Hope, Hopeless, Social 
Issues, Multiculturalism. 
 
1. Theatre and Counselling? What is this about? 
Psychologists and Counselors, as professional helpers, are conscious 
of the mental health needs of people of the 21st century in the sense that we 
deal generally with people’s pain, we deal with trouble, with depression, with 
trauma and try to prevent and repair the effects of larger social issues such as 
poverty, war, pandemics, lack of education, discrimination, migration, 
multiculturalism, and other situations that make people suffer. We help 
people get on with their lives. For that objective, we encourage them to use 
their potential strengths in their favor. 
Psychology and Counseling have evolved in parallel to the 
technologic, social, political, scientific, and cultural changes of our 
postmodern society. Because we are not in control of most larger conflicts in 
the world, development of a resilient personality becomes one of the most 
important tools in life. From childhood through late adulthood, there are 
certain times when we may need help addressing problems and issues that 
cause us emotional distress or make us feel overwhelmed. When you are 
experiencing these types of difficulties, you may benefit from the assistance 
of an experienced, trained professional. Professional counselors offer the 
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caring, expert assistance that we often need during these stressful times and 
have demonstrated that a resilient personality is one way to face the difficult 
situations we all find in life. 
Resilience is a term used in many disciplines, such as engineering, 
economics, politics, ecology, business and psychology, and has been defined 
as the ability to recover quickly from misfortune; the ability to return to an 
original form after being bent, compressed, or stretched out of shape.  In 
psychology it has been used to describe the capacity of people to cope with 
stress and catastrophe. The term as it is used here follows Al Siebert.1 He 
describes it as a human ability to recover quickly from disruptive change, or 
misfortune without being overwhelmed or acting in dysfunctional or harmful 
ways.  It is also used to indicate a characteristic of resistance to future 
negative events. This psychological meaning of resilience is often contrasted 
with "risk factors". Resilience provides the person with a vision of hope 
based on a strong structure of healthy optimism as a consequence of the 
confidence in one’s resources. 
 
2. Are Hope and Resilience, Theatre and Counselling Related? 
At this moment, you might be questioning what the relationship 
between resilience and hope, theatre and counselling is. Well, I strongly 
believe that theatre used in a therapeutic way is a factory of hope and 
resilience. 
Great play writers since early periods in time have used theatre plays 
to express their ideologies in situations of crisis. Theatre meant, for many of 
these people, a way of escape, a way of building a new and more positive 
reality. 
Augusto Boal2, a Brazilian theatrical director, writer, and politician, 
founded the Theatre of the Oppressed, a theatrical form in which he broached 
difficult and important themes such as the Brazilian government of the time: 
the same government that arrested, tortured and exiled him. The Theatre of 
the Oppressed allowed him to fuel an ideological revolution. Boal allowed 
blood to spill over the paper, over the stage. His methodology allowed for 
catharsis, enabling oppressed people to feel identification with this kind of 
theatre, and making them believe in a more hopeful future. 
Eugene Ionesco3, one of the foremost playwrights of the Theatre of 
the Absurd, used plays to express the way in which he perceived life as well. 
He showed through his masterpieces the modern feelings of alienation, and 
the difficulty (in some cases impossibility) of communication. He saw the 
society of his time as accelerated but conformist. 
Similar to Ionesco, Bertolt Brecht4 lived through the horror of World 
War II and he had to leave his country, Germany, as consequence of his 
socialist and antifascist politic orientation.  In his plays, Brecht found a way 
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to reflect the feelings he thought were representative of the feelings of the 
population. 
Constantin Stanislavski, director, actor and theatre theorist - and a 
compulsory reference for modern western theatre of the 20th century - 
developed a method which is probably his most important contribution to 
theatre: the psychological realism method. This method tries to reflect to the 
audience in a more real way the emotive world of the characters. He 
encouraged actors to explore their own feelings in order to create a more 
truthful experience with the audience in hopes of forging a stronger 
identification between the character and the public.  He perceived the theatre 
as a path of teaching and educating the people.  
Stanislavski5, whose main focus in theatre was the fight against the 
cliché acting style - the repetitive stereotype and emptiness of emotions of his 
epoch - reacted against the narcissistic way of acting focused on mere 
audience approval. He rescued the actor as an artist. He proposed a model in 
which the actor/actress acts with honesty according to his/her own nature, an 
actor/actress that works from the truth. That conception of acting gave more 
importance to the professionalism of the actor. It enabled them to find 
authentic emotional states and left much up to the fortuitous occurrence of 
them. 
In this sense, Theatre is strongly linked to Psychology and 
Counselling because both disciplines find the deepest understanding of the 
emotional states of human kind, even though with different purposes. Jacob 
Levy Moreno, a Psychiatrist born in Bucharest in 1889 showed in a more 
explicit way the link between theatre and psychology.   
Jacob Levy Moreno was the pioneer of using dramatic techniques to 
heal people. He found that dramatic techniques used in psychotherapy are 
useful for: 
 
A. Being aware of one’s own thoughts, feelings, 
motivations, behavior and relationships; 
B. Becoming better in the comprehension of situations, of 
other points of view, of our self image and our actions 
to others; 
C. Discovering one’s own capacity to act in new and 
more functional ways; and 
D. Rehearsing, learning or preparing to use behaviours or 
responses that are found to be more functional. 
 
These and many others theatrical artists have converted the stage, 
the forum, the playwrights, unveiling the art in social action and thereby 
turning theatre into social action. They did this by saying what they thought 
was wrong with their society. Doing that, not only aroused a state of 
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awareness in the public, but also a state of strength, hope and resilience in the 
artist. The effect of theatre carried two objectives out; it reached both the 
social and the psychological spheres. 
 
3. The Role of the Counsellor 
Theatre artists work as storytellers, their task consists in 
representing human behaviour. The counsellor, on the other hand, works on 
different levels: the personality level, the thinking level, the attitude level, 
and the behavioural level. People who ask for counselling help, generally 
want to make a change in the level of behaviour, but often times, the change 
they want to make in their behaviour is also related to one of the deeper 
levels. So, one task that covers more than one level is the developing of a 
more resilient personality, the discovering of strengths and the use of these 
strengths in ones’ own favour. These strengths provide a person with a wide 
range of possibilities, and the counsellor interested in using artistic 
techniques will see - as we have seen in the biographical information about 
the artists who have used them - that benefits obtained through theatrical art 
matches with the profile of a resilient personality. 
Frederich Flach in his book Resilience6 identifies some 
characteristics that conform the resilient personality; these characteristics are 
divided between inner strengths and interpersonal strengths. Among those 
inner strengths we observe: 
 
A strong, supple sense of self-esteem. 
A high level of personal discipline and a sense of responsibility. 
Recognition and development of one’s special gifts and talents. 
Creativity: open-mindedness, receptivity to new ideas, willingness to 
dream. 
A wide range of interests. 
A keen sense of humor. 
High tolerance for distress. 
Focus and a commitment to life. 
Faith, a philosophical and spiritual framework 
within which personal experiences can be interpreted and 
understood with meaning and hope, even at life’s 
seemingly most hopeless moments. 
 
Among the interpersonal strengths we observe: 
 
Independence of thought and action, without being 
unduly reluctant to rely on others. 
The ability to give and take in human interactions. 
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A well-established network of family and friends, 
including one or more who serve as confidants. 
The willingness to let go and skill at letting go of 
resentments and forgiving others as well as oneself. 
Proficiency on setting limits. 
Healthy self-interest. 
Freedom from one’s own selfishness and 
protection against the selfishness of others. 
Generosity. 
Ability to give and receive love. 
 
When revising the characteristics mentioned before, I truly believe 
that the vast majority of them can be developed through theatrical art 
counseling. Psicodramatic Therapy arises with Jacob Levy Moreno7 who, 
inspired by religion and philosophy, took advantage of sociology, theatre and 
psychology.  In that regard, Psicodramatic Therapy is a paradigm that 
integrates the faith and optimism of the humankind theory, the search for 
sense in the trans-personal perspective, the comprehensive biographical depth 
of psychoanalysis, and the contextual and social view of a systemic 
perspective. It thereby makes it easier to develop all the inner and the 
interpersonal strengths mentioned before. 
 
4. Theatrical and counselling techniques used as generators of 
hope and resilience 
 
A. The Text Analysis, Operative Words. Listening to the conversation with 
clients, counselors can identify operative words, or those words that people 
live with and that make sense to the discourse, but sometimes can be 
obstacles to the fluency of actions in the life of the client. The personal argot 
constitutes the mode of reacting to the environment; the language is the 
structure of the thoughts. For that reason, analysis of texts in the case of 
actors, directors and writers, or analysis of dialogues and conversations in the 
case of counselors, are a great resource not only for obtaining information 
about the personality of the clients/characters, but also for understanding 
them in the deepest sense. 
For doing that analysis, the steps of Stanislavski’s method are quite 
similar to the steps of counseling through active listening: underlying the 
operative words, making agreement about the content, the shown affection, 
the hidden affection, the causes of the action, the intention of the action, the 
consequences in action and in feelings. This analysis allows the deepest 
understanding of a text or a dialogue and results in beneficial work for both 
artists and counselors. 
It’s easier to see areas in which behaviour could improve through 
Theatre and Counselling: Factories of Hope and Resilience 
______________________________________________________________ 
152 
watching or reading others, and once we have seen them in the open, we can 
work internally. 
In order to be clearer about the importance of the text analysis, pay 
attention to the following phrases: “It’s easier to see areas that could become 
better in the behavior of others”. 
And now, listen the next one: “The best option to be aware of 
mistakes is to see them in the behavior of others”. 
The impact of the second one is harder than the first one. A careful 
analysis of the texts of the characters in plays is an excellent way of 
developing a more hopeful perspective on life. 
 
B. Acting and Systematic Desensitization. Systematic Desensitization is a 
technique from Cognitive Therapy that has shown high effectiveness in the 
treatment of phobias in general, but specifically social phobia. Counselling 
through theatre techniques could be a supportive tool for those who cannot 
deal with daily social requirements. Role-playing could be an “interlude” in 
the life of people with social phobia. It could constitute one of those 
paradoxical interventions used in therapy in which people experiment with 
those activities they are afraid of, but in a safe setting. Clients with social 
phobia can represent the character of someone quite extroverted as 
permission for being extroverted just for a short period of time. It would be 
desirable to join Art Therapy with Rational Emotive Behavior Therapy or 
Cognitive Therapy. 
 
C. Theatre and Development of Social Skills. Another way in which 
Theatrical Counseling can be helpful is in assertion training, one form of 
social skills training. People who lack social skills probably experience 
interpersonal difficulties at home, at work, at school and during leisure time. 
So, Corey8 gives some examples of work in assertion training. This can be 
useful for people who cannot express their anger or irritation, people who 
have difficulty saying no, those who are over polite and allow others to take 
advantage of them, or those who find it difficult to express affection and 
other positive responses. 
Playing (playing in all meanings of the word) a character in the 
context of a group of theatre counseling is beneficial for showing us different 
perspectives on life. In the group we can take a situation that has been 
difficult to someone in the group, the rest of the members of the group have 
to represent the situation of that someone in a free style, it means solving the 
situation from their own point of view. We all have lived similar situations, 
but we have different ways of facing those situations, and showing a wide 
range of possibilities in a safe setting is the objective of this activity. 
 
D. Theatrical Art Therapy and Post-Traumatic Stress. Survivors of a 
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traumatic event tend to enclose their feelings, to think there are no exits to 
their troubles, to get in a closed circuit of negative memories-negative 
feelings-anxiety or depression-negative behaviour-and the circle begins again 
with negative memories of the traumatic event. The tendency to enclose 
feelings is negative for people, but in cases of trauma, remembering the 
situation is like living it again and to do it without a professional intervention 
can maximize the trauma. That is a paradoxical situation because expressing 
feelings is exactly what survivors of traumatic events need. 
Art Therapy can be the safest way to deal with clients who have 
been victims of trauma; with this approach they can express their feelings 
through painting, writing, singing, and acting. They don’t avoid their feelings 
nor do they enclose them, nor re-live them; rather, they’re expressing them in 
a different way. 
Clients with post-traumatic stress can feel identification with a 
character in a similar situation, a well directed theatre play with therapeutic 
objectives can help people to express their deepest feelings and thoughts, 
those that people generally repress or have difficultly getting out. In 
counselling with a theatrical approach we can play with those difficult 
situations, we can dare to experiment with them but without being obliged to 
do it; in counseling we are not compelled to do anything we don’t wish to do. 
That is great for trauma survivors because the approach we take to the 
situation is not a menace: we are in control, we can go up to our own limits. 
Maralynn Hagood,9 for instance, has utilized successfully art 
therapy with survivors of sexual abuse. Her approach supports the theory 
about the art of projection as a way of expression and a non-intrusive way of 
exploring strong annoying feelings, and later on transforming them into 
learning and self knowing. This method recognizes the vast capacity of 
human beings to discover strengths in weaknesses, and as the phoenix, to be 
born again from the ashes. 
 
E. Theatrical Art Therapy and Empathy Development. In the same way, 
watching theatre plays can be an excellent way to analyze perspectives from 
different points of view. Analyzing the behavior of people in a play, and 
questioning the reasons for acting in a certain way with the understanding 
that people act in ways because it was often their very best try, lets the clients 
observe life from a distinct angle and directs them to a deeper understanding 
of the person and consequently to a more empathic mood. 
Just by questioning the reasons, motivations, and intentions of a 
character, and trying to explain and justify their actions we can develop 
empathy and avoid prejudices. In counseling we can take on board difficult 
themes with clients who are reticent to talk about some important topics or 
some specific kinds of people just through talking about different expressions 
of art as in movies, paintings, poems, and books. We are getting in the action 
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through an indirect technique. 
 
F. Theatre and Multiculturalism. Angels in America, by Tony Kushner10 is a 
representative example of how art can do worthwhile work in understanding 
Multiculturalism. Analyzing this play from the perspective of the counselor, 
or simply from the perspective on a theatre enthusiast, we can observe how 
religion, racism, sexual diversity, spirituality, politics, substances abuse, 
AIDS, life, death and comprehension of humankind is shown with mastery 
and accuracy. 
Jack Kroll, in Newsweek, writes about Angels in America, It is  
 
the most ambitious American play of our time: an 
epic that ranges from earth to heaven; focuses on politics, 
sex and religion; transports us to Washington, the Kremlin, 
the South Bronx, Salt Lake City and Antarctica; deals with 
Jews, Mormons, WASPs, blacks; switches between realism 
and fantasy, from tragedy of AIDS to the camp comedy of 
drag queens to the death or at least the absconding of 
God.10 
 
Watching this kind of play with a critical analytical eye is an 
opportunity for multiculturalism in counselling itself. Through reading it with 
an analysis of operative words, or by rehearsing it with therapeutic purposes, 
for example, interpreting a specific character especially if it is one who we 
disagree with in thoughts and feelings, deepens this type of counselling. 
One of the great strengths of contemporary theatre is its rich 
capacity to renew itself through dynamic international and intercultural 
encounters. It enables different kinds of people to get an overview of the 
“whole scenery” of the world. Such a widening spectrum of globalization has 
lead to a remarkable hybridization of the possibilities for theatre itself and 
also of the possibilities for counseling. This characteristic result is so relevant 
for the current situation in almost every country of the world: people with 
multi-nationalities, cosmopolitan cities, inhabitants with different 
backgrounds such as natives, migrants, and floating population (people who 
are in the country for business or studies). 
This reality is valid almost worldwide and is so useful in 
multiculturalism counseling. In Japan,11 the NOHO Theatre Group of Kyoto 
staged the plays of Samuel Becket in a fusion of kyogen and experimental 
elements, mixing occidental theatre with the oriental form of doing theatre. 
Another example of multicultural theatre took place in 1996 at the Habima 
Theatre in Tel Aviv when a company founded in 1917 by actors trained at the 
Moscow Art Theatre in the naturalistic style by Stanislavski himself, and 
presented for the first time a new work written and performed as a modern 
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Hebrew interpretation of Nöh and Kabuki. Or again in Paris, where Arine 
Mnouchkine directed  the Théâtre du Soleil in a compelling production of Les 
Atrides, a four play, ten-hour cycle of Greek tragedies in which the actors 
wore opulent ceremonial costumes of Asian provenance, the stagehands were 
kabuki-like, while the choreography of the chorus emulated the Kathakali 
dance dramas of Southern India. Why do I mention these plays? Because 
these are a perfect display of multiculturalism. These masterpieces of theatre 
have made the crossover and have allowed people from very different parts 
of the world to come closer together through the theatre. 
 
5.  Final notes 
Resilience should be understood in terms of dynamic abilities, or as 
characteristics that can be developed with good guidance. Counseling and 
Theatre contribute to people recovering their hope and a better attitude to life. 
For developing a resilient personality people have many resources, 
counseling with theatre is just one of them. It doesn’t work for everyone and 
there are wide ranges of alternatives. 
For sharing a more resilient personality we don’t need to change our 
whole life. Developing resilience does not imply that we have to start from 
nothing. It’s more about rearranging, combining, and synthesizing existing 
ideas and frames of reference. 
When we are in trouble, we try to solve the problems by our own 
well-known rules for doing everything. When the old techniques don’t work, 
the counseling and theatre can offer us tools for solving problems through a 
relearning process.  
Disciplines today are not detached, the period of time in which 
professionals worked individually has passed. Collaborative work is the 
result of necessities of the world of 21st century. Following this, different 
perspectives of Psychology, Counseling and Arts perform work without 
precedence because we are not located in established disciplinary ways of 
doing things. Artists and Counselors work can be seen along the same lines: 
as creating new visions of the reality in which we live, working together to 
contribute to the development of a more resilient personality, and to create 
hope for those whose situations in life have made them hopeless. 
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Abstract: Abstract: Three different theoretical frameworks of optimism-
pessimism (hereunder OP) constitute the basis for this study; the 
Dispositional Optimism, the Hope Theory, and the OP Explanatory Style. 
Analysis of the similarities and the differences between these theories reveals 
subtle differences that might lead to one unified theory. Within this theory 
two objectives were investigated: (a) the measure OP’s stability in the 
different content domains, and (b) the measure of consistency between the 
cognitive OP expectancies (hereunder, plausibility) and the positive-negative 
emotions. 244 participants of various ages (M= 35.97; SD = 18.35) 
completed two questionnaires: (1) An upgrade of existing questionnaires (2) 
A questionnaire to assess 5 events; 3 of high personal involvement for the 
individual (expected surgery), and 2 of low personal involvement (National 
economic situation).  
The results of the study show that: 
 
A. The OP variable is composed of two separate factors: 
one of high personal involvement, and the second of low 
personal involvement. In each of them the stability in the 
various content domains (cross-domain) is maintained; 
B. Lower plausibility-emotions correlation is found in high 
personal involvement than in low personal involvement. 
C. In events of high personal involvement a high positive 
correlation is found between the emotions and the OP 
grade. However, in events with low personal involvement, 
the correlation between emotions and OP grade is positive, 
but significantly lower. 
 
 The results emphasize the role of the emotions as one of the sources 
of information processing for the OP evaluation. High Emotional impact 
provides different information processing than low emotional impact.   
 
Key words: Optimism-Pessimism, Heuristic-Systematic information 
processing, emotions. 
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1. Theoretical background 
 
A. Optimism-Pessimism Theoretical frameworks.  Three different theoretical 
frameworks of optimism-pessimism (hereby OP) constitute the basis for this 
study; the Dispositional Optimism, the Hope Theory, and the OP Explanatory 
Style.  
 The Dispositional Optimism is based on a particular version of the 
expectancy-value model approach to motivation which leads to a description 
of the self-regulatory model.1 
 The Hope Theory conceptualizes hope as a cognitive set that is 
directed at goal attainment. Hope contains two interrelated components: The 
first component is agency, which is a perception of successful use of energy 
in the pursuit of goals in one’s past, present, and future. The second 
component is pathways thinking, which is defined as a perceived ability to 
imagine ways of generating successful routes by which to reach a given 
goal.2 
 According to the OP Explanatory Style, the terms Optimism and 
Pessimism apply to the ways in which people routinely explain events in their 
lives. People are optimistic when they attribute problems to temporary, 
specific, and external (opposed to permanent, pervasive, and internal) 
causes.3   
 
B. Common dominators in most aspects of OP theories. Deep study of the 
terms “Optimism” & “Pessimism” requires analysis of the similarity and the 
difference amongst the theories. We found common denominators in most 
aspects of OP theories. 
 
C. Expectation= plausibility; estimation of outcome probability. There is a 
general agreement on the OP definition: Optimism or Pessimism is the 
expectancy of future positive or negative outcomes, respectively.45 Subtle 
differences in the definition of expectancy led to the use of the word 
“plausibility” which is defined as the estimation of outcome probability 
including adjusted calculation of other factors such as personal history, 
personal characteristics, heuristics etc. In other words, plausibility refers to 
the cognitive process of information that helps to predict future outcome. 
 
D. Similar process: positive (negative) plausibility enhances (reduces) 
motivation and emotions, and consequential behaviour. Positive plausibility 
enhances motivation towards goal attainment, while negative plausibility 
reduces motivation.  Positive plausibility leads to positive emotions and vice 
versa:  OP consequences predict behaviour.  
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E. Analysis of the OP theories may lead to one unified theory. Analysis of 
these three OP theories reveals subtle differences that might lead to one 
unified theory. The unified theory concludes plausibility and emotions: 
Positive plausibility and emotions enhance motivation towards goal 
attainment that predicts behaviour, while negative plausibility and emotions 
reduce motivation towards goal attainment. 
 
F. Contradicting findings whether the OP variable is domain-general or 
domain-specific. The OP theoretical frameworks present relative life-time 
stability of the OP variable.67 However, contradictions were found regarding 
the stability of OP in the different content domain: Garber claimed that 
findings have been mixed in empirical examinations of the relation between 
general OP Explanatory Style and explanations within specific domains.8 
Lopez clarified that although the Hope Theory emphasizes the dispositional 
hope over the last decade, it has become clear that ‘here and now’ hope is 
important.9 One of our objectives is to discover the conditions in which the 
OP is cross-domain.  
 
G. Emotions have more influence on the OP variable in events of high 
personal involvement. Lazarus defines emotions as complicated responses 
that involve physical and mental states, and include subjective psychological 
conditions, impulsion to act and physical changes. Emotions rise in 
accordance with personal meaning or explanation of surrounding events, 
when one attributes an event to an achievement, or to prevention of a 
personal goal.10 In other words, emotions will rise when events are explained 
as successful and they strengthen our self-esteem, or when they are explained 
as failures which threaten our self-esteem. One of the objectives of this study 
is to reveal the influence of high vs. low personal involvement on the 
emotions in the OP variable. 
 
.2 The Research Hypotheses 
 Three hypotheses are derived from the theoretical background. First, 
the OP variable will keep its stability in accordance with the level of personal 
involvement: Events of high (vs. low) personal involvement will produce 
different OP variables. Second, in events of low personal involvement higher 
plausibility-emotions will be found than in events of high personal 
involvement. This hypothesis is explained by the theory in which - in low 
personal involvement - the emotions’ importance decreases and results from 
the plausibility. However, in high personal involvement - when the impact of 
the emotions increases - lower plausibility-emotions correlation is expected. 
The Third involves two sub-hypotheses: events of low personal involvement 
will rely more on plausibility than on emotions, and events of high personal 
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involvement will rely more on the emotional component than on the 
plausibility. 
 Since low personal involvement reduces the influence of the 
emotions on the OP variable, events of low personal involvement will mainly 
rely on plausibility in evaluating OP. However, events of high personal 
involvement enhance the influence of emotions in OP and would cause a 
major influence.   
 
3. Methods 
A. Participants. 244 participants (193 females and 51 males, M= 35.97; SD = 
18.35) took part in this study. The participants were chosen randomly from 
different courses of Social Science (40%), 3 high-school classroom teachers 
(30%) and a group of elderly participants in special courses (30%). 
 
B. Materials. Participants completed two OP questionnaires in this study.  
The first questionnaire is self-report measure which is an upgrade of existing 
questionnaires: the Revised Life Orientation Test (LOT-R) that measures OP 
according to the Dispositional Optimism Theory11 and the Hope Scale (HS) 
that derived from the Hope Theory.12  
 The LOT-R consists of eight items (plus four filler items), four of 
which are positively and four negatively worded. Respondents indicate their 
agreement with statements on a 5-point Likert type scale where 0 = strongly 
disagree and 4 = strongly agree. High scores indicate high levels of 
optimism. 
 The HS comprises 8 items with an additional 4 items to disguise the 
nature of the test. Respondents rate the extent to which statements apply to 
them on a 4-point Likert-type scale in which 1=definitely false and4= 
definitely true.  
 In the upgraded questionnaire we used a 5-point Likert-type scale in 
which 1=totally disagree and 5=totally agree, high scores indicate high levels 
of optimism. We added emotional statements to the questionnaire that 
contains a total of 46 statements, 12 of which are filler items.  Internal 
reliability using Cronbach’s coefficient alpha= .916. 
 We also initiated a new OP questionnaire, based on the Attributional 
Style Questionnaire (ASQ)13 structure in order to measure OP in different 
content domains. Participants were required to assess their plausibility and 
their emotions in 5 different events; three events of high personal 
involvement for the individual and including expected surgery, a dismissal 
possibility and theoretical problem in a couple’s life, and two events  of low 
personal involvement that deal with the national economic situation, and the 
existing separate groups in the nation. 
 For example, participants were requested to report on their thoughts 
(plausibility) in a hypothetic event of possible diagnosis after CT imaging. 
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They were able to choose more than one option, and to estimate each ones’ 
weight in percentages. They were also requested to report on their feelings 
(emotions) towards the future in this case. They could choose more than one 
feeling, and estimate the weight of each feeling.  
 The results were grouped in two groups: high and low personal 
involvement high scores indicating high levels of optimism. Internal 
reliability using Cronbach’s coefficient alpha = .49, .45 respectively. These 
low consistencies reflect separate variable components (plausibility and 
emotion) and are similar to the internal reliability of the ASQ (range from .44 
to .69).  
 
C. Procedure. Participants took part in groups of 20-30. After completing a 
consent form, they were handed a questionnaire booklet containing the tests. 
Participants were assigned to all five events of the new OP questionnaire. All 
participants first completed the OP self report questionnaire and then 
answered the new OP questionnaire. After completing the booklet, they were 
thanked and debriefed. 
 
4. Results  
 The first hypothesis postulates that events of high vs. low personal 
involvement will produce different OP, in each of which the stability is 
maintained (cross-domain). Confirmatory factor analysis of the OP 
questionnaire; events analysis using varimax rotation method is presented in 
table 1.  
 
Item F1 F2 
Event 1- pessimistic statement  .825  
Event 1- optimistic statement -.800  
Event 2- pessimistic statement  .702  
Event 2- optimistic statement -.694  
Event 3- pessimistic statement .546  
Event 3- optimistic statement -.424  
Event 5- pessimistic statement  -.708 
Event 5- optimistic statement  .757 
Event 4- pessimistic statement  -.744 
Event 4- optimistic statement  .757 
Table 1. CFA (2 factors) rotated matrix of the OP variable 
questionnaire; events analysis  
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 The results confirm the hypothesis. The findings indicate that the 
OP variable is composed of two separate factors, one of high personal 
involvement (presented as events 1-3) and the second of low personal 
involvement (presented as events 4-5). In each of them, the stability in the 
various content domains (cross-domain) is maintained. The two factors are 
independent (r= -.018, p>.05). 
 The second research hypothesis assumed that in events of low 
personal involvement higher correlation will be found between plausibility 
and emotions than in events of high personal involvement. The third research 
hypothesis was that OP in events of low personal involvement will rely more 
on the cognitive plausibility than on emotions and vice versa, OP in events of 
high personal involvement will rely more on the emotional component than 
on the cognitive plausibility. In order to test these two hypotheses we used 
the OP self report questionnaire, that represents a general OP, as evaluator of 
the higher plausibility/emotions influence on the OP in analyzing specific 
events. The operational hypotheses were, therefore, that in low personal 
involvement, higher correlation will be found between plausibility and 
emotions than in high personal involvement. In addition, in low personal 
involvement, when the plausibility will be held constant, no correlation will 
be found between emotions and the OP self report questionnaire. However, in 
high personal involvement, when the emotions will be held constant, no 
correlation will be found between plausibility and the OP self report 
questionnaire. 
 We used partial correlation to test the third hypothesis. Tables 2-3 
present the correlation between the OP self report questionnaire plausibility 
and emotions in low and high personal involvement. After each table, partial 
correlation is presented: 
 
  
  OP self report Q  Plausibility Emotions  
OP self report Q -   
Plausibility .353(**) -  
Emotions .244(**) .569(**) - 
**  p < 0.01. 
Table 2. Pearson correlation among OP self report questionnaire, 
plausibility and emotions in low personal involvement 
 
 Partial correlation between OP self report questionnaire and 
emotions when the plausibility is held constant is found r= .055, p > .05. 
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 OP self report Q  Plausibility Emotions  
OP self report Q -   
Plausibility .338(**) -  
Emotions .496(**) .466(**) - 
**  p < 0.01. 
 
Table 3. Pearson correlation among OP self report questionnaire, 
plausibility and emotions in high personal involvement 
 
 Partial correlation between OP self report questionnaire and 
plausibility when the emotions are held constant is found r= .139, r < .05. 
 The result generally confirmed the two hypotheses: in low personal 
involvement higher correlation is found between plausibility and emotions 
than plausibility-emotions correlation in high personal involvement. In 
addition, higher correlation is found between the OP self-report questionnaire 
and plausibility, than the correlation between this questionnaire and 
emotions. However, in high personal involvement the correlation between the 
OP self-report questionnaire and plausibility is moderate, but the correlation 
between this questionnaire and emotions is higher. The difference between 
the correlation the OP self-report questionnaire and emotions in events of 
high and low personal involvement is significant (p = 0.0013). 
 Partial correlation was performed on low and high personal 
involvement. In low personal involvement, when the emotional component 
was held constant, no significant correlation was found between the OP self-
report questionnaire and emotions. In high personal involvement, when 
emotions components were held constant, a positive low correlation was 
found between the OP self-report questionnaire and plausibility.  
 
5. Discussion  
A. Summary of the research findings. The results of the study show the 
following. The OP variable is composed of two separate factors, one of high 
personal involvement and the second of low personal involvement. In each of 
them, the stability in the various content domains (cross-domain) is 
maintained;  
 Lower plausibility-emotions correlation is found in high personal 
involvement than in low personal involvement.  
 In OP of low personal involvement, when the plausibility is held 
constant, no correlation is found between emotions and the OP self-report 
questionnaire. In OP of high personal involvement, when the emotions are 
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held constant, low correlation is found between plausibility and the OP self-
report questionnaire. 
 Understanding the research results demands a short  introduction to 
the Heuristic-Systematic Model, that describes two possibilities of 
information processing toward attitudinal judgment.14 This theory will further 
help in explaining the results of this research. 
 
B. The Heuristic-System Model: high motivation and cognitive capacity will 
cause systematic information processing. Heuristic-system model (HSM;) 
distinguishes two prototypical modes of information processing that form the 
poles of a continuum of processing effort: a) an effortless heuristic mode and 
b) a systematic mode requiring more effort. According to the HSM theory, 
the processing effort varies with a perceiver’s motivation and cognitive 
capacity.  
 Heuristic processing involves the use of simple generalizations that 
individuals believe are predictive of a variable.  These cognitive shortcuts are 
developed from prior experiences and become procedural knowledge used to 
evaluate messages. Systematic processing, by contrast, involves detailed 
analysis of the quality and structure of the argument, and requires greater 
cognitive effort and attention.  
 Motivation to process systematically is often determined by the 
evaluator’s desire for accuracy in his or her judgments, derived from the need 
to possess confidence in his/her evaluation. To the extent that an evaluator 
has a strong desire to reach an accurate conclusion, that individual is more 
likely to engage in systematic processing. Moreover, as individuals increase 
their level of systematic processing, the effects of heuristic cues are typically 
attenuated, although not necessarily removed. Derived from the HSM theory, 
a necessary component to produce heuristic and/or systematic processing is 
the level of confidence that one possesses an accurate variable (hereby ST-
AC gap).  
 The model’s sufficiency principle states that people try to attain 
sufficient confidence in their judgment. What is sufficient is defined by two 
constructs: a) the sufficiency threshold (ST), defined as the level of 
confidence a person would like to have, and b) the person’s actual confidence 
(AC). The HSM assumes that whenever the actual confidence is below the 
sufficiency threshold, the individual will be motivated to process (additional) 
information, and the larger ST-AC gaps are more likely to require systematic 
processing, whereas smaller gaps may be bridged by heuristic alone. 
 Both sufficiency threshold of confidence and actual confidence vary 
across persons and situations. For example, if the evaluation is attributed to 
low personal relevance, both ST and AC should be similarly low and little 
processing effort would be expected. When the ST is high, AC in holding an 
accurate evaluation is questioned. When the AC is also high, no necessity to 
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hold an accurate evaluation will appear, and respectively, there will be no 
motivation to information processing requiring more effort. However, low 
AC increases one’s motivation to hold an accurate evaluation and would 
cause an increase in information processing (systematic processing) requiring 
effort. 
 
C. Adaptation of the HSM to The OP variable. As examined in the research 
finding, there are two independent factors of the OP variable; one of high 
personal involvement and another one of low personal involvement. Each 
one of them includes two components: a) plausibility, b) emotion. In the 
research we used also a general OP measurement to measure the OP self-
report questionnaire (c).  
 C1. OP in events of low personal involvement provide heuristic 
information processing. Our findings support the adaptation of the HSM 
theory to the OP theory: in events of low personal involvement heuristic 
information processing appears. Three findings represent this kind of 
information processing: 
 Higher plausibility-emotions correlation in low personal 
involvement than in high personal involvement, points to the tendency to 
maintain consistency between the two components and therefore to use 
heuristic processing.  
 In partial correlation, when the plausibility component is held 
constant, no correlation is found between the OP self-report questionnaire 
and emotions. This finding proves that the main influence on the evaluation 
of events of low personal involvement is by the plausibility component that 
effects emotions. 
 C2. Events of high personal involvement provide heuristic and/or 
systematic information processing. The results point to the emotional 
heuristic processing as the type of heuristic processing that is used in OP of 
high personal involvement. That is, holding emotions as constant in partial 
correlation examines low positive significant correlation between the OP 
self-report questionnaire and plausibility. In other words, encountering events 
of high personal involvement mainly raises the emotional level, which 
generally affects (through emotional heuristic processing, and in specific 
conditions that will be discussed, through systematic processing) the 
evaluative plausibility. 
 However in specific conditions, systematic processing may emerge. 
The first condition is high personal involvement, which requires high ST. 
The second condition is low AC that appears in moderate levels of OP. This 
condition is implied by the low correlation plausibility-emotions in high 
personal involvement. However, this subject needs further research. 
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D. Summary. The main conclusions of this research are as follows. In OP of 
low personal involvement the heuristic information processing controls. In 
OP of high personal involvement emotional heuristic processing usually 
controls. In further research the appearance of systematic processing will be 
measured in OP of high personal involvement, when the plausibility is 
moderate. 
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Part III 
Literature, Art and Hope 

Finding Life in the Liminal: 
The True Voice in the Cinematic Narration of a Psychopath 
 
Phil Fitzsimmons 
 
Abstract: This paper is grounded in Blessing and Tudico’s notion that 
movies are a reflection of and a reaction to the ongoing search for purpose 
and meaning in our daily lives.1 The existential answers to the purpose of 
life, once found in institutions such as the church, now supposedly resides in 
popular culture in general and the cinema in particular. As Lyden further 
suggests the sense of encroaching chaos and meaningless that proliferates in 
current Western society is tempered by the neat framing of time and focussed 
overcoming of the ‘uncanny’, evil, death, injustice, pain and suffering that 
movies provide.2 
 An answer to this problem is not immediately apparent in the movie 
‘The Departed’. It is not until the concept of the ‘scapegoat’, a premise 
touched on visually and linguistically several times in the movie, is applied 
as a thematic and dialogic foil that the apparent nihilism of this film is seen 
to be a carefully constructed ruse. Using ‘language in action’ as a platform of 
demonstration, this movie will be deconstructed via the notion of the 
‘scapegoat’ to reveal how key elements of the dialogue raise the subtext into 
pivotal ‘definable perspectives’ of hope in a world of apparent mayhem, 
murder, betrayal and hopelessness.  
 
Key words: Hope, The Departed, scapegoat. 
 
1. Foundations of Analysis  
 The framework of analysis that gave rise to this chapter is grounded 
in three key precepts. Firstly, social construction is primarily developed 
through a narrative blend of social reality and symbolic interaction vehicle 
through which social reality is constructed.3 However, it is generally 
accepted that at present this narrative mélange in the western world is in a 
state of flux. In an era of post-millennial instability, where we in the First 
World appear to be existentially aimless the transtextual narrative of terror 
and terrorism has overshadowed our thoughts and dominated the stories that 
we told in our daily lives through the print and visual media. Our world 
survived the supposed techno time bomb of the change into the third 
millennium, and in age of cynicism and rapid increase of IT wizardry that 
constantly bombards our waking senses with supposed non fiction hypertext 
we have lost the concept of the ‘connective narratives’; the ones that tell us 
who we are. 
Secondly, up until relatively recently it was through our primary 
social institutions that our sense of connected narrative arose, and in 
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particular our religious institutions. However, in many instances these appear 
to be failing, not in the sense of telling the wrong story or a story, but in the 
way they tell their stories. They are still shuffling down the same old mode 
continuum as the exegesis of these narratives has slipped into a ‘taken for 
granted’ explanation instead of what I would call ‘heuristic liminality’. In 
other words our narratives have become forms of “norm bound incumbency, 
liminality is belittled, skipped over and denied”.4 Our stories no longer take 
us to the edge of possibility and provide opportunities of exploring new 
meanings through the extremes found at the edge of our imagination. Their 
message is indeed the medium but it not longer resonates in the same way. 
Hence, instead it would appear that that the old prayer of ‘give us 
our daily bread’ is now located in the screens found in our homes and in the 
movie theatres. However, with television rapidly becoming a small visual 
snippet that simply keeps the commercials apart, the cinema is now the new 
house of worship. It is there that millions find existential sustenance in the 
‘dream state”5 of others as a reflection of themselves. 
This paper focuses on one of the most recent ‘new mirrors’, The 
Departed, and how it defines the concept of hope firstly through how it is 
defined in the current context of culture, and secondly how it should be 
defined through the ever present but at times almost undetectable lens of the 
‘scapegoat’ motif. However, this movie refocuses the typical interwoven 
thread of voice and cinematic eye, and instead utilizes an initial documentary 
style to introduce its simple first level of discourse, which then switches into 
a third person jigsaw of character interplay. However, throughout the movie 
there are elements of dialogue that act as linguistic disconnectors, and 
introduce a primal narrative in which “the question of voice becomes, finally 
the question of mind, and both are inseparable from the question of 
meaning”.6 
 
2. The Voice and Subvoice: The Key is at the Door 
From the moment the initial voice over begins in this film, the 
narrative not only details and complements what the viewer sees, but begins 
a subtle counterpoint. While the first person assertions of Frank Costello, an 
Irish gangster, and visual elements assign the narrative to its plot trajectory of 
“you have to take what you want”; Costello’s personal view, viewpoint and 
ideology give unstated voice to other levels of discourse. While the initial 
focus creates a continual commentary on hopeless, death and abandonment, 
there is a continual parenthetic commentary that re-brackets the scenes of 
bloodshed and third person dialogue into a sense that there is hope in a world 
defined since the turn of the twentieth century as ‘chaos’.  
While seemingly overwhelmed within greed and hopelessness, the 
linguistic re-bracketing commences with an embedded link to the symbol of 
the ‘scapegoat’ and the irrelevance and corruption of the church. 
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Commenting on the most ancient of motifs, Deardroff defines the 
scapegoat’s character and characteristics as “the fall from the promised life. 
Here is the one driven to interiority, marked by the wound and wounded for 
bearing the mark”.7 Commencing with Costello, all of the characters in this 
movie experience this fall from grace and bear a mark of some kind.  
The initial frames of violence and racism are a lead into Costello’s 
comment. “I don’t want to be a product of my environment. I want my 
environment to be a product of me”. While asserting the dominant theme of 
being in control of his own life and the immediate environment around him, 
this single sentence is a crystallization of the ancient religious symbol of the 
first murder when Cain killed his brother Able and received the ‘mark of 
Cain’. In what Girard calls, a ‘sacrificial crisis”,8 this murder was over the 
use of food from the immediate environment as means of supplanting the 
killing of a lamb as the sacrificial symbol of eternal hope and resurrection. In 
the Christian cannon this murder was the enactment of the Edenic familial 
sacrificial system in which an innocent lamb was killed as means of 
revealing that a saviour would come as a means of rescue by taking on the 
vicarious death of all humanity. In the Jewish exodus this daily sacrificial rite 
became an even more focussed ritual through the annual Day of Atonement 
rites. During the course of this ceremony the sins of the slain lamb were 
figuratively cast onto a scapegoat, which was sent in to the desert to die. 
Acting as a double binary, this ceremony metaphorically not only prefigured 
the final redemptive act of a messianic figure by taking on the evil of all 
mankind through his death, but the ending of all sin in which evil is cast out. 
This casting out process is typically viewed as Satan being the final bearer of 
the sins he created, as he is finally destroyed in the heat and loneliness of a 
figurative desert. The Christian church has taken over this typological 
narrative and has typically seen its role as proclaiming this dual message of 
the messiah as sin bearer and finisher of evil. The theological corollary of 
this being the principle that the death of the Christian believer is temporary 
and that his or her sins will finally be atoned for by the messiah who will 
place all sin onto the head of the final scapegoat, on the final day of 
judgement. 
Thus in a few short words Costello reveals the impetus and narrative 
framework of the movie as well as his life path of murder. On the surface it 
would appear that this movie is a metaphor for the death of what constitutes 
genuine hope at both a personal, ideological and cultural level. In almost the 
same breath Costello conjoins this ideological synthesis with a comment that, 
“years ago we had the church, that was only a way of saying we had each 
other. The Knights of Columbus were head-breakers. They took over their 
piece of the city”. As an Irishman, it obvious his religious context in the 
movie is bound up with the catholic faith in a contest for ‘turf’. Thus, there 
exists a triune conflict between the popular view of the church as being 
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irrelevant, the loss of the genuine message from those who minister in the 
church, and Costello’s chosen pathway. 
Another reoccurring motif of this movie is the revelation that the 
priests in Costello’s world are just as corrupt has he is. Rather than being the 
pathway of hope, the church is continually cast as being a new mafia, one 
that deals in even more sordid activities than any of the ethnic criminal 
forms.  
Linked to this chain of cohesion, is Costello’s comment that “the 
church wants you in your place”. Coming within the initial section of the 
movie, where Costello is castigating the church, he fails to realize that in his 
search for apparent freedom to do as he pleases he has actually set in place a 
criminal form that insists on the same mindless allegiance and acquiescence. 
Indeed from this point on in the film, the plot parallels and intertwines 
Costello’s criminal activity with church activity and references to the notion 
of salvation.  
The second hint of the presence of the scapegoat trope surfaces in 
the initial voice over commentary by Costello when he states: 
 
Twenty years after an Irishman couldn't get a job, we had 
the presidency. That's what the niggers don't realize. If I 
got one thing against the black chaps it's this: No one gives 
it to you. You have to take it. 
 
While Costello’s statements thus far reasserts the narrative principle 
that the activity of authoring always takes place in the context of a 
relationship, in the ongoing dialogue between self and others, in his context it 
reveals the ongoing threads of the scapegoat motif and murder. A subtle hint 
of conspiracy theory is revived here. A common set of popular myths in 
regard to the Kennedy presidency are that John Fitzgerald Kennedy was 
elected on the back of his father’s dirty money and criminal activity, and his 
assassination was a scapegoat elimination because of his political directions. 
In a linked scene where Costello is taking what he wants, he begins 
the ‘buying off’ of the young Collin Sullivan with food and comics, the first 
of which are three loaves of bread. With these messianic motifs at the fore, 
the movie rapidly shifts into another religious context, the scene of a morning 
mass where young Collin is serving as an altar boy. With incense swirling 
around, again a symbol of messianic intercession, the priest intones:  
 
To you, O Lord we commend the soul of Alphonsus, your 
Servant; in the sight of this world he is now dead; in your 
sight may he live forever. Forgive whatever sins he 
committed through human weakness and in your goodness 
grant him everlasting peace. 
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 As indicated, everlasting peace can only be achieved through the 
rite and symbolism of the scapegoat carrying the reason for sin into oblivion. 
However, it quickly becomes apparent that Colin grows up in the fold of 
Frank Costello, even when he moves into the Boston police force. As a 
defector from his initial faith, and mole for Costello in another bastion of 
protection, Sullivan also moves into a state where he is doubly in need of a 
scapegoat. Like Costello, not only has he departed from the supposed way of 
truth as faith but he also departed from the path of the church’s golden rule.  
 As a polar opposite to this thread of an outsider becoming a part of 
Costello’s family, Costello’s real nephew, Billy Costello, moves away from 
the family. In a confrontation with his Uncle Ed Costello, he makes it clear 
that after the death of his mother he will be ending all family connections. 
However, he also enters the same police force as Collin, and because of his 
insider knowledge is recruited to become an informer for the police. He thus 
takes on the mantle of the scapegoat. Although desperately wanting to escape 
his past, he is forced to re-enter that world as an undercover agent, the 
payment for which is the ultimate loss of his soul, sense of self and his life. 
In what Miller believes is “an integral part of the sacred aspect of the 
repeated narrative framework of the one who could not rest in his own lived 
life”,9 Billy is from this scene onwards “is inscribed, for him and for us, with 
death”.10 As his death is for a cause that was not of his making and the result 
of others crimes, indulgences and transgressions, it is the departing of the 
‘scapegoat’.  
 After a series of intertwined sequences where we gain even more 
glimpses into the worlds of these two characters the movie cuts to the funeral 
of Billy’s mother. With no connection to the few mourners that are there, we 
finally see Billy alone at the graveside. He notices a tag on one of the 
wreathes under the Virgin Mary, it reads “Heaven holds the Faithful 
Departed" and it is signed: "F. Costello". As Bailey has pointed out the 
flowers, especially those cast on the circular wreath are associated with the 
finding of grace, Jerusalem as the place of grace or spiritual plenty.11 The 
motifs of death, abandonment and human weakness once again meet on 
common ground, at a point of connection for the two family members under 
another symbol of salvation. As Deardorf has pointed out, once a society 
departs from the notions of family, love and the higher ideals of humanity 
there is often the need, or at least the understanding of the need for a 
sacrifice. Through a sacrificial wounding those wandering from the path can 
find hope in the trialogue narrative of “the stranger, village and road-
personal, local and universal”.12 Again, the subtext of the need for scapegoat 
surfaces in this trinity where Billy has not been able to fit within the village, 
and does not look up to a symbol of the universal. 
 In a key scene where Costello is confronted by Queenan and 
Dignan, the officers ‘running’ Billy, a key parenthetical aside revisits the 
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heated confrontation between the protagonists. As he walks off, Costello 
joins this girlfriend, as they follow a group of young girls dressed as angels. 
This is a subtle return to the theme of the scapegoat moving on ‘the universal 
road’. However, the theme of redemption is immediately highlighted when 
the movie cuts to a black and while television playing, and man is seen 
kneeling before a crucified Christ. He loudly exclaims, “Frankie. Frankie, 
your mother forgives me”. Both elements in this post confrontation 
perspective are linked to the initial opening where Billy is serving as an altar 
boy, and the priest finishes off the funeral with the incantation, 
 
May the angels lead you into paradise; May the martyrs 
come to welcome you and take you to the holy city, the 
new and eternal Jerusalem. 
 
It is at this point that the movie rapidly leads to the death of all of the three 
main characters. Costello is killed by Collin for being an FBI informer, 
Collin is killed by Dignan in act of revenge, each shot and killed for 
following their path of vindico vindcta, the killing of one’s own family or 
kinsman. Only Billy dies the death of the scapegoat, the “unexamined life”.13 
 
3. The Surfacing of Hope 
 In this cinematic dreamscape of mayhem, death and bloodshed, 
where does the viewer see the emergence of hope? The first person voice 
over that commences this film invites the reader-viewer to also understand 
this film through the first person singular and ask the questions raised by this 
movie through the same lens. From the opening scenes we seem to be forced 
to ask, how will it end? Will my life end in the same way as the characters I 
have seen? 
 At the first level of discourse the narrative of this movie focuses on 
hopelessness and links this concept to the issues of death and quality of life. 
It very bluntly says that we now live in a world where the concept of hope 
has all but been extinguished. “The primary disease of earth’s prisoner is 
neither coronary heart disease or cancer. It is meaninglessness”.14 
 However, as pointed out in the previous pages, one of the second 
levels of discourse in this film is the ideal of the scapegoat narrative. This 
age old understory has always been grounded in the concept of finding a sure 
resting place through personal sacrifice. Throughout history this reoccurring 
narrative element has always spoken of the hope that lies not in a life that 
focuses on the self, but one that focuses on relationships and love. Just as 
Costello dies as part of the environment he created, falling backwards into a 
false grave of a grader’s bucket so too the being that relies on self and the use 
of “pleasure as an art of existence”15 as the sole art of existence never 
completely finds rest for their soul.  
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 More importantly, the scapegoat motif in this movie echoes all of its 
predecessors in that its message is that the secret to life is found in the 
development of a spiritual core, and in the ‘substitutional’ death of another. 
While this has theological overtones, For Victor Frankel the praxis of this 
theological and psychological understanding was more fundamental, one has 
to give oneself to another. 
 
The more one forgets himself-by giving himself to a cause 
to serve or another person to love-the more human he is 
and the more he actualizes himself.16
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Abstract: The article is opened with a brief analysis of George Steiner’s 
disillusionment with the humane power of art. Faced with the atrocities of the 
twentieth century, European literature of the post-WW2 period lost its purely 
aesthetic character and testified to the overwhelming sense of despair. Such 
transformation of the artistic paradigm opened ground for philosophic 
nihilism epitomised by Jacques Derrida and post-modern whirling of 
signifiers (notably this shift flooded Polish thought as late as in the 1990s, 
after the fall of the Communist regime). Still, at the turn of the century, it 
became clear that what initially seemed an expression of utter despair, 
retrospectively revealed its more ambiguous nature. This shift is illustrated 
with the dynamics of the reception of Samuel Beckett’s drama within the last 
few decades. The final part of the paper focuses on traces of hope which are 
to be found even in such desperate work as that of Tadeusz Kantor, Tadeusz 
Różewicz, and the Wierszalin Theatre. 
 
Key words: 20th century literature, theatre, Derrida, Beckett, Kantor, 
Rozewicz, Wierszalin Theatre. 
 
 
 
 Yet again, in Grammars of Creation, a book published at the starting 
point of this century, George Steiner looks back at the watery craters of 
Verdun and the ghastly barracks of Auschwitz. Disillusioned with humanity, 
he insists on pursuing reasons that might have triggered the atrocities of the 
twentieth century. Steiner seems to believe, notwithstanding his awareness of 
“the divorce between humanity and language,”1 that a human being still is a 
creature directed by the imperative of questioning, the craving for 
belabouring and by the desire for speculation. Grammars of Creation, as any 
other work written by George Steiner, gives testimony to the very nature of 
the “language animal” and thus proves that there is, after all, something left 
to say. 
 Among the questions that dominate Steiner’s argumentation, the one 
concerning the ambiguity of hope and fear fascinates me with its vibrant 
resonance. Messianic hope - which encompasses for Steiner both Christian 
and Marxist postulates for future perfection - and the fear of death are the 
notions whose epistemological vitality has stimulated the cultural evolution 
of mankind. But the twentieth century changed a lot in this respect:  
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The twentieth century has put in doubt the theological, the 
philosophical, and the political-material insurance for hope. 
It queries the rationale and credibility of future tenses. It 
makes understandable the statement that ‘there is 
abundance of hope, but none for us’ (Franz Kafka).2  
 
 As elsewhere Steiner expresses  his disillusionment with the human 
power of art and questions its ethically privileged position.3 The main thesis 
of “Humane Literacy” - an essay published in 1963 - concisely and most 
accurately expounds this view. 
 
We come after, and that is the nerve of our condition. After 
the unprecedented ruin of humane values and hopes by the 
political bestiality of our age. That ruin is the starting point 
of any serious thought about literature and the place of 
literature in society. Literature deals essentially and 
continually with the image of man, with the shape and 
motive of human conduct. We cannot act now, be it as 
critics or merely as rational beings, as if nothing of vital 
relevance had happened to our sense of the human 
possibility, as if the extermination by hunger or violence of 
some seventy million men, women, and children in Europe 
and Russia between 1914 and 1945 had not altered, 
profoundly, the quality of our awareness. We cannot 
pretend that Belsen is irrelevant to the responsible life of 
the imagination. What man has inflicted on man, in very 
recent time, has affected the writer's primary material - the 
sum and potential of human behaviour - and it presses on 
the brain with a new darkness.4 
 
 This lengthy quotation establishes the conceptual framework for my 
paper. True: the European literature of the post-WW2 period lost its purely 
aesthetic disposition and testified to the overwhelming sense of despair that 
characterised most of the art of the time. Such transformation of the artistic 
paradigm opened grounds for philosophic nihilism epitomised by Jacques 
Derrida and the post-modern whirling of signifiers. Still, at the turn of the 
century, it became clear that what initially seemed an expression of utter 
despair, retrospectively reveals its more ambiguous nature - traces of hope, 
faint as they might be, have remained an intrinsic part of desperation. 
Paraphrasing Steiner's metaphor: the act of production of a profound and 
veracious work of art restores the credibility and rationale of future tenses. 
Wretchedness, desperation and futility, when incorporated in artistic 
structures, depart from the domain of the phenomenal world and enter the 
Tomasz Wiśniewski 
______________________________________________________________ 
183 
semiosphere. The experience is thus endowed with meaning - be it the 
meaninglessness - which is directed to those who are yet to come. 
 When working on the above thesis, I have scrutinised a considerable 
number of the English- and Polish- language literary texts and theatrical 
performances. For the sake of this paper, I have selected some of the most 
striking examples. I will begin my argumentation with a description of the 
semantic shift in Samuel Beckett’s studies, which has occurred within the last 
few decades. Next, I will refer to Tadeusz Kantor’s theatrical manifesto “The 
Theatre of Death”. It will be followed by a concise analysis of one poem - 
“Ocalenie” - written by another artist from Poland, by Tadeusz Różewicz. In 
the conclusive part, I am going to focus on “Bóg Niżyński”, a recent 
production of a Polish off-fringe theatre, “The Wierszalin Theatre”.  
 An analysis of what has happened to the reception of Samuel 
Beckett’s drama since the world premiere of En Attendant Godot in 1953 
opens the illustrative part of my paper. The global range of Beckett’s 
centenary celebrations in 2006 proved that his work is nowadays deprived of 
the initial aura of incomprehension and sturdy rejection. Stereotypically 
regarded as an unprecedented theatrical scandal (even today anti-drama and 
anti-theatre remain the labels which, in popular view, best describe Beckett’s 
work), the scandal which completely ignores our habits and our expectations, 
Waiting for Godot is no longer considered as an absurd play drained of any 
relation to the traditional culture, as a total annihilation of human values, as a 
nihilistic degradation of norms and conventions. Subjected to scrupulous 
analysis, Beckett turned into a modern classic whose artistic kinship with, 
among others, John Milton, William Shakespeare, Jean Racine, Percy Bysshe 
Shelley and William Butler Yeats, is taken for granted. 
 In the English speaking world the case is particularly explicit. 
Recent productions of Waiting for Godot tend to explore peculiarities of the 
Irish humour (Beckett was Irish). When in 1991, Walter Asmus directed the 
play for the Gate Theatre in Dublin, he frequently defused theatrical tension 
with sudden and unexpected shifts of suggested meanings. I will take just one 
example, that of an amusing, if awkward, scene in which the play on the 
word “nothing” is particularly visible. In the course of the performance, 
Estragon - one of the two main characters - utters a sentence, which yokes 
together the fictional world and the theatrical situation. When saying “In the 
meantime nothing happens”, Estragon comments upon futility of his life, 
reveals his exasperation, alludes to the sense of void, desolation, 
hopelessness. But simultaneously he proves that appalling weariness is an 
intentional quality of the performance - it is an objective of the playwright to 
make the audience bored. In the Gate Theatre production, Walter Asmus 
explores consequences of this double perspective by devising, immediately 
before the Estragon's utterance, enormously long, hardly bearable in the 
theatrical circumstances, silent tableau. In the meantime nothing happens in a 
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very physical way. Yet, the effect that the Estragon’s words brought to the 
audience was that of relief: at last something happened, at last someone broke 
the silence. 
 The comical capacity of the play was further pursued by Peter Hall 
when in 1997 he directed Waiting for Godot at the Old Vic Theatre in 
London. Frequent outbursts of sheer laughter would be something of a shock 
for those who attended Peter Hall’s English language premiere of the play at 
the Arts Theatre in London forty-two years earlier and reacted to it with 
sceptical irritation. Abstract connotations of the minimalist stage design (the 
stage was just a blue box-set), being confronted with the flamboyant 
splendour of the Victorian theatre building, introduced an additional clash 
between contemporary aesthetic norms and those of the nineteenth century. 
What I am trying to say is that Peter Hall’s second production of Waiting for 
Godot provoked a curious interplay of at least three concepts of theatre and, 
by implication, confronted threes sets of human values. On the diachronic 
plane, Hall rejects the naive aesthetics of Victorian entertainment and re-
evaluates the annihilating poetics of nonsense stereotypically ascribed to 
everything which is labelled as the theatre of the absurd. Finally, and most 
importantly, Hall directed his second Godot as a lyrical play in which the 
sense of despair is intermingled with that of lingering hope. Godot has not 
arrived within the two acts of the play. Still, he may - but does not have to - 
come. What is being communicated throughout the play is the fact that in the 
meantime nothing happens. As one other Beckett character puts it:  
 
Ah well what a joy in any case to know you are there, as 
usual, and perhaps awake, and perhaps taking all this in, 
some of all this, what a happy day for me... it will have 
been.5 
 
 Beckett’s stage is inhabited by awkward, shabby figures (e.g. 
Krapp’s Last Tape and Footfalls), which are at times reduced to parts of the 
body (Not I, That Time and Play). And this exemplifies a more general shift, 
which transformed the visual aesthetics in the theatre of 1950s, 60s and 70s. 
The fragmented images, the peripheral phenomena and the tattered actors 
became pivotal elements for the major theatrical experiments of the time, be 
it a Beckett, a Kantor or a Grotowski.  
 In “The Theatre of Death” - to take the example of Tadeusz Kantor’s 
theatrical manifesto - we come across a passage which deals with Kantor’s 
“long-held conviction that only the reality of the lowest order, the poorest 
and least prestigious objects are capable of revealing their full objectivity in a 
work of art.”6 Convinced of “the absolute downfall of today’s 
[institutionalised] theatre,”7, Kantor proposes to re-new the relationship 
between an actor and a spectator by coupling the stage with the notion of 
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death:  
 
The MANNEQUIN in my theatre must become a MODEL, 
through which pass a strong sense of DEATH and the 
condition of the DEAD. A model for the live ACTOR.8  
 
 The model of the theatre which is proposed here offers stark contrast 
to the one which is associated with the Irish theatrical tradition. Whereas for 
Kantor the stage should follow the pattern of the dead, in Irish tradition the 
audience epitomises the dead who are watching the living actors.9 The 
contrast is very telling since it reflects mental disturbance which was 
expressed through this distressing metaphor:  the living took the passive role 
of the observers whilst the dead were acting. The museum in Auschwitz and 
the massive monument in Verdun make the living guilty of having survived. 
 I find it symptomatic that two major Polish poets of the second half 
of the twentieth century examined the semantics of the word “ocalenie” 
(‘rescue’, ‘salvation’) in their works published once the war had finished. If 
in 1945 Czesław Miłosz entitled his collection of poems as “Ocalenie” 
(“Rescue”), Tadeusz Różewicz named one of his most famous early poems as 
“Ocalony”. For the sake of conciseness, I will briefly comment on an English 
translation of only the latter work.  
 Adam Czerniawski opens Różewicz’s poem - translated as “The 
Survivor” - with a gloomily furnished tercet: “I am twenty-four // led to 
slaughter // I survived.”10 Utter confusion of the speaker is further 
strengthened in the following four stanzas in which he: degrades the 
oppositions of “man and beast // love and hate // friend and foe // darkness 
and light” to the rank of hollow and empty synonyms (stanza 2); 
dehumanises the dignity of a human body (stanza 3); equates “virtue” with 
“crime”, “truth” with “lies”, “beauty” with “ugliness”, “courage” with 
“cowardice” since these ideas are merely words (stanza 4). What is more, in 
the fifth stanza the speaker sounds absolutely astonished by the fact that 
“Virtue and crime weight the same // I’ve seen it: // in a man who was both // 
criminal and virtuous”. The frame composition - the final stanza echoes the 
first one - seems to complete the destructive force of this desperate and 
disillusioned expression.  
 Yet, the depths of despair, which certainly dominate Różewicz’s 
“Rescue”, are counterbalanced with slight signs of hope which spring up in 
the penultimate stanza. Let me read the Polish original here: “Szukam 
nauczyciela i mistrza // niech przywróci mi wzrok słuch i mowę // niech 
jeszcze raz nazwie rzeczy i pojęcia // niech oddzieli światło od ciemności.”11 
In Czerniawski’s translation it reads: “I seek a teacher and a master // may he 
restore my sight hearing and speech // may he again name objects and ideas // 
may he separate darkness from light.” This quatrain - this sentence - entails 
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everything that lies at the core of my argumentation. Disillusioned, depressed 
and disenchanted as he is, the speaker preserves in himself capacity for hope, 
the value which seems decisive for maintaining at least some humane traces 
within the mentalscape of the “language animal”. 
 I think that in this sense George Steiner - to refer again to his 
standpoint - catches, with remarkable accuracy, the very gist of the human 
conduct when he wrights in Grammars of Creation the following sentences:  
 
In the overwhelming majority of formative acts […], 
[artists] have hoped to transmit to the future their identity. 
They have hungered after immortality, within the bounds 
which saddened common sense assigned to this promise.12 
 
 As directed to the future, any artistically successful expression of 
despair - caused by the devastation of personal or universal principles - 
assigns to the ruins of the mind more general meaning. After all, some 
promise of hope originates any communicative act since a transmission of the 
mentalscape a priori equals overcoming of the limitations of the self. Hamm, 
a vicious, if pitiable, protagonist of Samuel Beckett’s Endgame, conveys this 
axiom in a very intriguing way:  
 
Hamm: We’re not beginning to… to… mean something? 
 
Clov: Mean something! You and I, mean something! (Brief 
laugh.) Ah that’s a good one!  
 
Hamm: I wonder. (Pause.) Imagine if a rational being came 
back to earth, wouldn’t he be liable to get ideas into his 
head if he observed us long enough. (Voice of a rational 
being.) Ah, good, now I see what it is, yes, now I 
understand what they’re at! ([…] Normal voice.) And 
without going so far as that, we ourselves… (with 
emotion)… we ourselves… at certain moments … 
(Vehemently.) To think perhaps it won’t all have been for 
nothing!13 
 
 When trying to provide the most conclusive proof for the practical 
relevance of my argumentation for contemporary art, I could not help 
thinking about a tiny independent theatre from Supraśl, a provincial town of 
some 4,500 inhabitants which is hidden somewhere in the forests of eastern 
Poland. I am speaking here about the Wierszalin Theatre. I do mention its de-
centralised location on purpose - how many of us have visited Supraśl? - the 
decision of establishing an aspiring theatrical group in the peripheries of 
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Poland, demonstrates complete disregard to the tediousness of the 
mainstream.14 
 In the final part of my paper, I am going to concentrate on a recent 
production of the Wierszalin Theatre, which is entitled “Bóg Niżyński” - 
“God Niżyński”. As the title suggests, the performance is based on the legend 
of Wacław Niżyński, a Russian ballet master who revolutionised the ballet 
conventions during his spectacular, though brief, international career, which 
collapsed at the end of WW1 when Niżyński, at the age of thirty, was 
overtaken by insanity. For the remaining thirty years of his life, the diagnosed 
schizophrenia completely isolated Niżyński from the external world (as the 
legend says he regained consciousness for a brief period in August 1939 so as 
to express, after reading newspapers, his ominous prophecy: “The second act 
is beginning.”)15 
 The story presented by the Wierszalin Theatre is set in a madhouse 
and creates a blasphemous liturgy in which Niżyński - the God, as he calls 
himself - dances on the grave of Siergiej Diagilev,  his most enthusiastic 
mentor, and a detrimental ex-lover. Metaphorical intermingling of the 
madhouse with the sacred16 ruthlessly exploits the void of the human psyche. 
Mental instability of the protagonist throws him into extreme emotions of 
sublime holiness, vicious conceit, self-destructive passion, untamed creativity 
and sheer madness. The ferocious expression of insanity, which permits us to 
probe - in this mysterious play of the twentieth first century - the depths of 
despair, is decisive for the humane quality of “God Niżyński”. The ruin of 
Niżyński’s hopes, aspirations and values, his blasphemous dance and his 
sacrilegious crucifixion might become - for some of us at least - a starting 
point for a serious re-consideration of the void lodged within ourselves. On 
the artistic plane, “God Niżyński” transforms seemingly petrified theatrical 
conventions - such as the gradual anticlockwise switching off lights, the 
powdering of the body with flour and the climactic crucifixion - into 
powerful metaphors.  Yet once again, the creative act of the Wierszalin 
Theatre imposes meaning upon a meaningless story of a hopeless degradation 
of the ballet genius, of his mental exclusion, of his madness. Yet once again, 
the legend of the dead is performed for the living. And again, the hope arises 
that “perhaps it won’t all have been for nothing!” 
 
 
Notes 
 
1 G Steiner, Grammars of Creation, Yale University Press, New Haven and 
London, 2002, p. 283. 
2 ibid., p. 9. 
3 “We know that some of the men who devised and administered Auschwitz 
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had been taught to read Shakespeare and Goethe, and continued to do so”, G 
Steiner, ‘Humane Literacy’, in Language and Silence, G Steiner, Atheneum, 
New York, 1970, p. 5. 
4 ibid., p. 4. 
5 S Beckett, The Complete Dramatic Works, Faber and Faber, London, 1990, 
p. 152. 
6 T Kantor, ‘The Theatre of Death’, in Twentieth Century Polish Theatre, 
Drozdowski (ed.), John Calder, London, 1979, p. 103. 
7 ibid., pp. 102-103. 
8 ibid., p. 102. 
9 For a detailed comparative analysis of the Polish and the Irish theatrical 
traditions see: N Witoszek, The Theatre of Recollection. A Cultural Study of 
the Modern Dramatic Tradition in Ireland and Poland, University of 
Stockholm, Stockholm, 1988. 
10 T Różewicz, Poezje wybrane. Selected Poems, Wydawnictwo Literackie, 
Kraków, 1995, p. 7. 
11 ibid., p. 6. 
12 Steiner, Grammars of Creation, p. 326. 
13 Beckett, pp. 107-108. 
14 In this way, The Wierszalin Theatre follows the tradition of Grotowski’s 
Labaratory Theatre, and The Gardzienice Theatre. 
15 After: W Krasowska, Niżyński, Państwowy Instytut Wydawniczy, 
Warszawa, 1978, p. 208. 
16 The sacred understood as a sphere which matches metaphysical ‘the above’ 
with ‘the below’. 
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Phenomenology of Hope and Despair:  
A Qur’anic Perspective 
 
Noor Mohammad Osmani 
 
Abstract: Hope is an intrinsic value towards success, victory, enthusiasm, 
and a positive attitude in life. It is the main driving force that leads one to 
strive for excellence. Despair, on the other hand, turns off the rays of hope 
and optimism, and keeps one constantly lagging behind. It perishes the 
victims from the inner roots. 
 Al-Qur’an, the Holy Book for all Muslims, sheds lights on the issue 
and urges one to be optimistic and hopeful. It warns of severe punishments 
for persistent criminals and sinners; while, on the other hand, sheds rays of 
hope for Divine mercy and forgiveness to the repentant. The Qur’an 
condemns the phenomenon of despair outright. It is only attributed to the 
deviant and non-believers. The Qur’an relates hope with belief in Allah and 
religion, and despair with disbelief and atheism. (Qur’an 12: 87, 15: 56) It is 
the non-believers alone that quickly turn to despair and hopelessness. He 
collapses during distresses and adversaries. It is the irony of humans that 
when affluent, turn out to be proud, and during adversaries get collapsed and 
loose all hopes, leading sometimes to suicide. (Qur’an 11: 9). The present 
research would therefore aim to provide a clear picture of hope and despair 
from Qur’anic perspective. How does the Qur’an instil hope in the minds of 
common people? What are the qualities of the people who are optimistic and 
have a positive attitude in life? What about those pessimistic and hopeless? 
The research focuses on the Qur’anic ayat as the primary reference, and also 
on the traditions of the Prophets as the secondary source. The research is 
expected to instil some rays of hope in the minds of readers, and through 
their implementation would help them turn out as optimistic and positive 
human being. 
 
Key words: Hope, believers, despair, atheists, Qur’an, Sunnah. 
 
1. Defining Hope and Despair 
 Hope is a positive spiritual attitude in life, that leads a person 
towards activism, dynamism and constant striving towards excellence. 
Hope is a belief in a positive outcome related to events and circumstances 
in one’s life. Hope implies a certain amount of patience and perseverance 
even though a person is faced with the contrary situations. It is closely tied 
with faith and belief of a person. 
 In his Al-Iman wa al-Hayat [Faith and life], Yousuf Al-Qaradawi 
explains, “Hope is the Elixir or panacea of life, and a stimulator of activism. 
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It reduces the worries and increases happiness and brightness in people. Life 
with no hope has no meaning at all.”1 
 Allah has used it in both positive and negative sense. For example, 
in Surah al-Kahf, Allah mentions: 
 
Wealth and sons are allurements of the life of this world: 
But the things that endure, good deeds, are best in the sight 
of thy Lord, as rewards, and best as (the foundation for) 
hopes. (Al-Kahf 18:46) 
 
Allah has referred to good deeds as something to be hoped for. On the other 
hand, Allah says in Surah Al-Hijr:  
 
Leave them alone, to enjoy (the good things of this life) 
and to please themselves: let (false) hope amuse them: soon 
will they know (the reality). (Al-Hijr 15: 3) 
  
 The word ‘Amal’ or ‘Hope’ is referred to as false hope in the above 
ayah. It was reported that Adam’s children will have envy and long lasting 
‘hope’. 
 
2. Defining Despair  
 Despair is against hope. While hope makes a person hopeful and 
leads him to dynamism and activism, despair leads him to total hopelessness 
in life. It may lead him to suicide in many incidents. In most religions it is 
regarded as a matter of sin. Yousuf Qaradawi explains “Qunut”, “Ya’s” or 
‘despair’ as follows: 
 
Despair is against hope. It turns off the flame of hope in the 
chest, and severs the thread of expectation from the heart.. 
It is the invincible obstacle and strong block that destroys 
all motivations of work and weakens the body from all 
strengths.2 
 
 Ibn Masud says: “People get perished because of two things: 
Hopelessness and self pride. For hopelessness will lead to despair, and self-
pride will lead to egoism.”3 Imam Ghazali relates between the two by saying 
that happiness can only be obtained through hard work and constant efforts. 
A hopeless person does not put out any effort because everything is 
impossible to him. An egoist person, on the other hand, feels he attained his 
goal, so there is no need to put effort at all.4  
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3. Importance of Hope in Life 
 Hope is an essential element in life. Without this, one cannot 
continue in the struggles of his or her life. He or she cannot succeed in his or 
her mission. Hope leads one to dynamism in spirit and physical strength. It 
transforms the lazy into active, and helps the active to perform even better in 
order to obtain excellence. 
 In Islam, hope is a required condition to gain success in both the 
world and the Hereafter. You cannot get desired success unless you strive for 
it with an ardent hope. Likewise, you cannot get salvation in the Hereafter 
without a firm faith and hope in Allah’s Mercy and Forgiveness. The Prophet 
Muhammad (SAAS) is reported to have said: 
 
Live a truthful, moderate, and hopeful life. No one would 
enter Jannah because of his righteous acts (alone). “Not 
even yourself O Prophet of Allah!”? Yes, even not myself, 
unless Allah (SWT) covers me with His Mercy and 
Forgiveness.5 
 
‘Hope’ is a very essential element for the advancement of sciences.  
 
If the scholars of science, invention and technology [says 
Qaradawi] stop at the established precepts of their time; 
and the ‘Hope’ did not aid them to discover unseen realities 
and information, the science would not develop forward 
and could not reach men to Moon. The ray of light which 
enlightens the great hearts, makes the road clear, and 
removes darkness, it is ‘hope’, or let us say it is Iman in 
Allah’s help.6 
 
 Ghazali mentions that one needs to be hopeful toward Allah and 
remain at His Mercy. It is very much hoped that Allah would then forgive 
him.7 Ghazali quotes the hadith of the Prophet that a rich man who used to 
give loans to people and remained lenient to the rich and forgave the poor. 
He met Allah without any other good act. Allah forgave him. For, the man, 
though was empty-handed in terms of other good acts, remained hopeful for 
the mercy of Allah for this noble dealing with the people.8  
 
4. Iman necessary condition for hope 
 A believer always remains hopeful. Iman and hope are interrelated. 
A true believer is the person with supreme happiness, joy and contentment of 
heart. He stays at great distance from pessimism, impatience and despair. The 
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materialists stay with the observed laws of cause and effect. They do not 
hope for anything beyond. The believers supersede observed phenomena and 
reach for the secrets of existence: to Allah, the creator of cause and effect. In 
Islam, Allah is the owner and controller of causes and its effects. The 
believers, therefore, turn to Him during dangers and calamities. They get 
peace of mind in turning to Him during calamities and gain His company 
when no one is around. The patient turns to Him when all the doctors of the 
world become hopeless, and he still feels hopeful of recovery. The secret 
behind such a positive approach is one’s firm faith with Allah, the creator of 
the universe, the controller and the sustainer. Allah has confirmed this in the 
different places of the Qur’an, such as: 
 
Who created me, and it is He Who guides me; “Who gives 
me food and drink,” “And when I am ill, it is He Who cures 
me. (Shu`ara 26: 78-80) 
 
5. Impact of hope on happiness 
 A believer in Allah’s favours gets security, satisfaction and 
happiness in life. It is the ray of hope that enlightens ways for him and guides 
him through to the right direction. A person full of hope is usually a happy 
person. A peasant works hard and sweats for the hope of its produce. A 
businessman risks travelling and dangers for his hope of profit. A student 
strives constantly for his hope of success. A soldier risks his life and offers 
brave acts for his hope of victory. A subjugated nation constantly struggles 
for freedom. A patient tolerates bitter medicine for the hope of cure. 
Likewise, a Believer in Allah strives against his unlawful desires and follows 
Allah’s commands for the hope of obtaining Allah’s Pleasure and entering 
into Jannah. The hope, then, is the panacea of life and stimulator of activism. 
It reduces the worries and increases happiness in people. How narrower the 
life in which no hope exists at all.9 
 
6. Types of happiness 
 In Islam, a believer could attain two types of happiness, in the world 
and the Hereafter. Ibn Al-Qaiyyim classifies this happiness into three 
types:10  
A. External happiness. It can be achieved through richness 
and having a long life. According to Ibn al-Qaiyyim the 
parable of this type of happiness is like the bald-headed 
person who gets happy by the beautiful and stylish hair of 
his cousin. 
 
B. Happiness in Physical appearance. It is obtained through 
good health, sound intelligence, handsome looks and a 
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well-built body. Though it is linked with a person’s own 
self, it is still beyond a person’s real personality. For his 
identity is not through his body or wealth; but through his 
spirit and heart. 
 
C. Spiritual Happiness. The real happiness lies in his 
spiritual happiness, which is to be obtained through 
learning beneficial knowledge that guides one throughout 
his or her life. 
 
7. Hopefulness as a trait in Believers 
 One of the common characteristics of humans is the desire to be 
happy. Every individual tries hard to achieve this goal, thinks more of the 
future than the present and is often preoccupied with thoughts alike. Mu’min 
places his hope in Allah according to his faith, sincerity and closeness to 
Allah. Knowing that everything happens according to His will, believers do 
not fall into despair or become hopeless and pessimistic. Believers who are 
aware of this do not lose hope, even when facing the most distressing events, 
in Allah’s mercy or help.11 
 The Qur’an, for instance, portrays believers as being in a constant 
spiritual state of hopefulness toward Allah. As Allah promises to the 
Believers: “As for those who believe and do right actions, We will erase their 
bad actions and recompense them for the best of what they did.” (Al-
’Ankabut 29: 7) The believers’ prayers and wishes are full of hope. “They 
call upon their Lord in fear and ardent hope.” (As-Sajdah 32: 16) 
 
8. Prophets as Models of Hopeful 
 
A. Prophet Ibrahim. He was rejected by his own people, and they wanted to 
burn him alive. Ibrahim was of composed mind, not fearful of their plots. For 
he had rested hope in the power and mercy of Allah. “The only answer of his 
people was to say: “Kill him or burn him!” But Allah rescued him from the 
fire. There are certainly Signs in that for people who believe.” (Ankabut 29: 
24) Further, “We said: “Fire, be coolness and peace for Ibrahim!” (Al-
Anbiya’ 21: 69) 
 
B. Prophet Ya`qub. He lost his beloved son, Yousuf, to the conspiracy of his 
other children. Many years passed by. Still he did not lose hope in getting 
back his son and advised his children to search for Yousuf and Ben Yamin. 
He said: 
O my sons! go ye and enquire about Joseph and his brother, 
and never give up hope of Allah’s Soothing Mercy: truly 
no one despairs of Allah’s Soothing Mercy, except those 
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who have no faith. (Yousuf 12: 87) 
 
C. Prophet Aiyyub. He was the best example of patience and gratitude in the 
face of severe afflictions that he went through. He suffered from severe 
disease; but did not lose hope with Allah for getting cured, and with no 
complaints. Allah answered his prayers:  
 
So We listened to him: We removed the distress that was 
on him, and We restored his people to him, and doubled 
their number- as a Grace from Ourselves, and a thing for 
commemoration, for all who serve Us. (Al-Anbiya’ 21: 83-
84) 
 
D. Prophet Yunus. He left his community without Allah’s permission, and, 
ultimately, was swallowed by a large fish, which means he faced total 
destruction. But Younus did not lose hope in Allah and celebrated Allah’s 
praise and glorification. Allah listened to him and released him from the 
afflictions. Allah says: 
 
He cried through the depths of darkness, “There is no god 
but thou: glory to thee: I was indeed wrong! So We listened 
to him: and delivered him from distress: and thus do We 
deliver those who have faith. (Al-Anbiya’ 21: 87-88) 
 
E. Prophet Musa. The prominent Prophet of Allah Moses delivered Bani 
Isra’il from Egypt; but Pharaoh and his folk chased them. Bani Isra’il got 
panicked and became hopeless. They showed their dissatisfaction and anger 
to Moses; and it was a moment full of anxieties and worries. But he had firm 
conviction in Allah’s help that Allah will show him the way to get released. 
Allah kept the honour of Moses’ word, and asked him to hit the sea and it 
gave way to Moses and Bani Isra’il, and destruction only to Pharaoh and his 
folks.  
 
(Moses) said: “By no means! my Lord is with me! Soon 
will He guide me!” Then We told Moses by inspiration: 
“Strike the sea with thy rod.” So it divided, and each 
separate part became like the huge, firm mass of a 
mountain…. Verily in this is a Sign: but most of them do 
not believe. (Shu`ara 26: 62-67) 
 
F. Prophet Muhammad. The life of Prophet Muhammad also serves as the 
best example of hope, patience and submission to Allah’s help and mercy. He 
was dejected and rejected by his own people in Makkah. His great protectors 
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like his uncle and wife Khadijah passed away. He left for Ta’if in search for 
another land of Islam. But the people of Ta’if treated him severely. Their 
hooligans hurled rocks at him and he was chased out bleeding. But to their 
dismay, the Prophet of hope and mercy, when given an option of destroying 
this nation, he opted for forgiveness. He said: “No, I hope that God will bring 
out from their offspring people who worship Him alone and associate no 
partners with Him.”12 
 Allah made it a reality. It was within 80 years that a young man of 
this Thaqafi tribe, Muhammad bin Qasim was able to conquer Sind, while 
coming to rescue a few Muslim woman hostages by a pirate chief. The 
Prophet was full of hope and optimism which brought astonishing results.13 
He migrates to Madinah, and hides inside Thawr cave. The investigator came 
to the mouth of the cave with the other people of Quraysh. If they looked 
down, they would see the Prophet and Abu Bakr. Abu Bakr was anxious 
about the safety of the Prophet, but the Prophet was firm, free from fear and 
hopeful for the help of Allah. He said: “What do you think O Abu Bakr about 
the two men? Allah is third.”14 Allah liked the word of the Prophet and 
recorded this in the eternal Book. These are few examples from the pages of 
history which are true events, though the materialists will reject some or all 
of them, as they stand against ‘Aql and what people usually see.  
 
9. Basis of Hopefulness 
 Imam Ghazali mentions that if one deeply reflects on Allah’s 
bounties, he would always remain hopeful. For if he realizes that Allah has 
created him in the best shape and provided for him all the necessities of life 
abundantly. He created the world and filled it with all types of bounties, 
favours and temptations. Allah made it so beautiful that most of the people do 
not want to die and they want to live and enjoy as much as they could.15 
Allah asked people to reflect on the creation of Allah and His limitless 
favours. This would make them hopeful to live with a mission in life to 
please Allah the creator. For, Allah did not create him without a purpose. “O 
people of understanding! deeply reflect on His creations.” (Hashr 59: 2) 
 In many Qur’anic ayat Allah promised the Believers that he would 
support them in their daily life. Allah also welcomes the repentance from the 
sinners and promised to accept it provided that it was done with a sincere 
heart. He also promised that He will replace their wrong actions into good. 
Imam Ibnul Qayyim clarifies that ‘if the spiritual life gets pure and holy, 
material life also becomes pure and holy, as the heart controls the organs of a 
person.’16 
 Allah (swt) not only promised a good life in this world, but most 
importantly He promised to the righteous persons a wonderful reward in the 
Hereafter: life in the Gardens of Eden and in Paradise with endless bounties 
of Allah. Numerous Qur’anic ayat are cited on above and similar topics, such 
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as the following: 
 
For those who believe and do right actions, there are 
Gardens of Delight, to remain in them timelessly, forever. 
Allah’s Promise is true. He is the Almighty, the All-Wise. 
(Luqman 31: 8-9) 
 
 It is a unique feature of Islam that Allah has kept the door of 
Tawbah wide open for them. The people are not angels, nor should they be 
like Satan. If they commit any sin or mistake, and immediately repent to 
Allah directly, without the intermediary of any, He will accept their 
repentance provided that it was done sincerely. Allah has invited people to be 
hopeful, and not to turn hopeless. Say: “My servants, who have transgressed 
against yourselves, do not despair of Allah’s mercy. Truly Allah forgives all 
wrong actions. He is the Ever-Forgiving, the Most Merciful.” (Zumar 39: 53) 
Believers who sin but then repent and seek Allah’s forgiveness should not be 
seized by grief and hopelessness, for hopelessness displeases Allah. 
 
10.  Despair and Its Impact on Human life 
 Despair, as has been cited above, is against hope. While hope makes 
a person hopeful and leads that person to dynamism and activism; despair, on 
the other, leads a person to total hopelessness in life.  Imam Ghazali mentions 
that Allah has made the very foundation of despair unlawful for mankind by 
saying: “Despair not of the Mercy of Allah: for Allah forgives all sins.” 
(Zumar 39: 53) That is why the Prophet was reported to have said: “No one 
shall die but by keeping good hope with Allah.”17  Ali (R.A.) was reported to 
have said to a person who turned hopeless due to his limitless sins: “Your 
despair from the Mercy of Allah is greater sin than all your sins.”18  
 A hopeless person simply abandons trying to do something. He or 
she believes there is no hope in it. A proud person feels that he already 
obtained what is needed by him. Hopelessness acts like a slow, gradual 
poison that kills the soul of a person. He or she is totally deterred from 
society and environment. Hope can only bring one back to the right track. 
 
11.  Despair and Kufr are interrelated 
 Kufr and despair are interrelated and go hand in hand. The people 
who reject Allah are usually affected with such despair. These are the people 
who live with themselves and obey their desires. They severed any ties with 
the Universe and its Creator. There is close relation between despair and kufr. 
One leads to the other. Despair begets kufr, and vice versa. “Truly no one 
despairs of Allah’s Soothing Mercy, except those who have no faith.” 
(Yousuf 12: 87) 
 Men usually succumb to hopelessness during distressing events. The 
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Qur’an points to this as it says, “If We give man a taste of Mercy from 
Ourselves, and then withdraw it from him, behold! he is in despair and (falls 
into) blasphemy.” (Hud 11: 9) Also the Qur’an speaks of the characteristics 
of the people in general and says that during good days they get proud, and 
during calamities, they suffer from despair. Allah says, “Man does not tire of 
asking for good (things), but if ill touches him, he gives up all hope (and) is 
lost in despair.” (Fussilat 41: 49) 
 
12.  Meaningless hope of the Ignorant 
 “Hopefulness is a state of a peaceful heart, awaiting the desired 
goal.” At least this is how al-Ghazali puts it, and a ‘cause’ (sabab) is 
preconditioned toward this desired goal. Otherwise, it should rather be known 
as a wishful thought (tamanna) only.19 He cites examples from the Prophetic 
Hadith, “One who follows his own desire and lusts, and (at the same time) 
wishes for Allah’s (swt) (favour and) Jannah, is the real fatuous.”20 
 A person’s degree of hope for Allah’s mercy is in direct proportion 
to one’s attachment and closeness to Him and to one’s observance of the 
Qur’an’s rulings. Those who do not remember Allah, who live as they please, 
and who turn away from Allah’s commands and then expect a good 
recompense are only fooling themselves. The Qur’an speaks of the nations 
who in spite of disobeying Allah wished for His bounties, “But after them 
there followed a posterity who missed prayers and followed after lusts; soon, 
then, will they face Destruction.”  (Maryam 19: 59) In another instance, the 
Qur’an narrates, “After them succeeded an (evil) generation: They inherited 
the Book, but they chose (for themselves) the vanities of this world, saying 
(for excuse): ‘(Everything) will be forgiven us’.”  (A`raf 7: 169) Muhammad 
Asad comments on this verse and says, “Their wish that they would be 
forgiven for breaking God’s commandments in their pursuit of worldly gain 
is completely an allusion to their persistent belief that they are ‘God’s chosen 
people’ and that, no matter what they do, His forgiveness and grace are 
assured to them by virtue of their being Abraham’s descendants.”21 
 
13.  Conclusions: Overcoming Despair 
 Despair has become part of civil life today. Everyone will have his 
share of worries that sometimes may lead to despair. We need to deal with 
this in a systematic and rational way to overcome despair in our life. 
 Firstly, we have to be realistic in making demands upon ourselves 
and the society in which we live. Secondly, we should find contentment with 
the situation in which we find ourselves. This does not mean that we should 
not have ambitions and dreams. Rather we should have ambitions and be 
optimistic to achieve success in it. Umar b. `Abd al-`Aziz said: “I am an 
ambitious man. First, I desired governorship. When I attained it, I desired to 
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be Caliph. When I became caliph, I renounced its pleasures, for then my 
ambitions had turned to attaining Paradise.”22 Thirdly, we should enjoy our 
successes and achievements. All of us have some achievements to our credit. 
We need to take satisfaction and pride in them, as this helps to prevent us 
from making light of Allah’s blessings. Fourthly, we should be grateful to 
Allah for all His favours. “If you are grateful, I will give you more” (Quran  
14:7). Fifthly, we must observe daily prayers in congregations and leave the 
world behind five times a day. It will help us to become more Hereafter-
oriented and less worried about this temporal world. Sixthly, one should 
make the Qur’an, the divine Book of Allah, his or her partner to alleviate the 
worries and distresses. Reading and listening to the Qur’an will help refresh 
our hearts and our minds. Connecting to the Qur’an means connecting to 
God. Let it be a means to heal our hearts of stress and worries. 23 Finally, we 
must refrain from envying others. If Allah has gifted some of His servants 
with special gifts, we should not get upset because of this. We should find out 
the good circumstances that we are in, and be thankful to Allah for this.  
 The Prophet said: Whenever you see someone better than you in 
wealth, face or figure, you should look at someone who is inferior to you in 
these respects (so that you may thank Allah for His blessings).24 If we are to 
compare ourselves with others, we should only do it in two respects: our 
Iman or Faith and our Islamic knowledge. We should be pleased by seeing 
that today is better than many days in the past, and the coming days can even 
be much better than it is now. We should not get upset by looking into the 
lost opportunities of the past; we should instead look forward to the promise 
of a better future. 
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Part IV 
Engaged Projects of Hope 

Freedom, Democracy, Affirmative Action, Employment 
Equity: The Current Landscape of Post-Apartheid South 
Africa: Are We Opening or Closing Futures? 
 
Fredelene Elie and Tshepiso Matentjie 
 
Abstract: Post-apartheid South Africa created the expectations of infinite 
possibilities for many of its citizens, especially the black segment of the 
population who now have access to quality education and employment 
opportunities which were denied to them under the apartheid government.  At 
the same time the white segment of the population are for the first time 
confronted with affirmative action and employment equity policies in order 
to redress the injustices created by apartheid policies. This paper set out to 
investigate and compare the effects of the current South African landscape on 
the hopes and perceptions of a group of white 12th grade students with those 
of a group of black 12th grade students who are on the verge of completing 
their highs school years, and entering the world of work or higher education. 
The hypotheses was that the new post-apartheid landscape will instil a greater 
sense of hope for previously disadvantaged young people, and hopelessness 
for white young people who are now confronted with policies that put black 
people ahead of them. The results of this investigation indicates that there is 
no  simple linear relationship between the new found freedoms and policies 
of post-apartheid South Africa and  the promise of a “better life for all”, as 
propagated by the ruling African National Congress. Variables that dispute 
this linear relationship are highlighted and some complexities of transforming 
South African society are also indicated. 
 
Key words: youth, affirmative action, employment equity, Apartheid. 
 
1. Introduction 
 The transition in South Africa is described as being from mandated 
segregation by race to desegregation and equality by post-apartheid policies 
such as affirmative action and employment equity. Although described by the 
rest of the world as a miracle transition, South Africa remains a divided 
society marked by deep inequities.  
 Although South Africa has made progress from apartheid to 
democracy, from racial privilege to equity in the sense of equal treatment of 
persons of all races, it has been far less successful in promoting equitable 
educational opportunities and adequacy. 
 Affirmative Action and Employment Equity as policies to level the 
playing fields in South Africa have been embraced by the masses of 
historically disadvantaged people as an opportunity for upliftment, and 
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although frowned upon by the historically advantaged group, considered a 
necessary evil. 
 Fourteen years after the first democratic elections the debate about 
Affirmative Action still continues to rage in the public domain. There are 
those (both black and white) who are calling for its demise – as it is 
considered degrading, especially to those who were disadvantaged but made 
it against all odds. 
 On the flipside of the coin are those who are adamant that 
affirmative action must stay until such time that it can be demonstrated that 
the majority of the disadvantaged masses have derived some form of benefit 
in post-apartheid South Africa. Either point has been difficult to prove, as 
witnessed by the glaring levels of poverty and lack of resources in 
communities who suffered the most under apartheid. It is this debate about 
Affirmative Action and Employment Equity and our daily work of doing 
Career Guidance with both black and white students in their final year of 
high school, that led us to ponder how this generation views the current 
landscape of Post-Apartheid South Africa. They were only 5 years old when 
we had our first democratic elections, and thus baring what they have been 
told about apartheid and its ramifications, have very little firsthand 
experience of the actual situation. Our aim here was to determine to what 
extent these policies instil hope and /or open or close doors for adolescents in 
South Africa. 
 
2.  Methodology 
 A micro qualitative study was conducted with a convenience sample 
of 20 participants: 5 black females, 5 black males, 5 white females, and 5 
white males. 
 The young people in this sample belong to the generation of South 
African youth growing up in ‘the New South Africa’ that officially offers 
them opportunities for a life of equality, one such opportunity being the ‘free 
and equal access to education’ (South African Schools Act 1996). They 
belong to a generation that was and is expected to build a life different and 
better from their parental generation. However, all of the black participant’s 
live in poverty, go to under resourced schools and are confronted with levels 
of community violence that renders them often insecure about their own 
chances in life. They are trying to construct their lives and identities in the 
still problem-abundant streets of what is commonly known as townships or 
informal settlements or shanty towns in South Africa. 
 The white participants in this sample are from a more affluent white 
community, attending a well resourced private school far removed from the 
realities of their black counterparts. 
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3. Data collection 
 A questionnaire with 5 open ended questions were administered to 
the participants and it attempted to tap into the following characteristics: 
 
 Participants awareness and understanding of these policies; The 
 impact of these policies on South African youth; Whether they 
 believe they can benefit by these policies; How do they feel about 
 their future in S.A in light of these policies; and What needs to 
 happen for them to have a sense of hope for their future in South 
 Africa 
 
4. Data Analysis 
 Based on the responses to the participants answers to the questions, 
we looked at themes and trends in their responses to get a sense of what the 
data means. 
 
5. Results 
A. Question 1: Participants awareness and understanding of these policies. 
 In response to the question that tapped into why they think these 
policies are part of the current landscape, most of the participants cited 
similar reasons such as the provision of: EQUALITY (between different 
groups), OPPORTUNITY (careers, jobs), OPEN DOORS (to a better future), 
GOAL ATTAINMENT (they do have goals but there is a perception that 
they need assistance – the third force), DO AWAY WITH 
DISCRIMINATION 
 
B. Question 2: The impact of these policies on South African youth 
 Asked about their believe about the impact of these policies on 
South African youth. The responses were again positive but ranged in 
perceptions. 
 •More Opportunities  •Less crime •the possibility of 
pursuing your dreams and to live your best life. 
 Black males cited:  
 • a sense of hope,  • fighting chance,  •equal chance 
for job, career and business opportunities • Motivated 
 National impact:  •youths see each other as equals, •don’t dwell 
on the past •one nation 
 
 White males cited: 
 •ambivalence, mixed emotions •causes conflict amongst youths
 •inspires more racial issues •we should go back to the olden 
days – no interracial mixing •creates further separation •a bad impact
 •we are really battling •it is now unfair 
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C. Question 3: Whether they believe they can benefit by these policies 
 This question tried to determine if they believe that they can derive 
any benefit from these anti-discriminatory policies.  The Results were as 
follows:  
 Black females 
 •more opportunities for me  •encourage me  •financial 
assistance •more jobs 
 
 White Females 
 •equal footing between social groups •unbiased selection for 
universities and jobs •people won’t judge based on skin colour or 
gender •can pursue dreams with great possibilities and success •we 
can be free as we meant to be.  
 
Some white females at this stage focused on the fact that these policies are 
merely false promises and that it is not applicable to white males. 
 The black males had a general positive response to this question.: 
 •freedom to be a better person •to have a universally positive 
environment •making us all .equal •gives direction, to know what 
to do and what not to do •information and easy access. 
 
 White Males felt completely marginalized. They cited: 
 •uncertainties about their future in this country •benefiting 
youth from other races •difficult for white males to benefit from 
affirmative action •does not benefit us at all 
 
D. Question 4: How do they feel about their future in S.A in light of these 
policies. 
 In terms of their feelings about their future in South Africa in light 
of these policies: the black participants generally felt positive. The white 
females had ambivalent feelings: some felt that their future could be 
prosperous if these policies are implemented properly; whilst some felt that 
they actually do not have a future in this country. One participant felt 
strongly that she would have to leave South Africa as she does not foresee 
any future for her in S.A. 
 The white males responded with total hopelessness to this question. 
They all mentioned that they do not see any future for themselves in S.A. 
Some were even explicit about the fact that they will have to immigrate to 
other countries where they can be treated as equals, as they do not see this 
happening in the country of their birth. They felt that the policies will even 
afford unqualified black people career opportunities before them. 
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E. Question 5: What needs to happen for them to have a sense of hope for 
their future in South Africa. 
 To this question, the black participants indicated what they perceive 
as problems around the implementation of these policies. Even though they 
are positive about the polices as a mechanism through which they can be fast 
tracked to a better life, they see the policies as useless if it does not address 
the lack of resources in their schools, insufficient access to financial aid to 
enter higher education, as well as the high drop-out rate in higher education 
of black students and the high unemployment rate of black graduates.  
 The White female and white male responses to this question were 
almost for an overwhelming appeal to start over, from a clean slate, where 
everyone is considered equal, where there is no discrimination or reverse 
racism, and for a situation where everyone can compete on equal footing. 
Some of the white males even called for white empowerment and a return to 
the old order of the apartheid years. 
 
6. Hope Theory 
 The view of hope as a psychological construct is based on Snyder’s 
et al. (2000) view that hope consists of three cognitive components, namely: 
goal, pathway and agency thoughts. This model of hope was used as an 
organizing frame in this study. In this model hopeful thought reflects the 
belief that one can find pathways to desired goals and become motivated to 
use those pathways or goal attainment. 
 
A. Goals 
 The data from these participant’s responses indicates that there is no 
shortage of desired goals amongst young people in South Africa. 
 
B. Pathways Thinking 
 Pathways thinking involves the ability to generate at least one, and 
often more, useable routes to a desired goal even in the face of impediments. 
The current data generation method did not tap into this aspect as pertaining 
to their internal messages such as “I’ll find a way to reach my goals”. For the 
black participants as well as for most of the white female participants, 
however, it is clear that they do view Affirmative action as a mechanism to 
goal attainment. The white males see themselves totally excluded from this 
AA as a pathway to their goal attainment 
 
C. Agency Thinking 
The motivational component in hope theory is agency – the perceived 
capacity to use one’s pathways so as to reach desired goals. Whilst they 
might have the internal motivation to use their pathways, and employ agentic 
phrases such as “I can do this”, young people often hit the ceiling when a 
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mechanism that should facilitate their goal attainment fails them. In this case 
participants mentioned difficulties with the disconnect between Affirmative 
Action as a policy on paper and the proper visible implementation thereof, to 
the point where they will consider the policy useless as an aid to their goal 
attainment. 
 As a work in progress this very preliminary investigation has left us 
with more questions than answers such as: 
 
1. If these policies are viewed by previously disadvantaged youth as a 
pathway to their goal attainment - to achieve the better life for all as 
promised by the new government - is it fair to call for its demise in 
the face of glaring inequalities? 
2. Are there other routes to racial equality besides of affirmative 
action? 
3. Is it fair that a new generation of white young males, and soon 
young white women, should suffer the sins of their fathers who 
masterminded apartheid and are now exempt from much of the 
blame? 
4. How do the youth respond to the continuous call to nation building 
and the pride in South African campaign if there are policies such as 
affirmative action that work to level the playing fields but that are 
also viewed by certain segments of the youth as causing racial 
tensions and reverse discrimination and racism 
 
7. Conclusion 
 The current reality in South Africa indicates that there is no linear 
relationship between policies such as Affirmative Action and Employment 
Equity and higher hopefulness in historically disadvantaged youth or higher 
levels of hopelessness in white youths. However, white males on average still 
find employment quicker than their black counterparts and the majority of 
capital owners in South Africa are still white and therefore to a large extent 
controllers of the economy. Until such time that everybody in South Africa 
sees the rebuilding of South Africa as a collective responsibility, engaging 
with and implementing mechanisms for redress in the transition period as 
speedily as possible, we will be debating issues such as Affirmative Action 
and Employment Equity and the merits thereof. I remain hopeful however 
that through ongoing research and engagement with these issues that we will 
find answers and solutions to these questions which will allow the young 
people of South Africa to take up the call for masakhane: working together 
for a better future. 
It should be emphasized that this investigation is very preliminary and more 
an evolving work in progress. Therefore it is in no way intended to be 
generalized to the broader population of young people in South Africa. At 
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this stage it serves as a useful start to organise our thoughts for a more broad 
and in-depth study that will be more representative and therefore more 
generalizable to the broader population.  
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Changing Perceptions of Opportunities:  
Hope for Young People in High HIV- Risk Environments 
 
David Harrison, Linda Richter and Chris Desmond 
 
Abstract: South Africa is a socio-economically polarized country with a high 
prevalence of HIV. Almost half the lifetime risk of HIV infection among 
women occurs between the ages of 17 and 21. This spike of new infection is 
associated with declining condom use, which is not adequately explained by 
the desire to have a baby, changes in condom self-efficacy, duration of 
relationships, nor marriage.  
 Greater tolerance of risk is likely due to lower perceptions of 
opportunity among young people who leave school and enter ‘the meantime’ 
with little prospect of employment or further education.  Thus, HIV 
prevention strategies must address the factors shaping perception of 
opportunity and seek to reduce socio-economic gradients at the same time. 
 loveLife is a national HIV prevention campaign which seeks to 
reinforce the aspirations of adolescents of school going age. Its challenge is 
to sustain apparent reductions in HIV infection into early adulthood.  
Through its community-based programmes, it has identified and developed 
thousands of young leaders in HIV prevention. loveLife plans to capitalize on 
this leadership to change perceptions of opportunity in their marginalized 
communities and nurture a commitment to a more equitable society.  We 
argue that this strategy can help effect structural changes that lessen HIV 
infection. 
 
Key words: HIV, income distribution, leadership, opportunity, loveLife, risk 
reduction 
 
 
 The sense of being trapped at the bottom of the pile - unable to 
navigate an acceptable future - predisposes to risky sexual behaviour.1 This 
paper asks how strategies that engender hope can help to prevent HIV 
infection among young people in a heavily infected and socio-economically 
polarized country like South Africa. 
 Meta-analysis of behaviour change strategies for HIV prevention 
among young people shows that fear-based approaches are least effective, 
while those that are motivational - fostering hope and opportunity and 
building self-efficacy - have more impact.2 But it is not known whether this 
holds in contexts in which, for the majority, day-to-day choice and 
opportunity are severely constrained, and prospects of real improvement are 
poor.  Much, though not all, of the literature linking optimism to safer sexual 
Changing Perceptions of Opportunities 
______________________________________________________________ 
 
214 
 
behaviour describes interventions in relatively low HIV prevalence 
environments or on islands of poverty in a sea of wealth.3   
 How far can hope take young people when a quarter of 24-year-old 
women are HIV positive, 4 three-fifths of the population earn less than a fifth 
of total income,5 and only a third of 18-35-year-olds have ever had a job?6    
 This paper reviews the experience of loveLife - a national HIV 
prevention campaign for teenagers in South Africa. It describes the way in 
which loveLife has sought to build on the aspirations of young people, and 
evidence for the positive effect of its interventions. At the same time, it 
highlights limitations of the current approach and the urgent need to link 
messages of hope with enhanced access to opportunities. We conclude by 
describing how loveLife seeks to further develop its youth leadership 
initiatives to help change perceptions of opportunity for young people. 
 
1. New HIV Infection in Young People Fuels the Epidemic 
 The brunt of infection is borne by young women who account for 
77% of total prevalence among 15-24 year olds. In terms of spatial 
distribution, the highest rates on infection are found in urban informal 
settlements. The HIV prevalence among women in their early twenties 
(23.9%) is roughly three times that among 15-19-year-old women (9.4%).7 
However, the increase is not uniform, as there is a sharp increase in infection 
among 18-21-year-old women (see Figure 1).8 If there weren’t a spike in 
infection rates among 18-21-year-old women, the HIV epidemic in South 
Africa would be much smaller. 
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Figure 1: Sharp increase in HIV prevalence among 18-21-year-old 
women9 
 
 Over the last 7-8 years, there has been a slow decline in prevalence 
among young women.10 If this decline can be accelerated, rapid change in 
overall prevalence could be achieved over the next decade, for the following 
reasons. Firstly, new infections among young people continue to fuel the 
epidemic, accounting for about half of all new adult infections. This is down 
from an estimated 60% in 2000, 11 but still represents the greatest 
concentration of new infection. Secondly, South Africa has a young 
population: forty two percent of the population is under twenty years of age, 
and a just over a third (34.6%) under fifteen.12 This “youth bubble” creates 
the opportunity for relatively large changes in population dynamics within a 
short time. Thirdly, self-reports indicate that South African teenagers are 
skewed towards high risk, particularly with respect to consistent condom use. 
This means that even a relatively modest shift in teenage sexual behaviour 
could trigger sharp declines in overall infection.13  
 
2. Poor Prospects for Young People 
 The present socio-economic outlook for young people is poor. At 
the current rate of infection, the probability of the current cohort of 15-year-
old South Africans dying before the age of 60 years (45q15) is approximately 
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51% for women and 62% for men.14 Although the reasons for the epidemic’s 
severity in Southern Africa are not clear, Zanakis and others have shown 
associations between HIV infection and highly polarized income 
distribution.15    
 South Africa is a very unequal society, as evidenced by the Gini 
Coefficient; this rose from 0.69 in 1996 to 0.77 in 2001.16 Figure 2 shows 
cumulative household income distribution in 2000. The degree of income 
polarization is illustrated by fact that the poorest 60% of the population earn 
less than 20% of income, while the richest 20% of the population earns over 
60% of the income. 
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Figure 2: Income distribution in South Africa is highly unequal17 
 
 Young people bear a large burden of the effects of poverty, 
inequality and polarization. For example, they are poorer than older cohorts: 
young people aged 18-24 years of age are one of the poorest age groups in 
South Africa, including pensioners, being second only to children.18 Two-
fifths (41%) of 18-24-year-olds were living in poverty in 2003. Because of 
high rates of drop-out, nearly three quarters of the million plus young people 
who enter the labour market each year for the first time have not completed 
their schooling. 19 These young people seek work under conditions of severe 
structural unemployment.20 More than two thirds of young South Africans 
under 35 are not employed, and the same number have never had a job. Both 
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race and education affect labour market participation. Only 29% of young 
Africans entering the labour force will get a job within a year. 
 It is in this context that HIV prevention initiatives need to be 
developed for young people.  
 
3. The Response of loveLife 
 loveLife seeks to reduce the rate of new HIV infection among young 
people by bringing about sustained changes in their sexual behaviour. In so 
doing, it aims to contribute to reductions in the overall prevalence of HIV in 
South Africa. Established in late 1999, loveLife positions itself as a new 
lifestyle brand for young South Africans - part of the popular youth culture of 
music, fashion, pop icons and commercial brands, communicated largely 
through commercial media. The brand is the platform for an extensive range 
of face-to-face interaction in communities across South Africa, including 
youth centres and national athletic events. 
 Local mobilization in over 700 communities and 4,000 schools is 
led by a national corps of 1,200 18-25-year-olds known as 
groundBREAKERS (recruited annually for one year) and 5,000 volunteer 
peer motivators (‘mpintshis’). Each month, this programme reaches roughly 
half a million young people.  In this regard, loveLife has found young people 
themselves to be the most effective agents of change, as indicated by the 
quote below: 
 
Seeing billboards of a dying person didn’t tell me about 
me. But when some one says ‘You have such amazing 
potential that HIV shouldn’t be part of it’ - then it wasn’t 
about HIV.  It was about me.  No one is wagging a finger at 
me.  These groundBREAKERS were people the same age 
as me.  It wasn’t a celebrity living in a million-dollar house 
telling me what to do.  It was another young person from 
the same township as me.21 
 
From the outset, loveLife’s communication campaign was premised on the 
view that sexual behaviour change is inspired by a strong sense of purpose, 
belonging and identity with an HIV-free way of life, as illustrated in Figure 
3.   
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Figure 3: The loveLife approach 
 
 The approach aims to create a dialectic between the longer-term 
aspirations of young people and day-to-day pressures and expectations. For 
example, one of the most successful tactical campaigns sought to harness the 
national enthusiasm around the Fifa World Cup Soccer Bid for 2010 (which 
was later awarded to South Africa). Its “2010. Love to be there…” campaign 
won a national marketing excellence award and continues to be a rallying call 
at loveLife sports events. At the same time, loveLife recognizes the down-to-
earth aspirations of young people - to be safe, healthy, educated, employed 
and be part of a stable family.22   
 
4. The Impact of loveLife 
 By 2003, 85% of young people had been exposed to loveLife, and 
37% had participated in its face-to-face programmes, enabling its effects to 
be examined. 23   
 
 Results of a cross-sectional national probability household survey 
(of youth aged 15-24 years of age (n = 11,904) suggest that participation in 
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loveLife programmes is protective against HIV infection. To account for 
possible selection biases in programme participation, a multivariate logistic 
regression with 14 covariates was performed (including high school 
completion, race, age, urban/rural residence, awareness of other prevention 
campaigns and so on). Adjusted odds ratios for sexually experienced men and 
women were 0.60 (95% CI 0.40 - 0.89) and 0.61 (95% CI 0.43 - 0.85) 
respectively.24 Similar significant associations are not demonstrated among 
young people who have not had direct experience with loveLife’s programs.   
 While it is not possible with available data to establish causal links 
with declining new infection rates, young people exposed to loveLife report 
higher levels of condom use (AOR for men 1.75 CI 95% 1.36-2.25 and 
women 1.63 CI 95% 1.20-2.22), more discussion about HIV and AIDS with 
friends and family (AOR for men 3.2 CI 95% 2.5-4.0 and women 2.4 CI 95% 
1.9-2.9), and a higher likelihood to be tested for HIV (AOR for men 1.7 CI 
95% 1.0 - 2.9 and women 1.9 CI 95% 1.5 - 2.4).     
 To further assess the possible impact of self-selection bias, 
propensity score analysis was done to gauge the Adjusted Average 
Treatment-to-Treated Effect (ATT). This effect can be inferred as the 
“treatment effect” of loveLife programming relative to the baseline. Overall, 
the analysis shows strong treatment effects of loveLife programming for 4 
out of 6 outcomes (condom use consistency, talking with parents, changed 
behaviour as a result of HIV/Aids and talking to a partner about condoms). 
For women, the effect of loveLife programming on HIV serostatus is also 
significant (3.2% and 4.5% for participation in one and two programs 
respectively).25   
 Although these findings are quite robust and results still need to be 
interpreted with caution, the findings point to the importance of sustained 
face-to-face peer interaction to inspire change. 
 While loveLife cannot attribute these changes specifically to its 
aspirational approach, young men and women who participate in loveLife 
programmes are more likely to say that they have a clear idea of where they 
are headed in the future (AOR 1.8 CI 95% 1.4-2.4 and 1.5 CI 95% 1.3-1.9 
respectively).  As shown in Table 1, exposure to loveLife through the media 
is also associated with greater self-reported aspiration. 
 
Table 1: Media exposure to loveLife is with greater aspiration26  
Outcome variable Crude OR Adjusted OR* 
I have long range goals for myself 4.15 (2.05-
8.40) 
2.97 (1.71-
5.17) 
I think I will have many 
opportunities in life 
2.28 (1.75-
2.97) 
1.58 (1.24-
2.02) 
I know what I want out of life 2.37 (1.79- 2.16 (1.68-
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3.15) 2.80) 
I have a good idea of where I am 
headed in the future 
2.68 (2.11-
3.40) 
2.16 (1.84-
2.54) 
* Adjusted for gender, age, in school or not, electricity and geotype 
 
5. Hope, Opportunity and HIV 
 The associations between self-efficacy and safer sexual behaviour 
are already well described in the literature. Among South African youth 15-
24 years of age, condom use self-efficacy is significantly associated with 
condom use at last sexual intercourse in both men and women (AOR 1.64 CI 
95% 1.46-1.84 and 1.60 CI 95% 1.43-1.79).27 However, the ability to 
attribute changes in sexual behaviour to self-efficacy is constrained by the 
bluntness and biases of self-report survey instruments.   
 Gauging hope and optimism through such surveys - less immediate 
and more abstract concepts - is even more difficult. For example, the 
combined ‘explanatory value’ (adjusted R2) of the above four ‘optimism’ 
variables in predicting HIV is 0.015, compared to 0.045 for four variables 
related to condom self-efficacy - and the association is not statistically 
significant. The problem is compounded by expressed hopefulness of most 
young people. For example, 87% of 15-24-year-olds say that, looking ahead, 
they are most hopeful about their future. Only 12% are mostly not hopeful.28   
 This vague, yet prevailing sense of hopefulness for the future - 
consistent with hyperbolic models of utility29 - makes it difficult to gauge 
changes in hopefulness over time and is consequently not very helpful as a 
predictor of sexual behaviour.30 The degree to which health and social 
benefits are discounted in the very short term - days or weeks - might be 
more strongly correlated with individual choice and behaviour and provide a 
more sensitive barometer of change, provided suitable indicators of 
‘hopefulness in the short-term’ can be found.  
   Conversely, the association between socio-demographic factors and 
HIV - gender, age, living in informal urban areas, and failure to complete 
high school - consistently emerge as strong predictors of HIV infection.31 The 
relative ease with which the association between HIV and demographic and 
structural factors can be demonstrated, compared to the weak associations 
with indicators of hope and optimism, could obscure pathways to risk 
reduction which rely on a ‘capacity to aspire’.32 Greater appeal to 
psychological and attitudinal interventions may reflect growing frustration 
with the sparse returns of individual risk-reduction ‘messaging’.  
 The dilemma for HIV prevention is the clear recognition of the 
structural determinants of HIV infection, yet reluctance to take on efforts to 
reduce poverty and inequity. This means that structural change either sits 
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vaguely and uncomfortably in behaviour change constructs33 or is noted as a 
global imperative that will ultimately make or break HIV prevention efforts.34    
 Prevention needs to find new ways to bridge individual, social and 
structural dimensions of HIV infection. These include, but need to also go 
beyond, already promising directions, such as keeping young people in 
school and improving the quality and efficiency of education; scaling up 
micro-finance interventions to increase hope and opportunity and to change 
gender power relationships; 35 36 and expanding social security for the most 
marginalized groups. 
 
 
6. An Example from loveLife’s Experience 
 To the extent that attribution is possible, loveLife’s cross-sectional 
survey data suggests that marked changes in sexual outcomes for young 
women are associated with leaving school. 
 Figure 4 shows that potential outcomes of sexual activity, pregnancy 
and HIV prevalence, vary by age. The ratio of young women who report 
having had sex to those who report being pregnant declines sharply from 15 
to 17 years of age.37 At age 15, there is one pregnancy for every 13 girls who 
report having had sex. At age 16, the ratio is one pregnancy for every 7 
sexually active girls, while from age 17, the ratio drops below 3:1. In other 
words, the chance of becoming pregnant from sex increases with age - with 
sexually active 15- and 16-year-olds relatively protected. Beyond that age, 
the upward trend is as would be expected from a cumulative biological 
probability incremental of pregnancy. 
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Figure 4 : Outcomes of sexual activity vary by age among young women38 
 
 Ratios of sexual activity to HIV infection also vary by age, with 16-
and 17-year-olds appearing to be relatively protected. The strong correlation 
between reported sexual activity and HIV prevalence among 15-year-old girls 
is indicative of the fact that sexual activity in this age group is strongly 
associated with coercion, transactional sex and low condom use. This 
vulnerable sub-population may use injectable contraceptives, enabling then to 
prevent pregnancy, but not HIV infection.39 In contrast, most sexually active 
16-and 17-years-old are more likely to have sex with partners who also want 
to avoid pregnancy and thus may be more amenable to condom use.  
 The findings are not explained by substantive differences between 
younger and older women in the frequency of sexual activity. The proportion 
of 15-19-year-olds reporting sex 1-5 times a month is not substantially 
different from 20-24 year olds (46% vs 52%). The implication is that 
sexually active young women may initially protect themselves from 
pregnancy, but they subsequently experience life changes that put them at 
risk.  
 The life event that precipitates such marked changes in sexual 
outcomes is school-leaving - either through dropout or completion of 
schooling. And the direct reason for the spike in pregnancy and HIV 
infection is lower contraceptive use among school leavers - in particular 
lower rates of condom use. Sexually active school-going women are 1.7 
(95% CI 1.05-2.65) times more likely to use a contraceptive than their same-
David Harrison, Linda Richter and Chris Desmond 
______________________________________________________________ 
 
223 
aged peers.40 Further, there is a sharp decline in self-reported condom use 
among women of school-leaving age (18-21 years). Until 21 years of age, 
trends in condom use by single year age-bands track the odds of having HIV 
among women who have had sex (see Figure 5). The divergence of trends 
after 21 years of age probably reflects relative saturation of the high risk 
pool. 
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Figure 5: The HIV risk tracks condom use at last intercourse among 
sexually active young women41 
 
 One reason for variation in condom use by age could be the desire to 
have a baby. But for most young women, it cannot be explained by an 
explicit desire to conceive. A national survey conducted in 2006 found that 
less than a third (28%) of 15-24-year-old women who have been pregnant 
cite a desire to have a baby as their reason for pregnancy. A fifth cite 
personal affirmation. For example, “it would show that I am a woman” (8%); 
“would make people respect me” (7%); or “it would make my boyfriend 
marry me” (5%). Neither can the difference be explained by direct physical 
coercion, as only 3% said they were forced to have sex against their will. But 
two-thirds (66%) did not articulate a reason for being pregnant other than 
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they were not using a contraceptive.42 The same percentage of women reports 
having been pregnant when they did not want to be.43 
 As demonstrated earlier, there is a spike in HIV infection among 18-
21-year-old women around the time they leave school. 44 Most of these young 
women would not have participated in loveLife programmes because, despite 
its relative size, loveLife’s face-to-face coverage is still only 40% at best. 
They would also be experiencing a radical shift in identity, from learner to 
incipient mother and job-seeker. This change in identity is combined with 
intensified pressures, such as the need for protection at home and in the 
community, and family expectations of contribution to household work and 
income. We believe this shift in identity plays out in changes in the outcome 
of sexual behaviour. 
 The strongest predictor of condom use is whether condoms were 
used during the first sexual intercourse.45 However, this predictor is 
retrospective and cannot explain future changes. For women, the predictors 
which do explain future variation include changes in self-efficacy (AOR 1.6 
CI 95% 1.43-1.79), the length of relationship with partners (AOR for > 6mo 
0.44 CI 95% 0.32-0.62), and marriage (AOR 0.46 CI 95% 0.23-0.72). For 
men, optimism also emerges as a significant, though small, predictor of 
condom use at last sex (AOR 1.13 CI 95% 1.04-1.24). 
 Analysis of self-efficacy for condom use on a sample of 7,409 
sexually active 15-24-year-olds (using a 20-item score based on a previously 
validated scale) showed no significant difference between 15-19-year-olds 
and 20-24-year-olds (AOR 1.08 CI 95% 0.85-1.37). Self-efficacy for condom 
use is thus not a likely explanation for varying condom use by age.46       
 At first glance, the inverse relationship between condom use and the 
duration of relationships could be interpreted as misplaced trust in the 
protection afforded by long-term relationships and marriage. Marriage and/or 
long-term relationships alone could not account for most of the temporal 
variation. Marriage rates are low (9% among 20-24-year-old African 
women)47 48 and the likelihood of being in a stable monogamous relationship 
is much the same among 15-19-year-olds (36% report having one partner in 
the last year) as among 20-24-year-olds (39%).49  
 However, what about reluctance based on the view that condom use 
implies infidelity. We suggest that this is more expressive of the social 
expectations of women eligible for marriage than genuine naïve belief. Those 
women who agreed with the statement that using a condom implies distrust 
of your partner reported much lower condom use self-efficacy (AOR 0.57 CI 
95% 0.51-0.86). Collinearity between the belief that condom use implies 
distrust and lower self-efficacy suggests that expression of this belief is a 
function of self-efficacy - and not an independent explanation for condom 
use.  
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 All of the above begs the question as to why the proportion of 
sexually active women who have unprotected sex differs so markedly 
according to age. As we have shown, most young women who have been 
pregnant did not explicitly want to be, self-efficacy for condom use does not 
vary significantly, and the proportion of women in long-term relationships 
does not change substantially over this age period. 
 The likely answer is that some 18-21-year-old women succumb to a 
set of social pressures and expectations that prevail when they leave school. 
To the 19-year-old woman in an informal settlement - unemployed and 
insecure - acquiescence to immediate economic pressures and social 
expectations seems rational and for her own good. This compliance is very 
likely to take the form of sexual partnership with a man who can provide 
physical and material protection; but the ‘protection’ is often in exchange for 
unprotected sex.  Despite the general expression of optimism about their 
long-term future, in the short-term, the social and individual sexual behaviour 
of young people is shaped by the constraints of day-to-day reality - 
popularized by a well-known rap artist as living “in the meantime”.    
 
Sidlubusha bethu (we’re enjoying our youth) 
Siphelabantwana in the meantime (we’re fucking the girls 
in the meantime) 
Khona ‘zolahla (someone’s going to get laid tonight) 
Khona ‘zohlahla in the meantime… 
Lyrics by Sista Bettina  
 
 Trying to break out of the constraints has penalties with no 
guarantee of reward. Most young people - even those who are hopeful that 
the future may be brighter - feel they just have to settle for what they’ve got 
in the meantime. The ‘meantime’ mentality increases risk tolerance and this 
is the key challenge HIV prevention in South Africa.   
 
7.  Change Perceptions of Opportunity in the Meantime 
 We have argued that the statistically significant predictors of 
variability of condom use at any age seem to do a pretty poor job of 
explaining condom use by age. One reason for that is that we could be 
missing variables in self-efficacy measures based on social cognitive models. 
Gains may be got from expanding indicators of self-efficacy indicators that 
relate to the ‘outcome expectations’ described in social cognitive models. The 
two outcome expectations incorporated into the self-efficacy scale referred to 
earlier are “perceived risk of HIV” and “use of condoms is a sign of distrust”. 
These indicators, consistent with theories of rational decision-making, 
underscore the importance of knowledge and beliefs in determining 
individual behaviour. 
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 There are, though, many other outcome expectations that may be 
taken into account during sexual intercourse - if not consciously, at least 
subliminally. These include: the desire for partner approval which, if not 
forthcoming, could affect the duration of the relationship; the need for 
immediate physical or material protection versus longer term considerations; 
the fear of shrinking into being a nobody in the uncertain world of ‘the 
meantime’ versus the security of belonging to a group or having a partner; 
and the personal affirmation of motherhood, perhaps outweighing the stigma 
of muted community reproach. 
 In sexual relationships, the opportunities and costs of these 
outcomes are sub-consciously weighed, moderated by perceptions of who 
you think you are (identity), where you fit in society (belonging) and where 
you think you’re going (purpose). These attributes - a personal sense of 
identity, belonging and purpose - reflect an individual’s response to both 
group and structural influences. For example, a young woman leaving school 
may feel excluded from her family - who now expects her to contribute work 
and income to the household or move on - yet unequipped to generate money 
except through piece work which may include transactional sex. 
 The implication for HIV prevention is that we need to change the 
‘meantime defaults’ that lead to high risk behaviour, by fostering positive 
identity, building solidarity and nurturing a sense of purpose. At the same 
time, we need to find ways to dispel the notion of a ‘meantime’ by changing 
perceptions of opportunity. This is very close to the definition of hope 
advanced by Snyder and colleagues - ‘as the perceived capability to derive 
pathways to desired goals, and motivate oneself via agency thinking to use 
those pathways’.50 
 
8. Leadership for Change 
 So far, this paper has addressed only the first of the challenges to 
establishing a clear agenda linking behaviour change programmes and 
structural change, namely to better understand why response-to-risk varies 
significantly by age for individuals faced by relatively uniform socio-
economic circumstances. In this concluding section, we describe a theoretical 
framework within which the arguments for new approaches to prevention are 
formulated. 51 
 We make the assumption that individual’s norms are distributed 
around group norms in a probabilistic manner (see Figure 6). That is, 
individual norms are not independent of the group norm, although they may 
be different. While the position of an individual on the curve may change to 
the right or left, if the group norm shifts, the individual norm will shift with 
it. An individual deviates to a certain degree from the norm and so is 
dependent on where that norm is. A similar assumption is made for group 
norms relative to societal norms.   
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Relationship between group and individual behaviour
Distribution of group norm
(a normal distribution is used as an example)
Shifting a norm
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(solidarity)
Individual’s position on the curve
 
Figure 6: Illustrative relationship between group and individual 
behaviour 
 
 The above formulation points to ways in which behaviour, as shaped 
by norms, can be influenced via different pathways. Individual norms can be 
influenced by changing the group norm, the nature of the probabilistic 
distribution about the norm, and the individual’s position relative to the group 
norm.  
 To date, most efforts at changing individual outcomes have sought 
to influence the individual independently of the group. Our suggested 
framework provides for understanding different levels of intervention. In this 
model, we need to know, firstly, what influences the group norm and how it 
can be shifted; secondly, what influences the distribution of the norm and 
how can it be changed, and lastly, what determines an individual’s adherence 
or deviation from the norm and how that can be altered. 
 The first question raises issues relating to social context and 
leadership. The second and third are related to the degree of identification 
and solidarity within a particular group, bearing in mind that individuals may 
well be part of different groups. Leadership and solidarity are pertinent to 
group level identification at the individual level. 
 According to this model, prevention efforts need to shift the curve 
by decreasing the overall level of risk tolerance among young people in 
South Africa, increasing adherence to a lower norm of risk tolerance, and 
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changing the position on the curve of individuals by decreasing their personal 
levels of risk tolerance. 
 We have argued that school-leaving shifts the group norm to a 
higher level of risk tolerance. To use our earlier example, average condom 
use drops. The sudden loss of social cohesion that school provided leads to 
changes in the distribution of the norm, with a skewing towards higher risk; 
i.e. median condom use drops even more. These normative changes place the 
individual at greater risk, despite particular individuals changing position on 
the curve through their accumulation and use of HIV-prevention knowledge 
and self-efficacy skills during adolescence.   
 The main challenges for HIV prevention are: i) to shift the norm 
towards safer sexual behaviour among 18-24 year olds; and ii) to narrow their 
skewed distribution of risk. However, strategies of ‘safe sex messaging’ or 
‘safe sex negotiation’, which characterize risk-reduction focused on the 
individual, are not suitable as primary mechanisms to shift the curve. The key 
objective must be to change the prevailing perceptions of social, educational 
and economic opportunity, enabling young people to break through ceilings 
which trap them in the meantime (see Figure 7). 
 
 
Figure 7: Key factors shaping perceptions of opportunity among young 
people 
  
 Strategies to change individual behaviour - to shift their position on 
the curve - must be continued. However, it is clear that this will produce 
greater benefit for some as compared to others. For further traction, it is 
critical that interventions are developed to address three main types of 
challenges or ceilings: young people who are resigned to their situation and 
see no opportunities, those whose options are limited by their poor 
preparation, and those whose further progress is constrained. 
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 For those without options, we need to tackle the factors that trap 
them, including social expectations of women and, in some communities, the 
notion that fertility proves womanhood which feeds the need for meantime 
personal affirmation. But we also need to address the consequences of 
economic demoralization, which renders young people passive in waiting for 
opportunity instead of looking for it.  This mindset shift requires us to 
develop the ability to recognize and fully exploit opportunity, to take 
initiative and risks, think creatively and critically, work as a team, have a 
sense of wonder, determination and adventure.52 
 Without preparation - psychological, cognitive, behavioural - young 
people are unlikely to be able to capitalize on any opportunities that do 
present themselves. For this group, loveLife’s experience is that community 
service can help bridge the gap between school leaving and employment by 
developing personal and leadership skills and increasing social networks. To 
date, over 5,000 loveLife groundBREAKERS have graduated from the year-
long programme as community leaders in HIV prevention and a further 6,000 
are expected to pass through the groundBREAKER programme over the next 
five years.  Most of them (>70%) get employment or further education 
opportunities after completion. In addition to service, strategies must address 
the usual objectives of job readiness, including personal financial 
management, public speaking, team- and project management. 
  For those who have hit the ceiling, innovative ways must be found 
to link them to new opportunity, including service-linked student loans to 
allow completion of secondary and tertiary education, rapid expansion of 
volunteer placement, learnership and youth development initiatives. 
 Together, these efforts must be directed at changing perceptions of 
opportunity, including by providing some opportunities that lift the ceiling 
and reinforce an identity characterized by ambition and innovation. As 
Douglas and Wildavsky first suggested, perceptions of greater choice may 
reduce a society’s tolerance of risk.53 
 The second main challenge for HIV prevention is to rein in the 
skewed distribution of risk, brought about by the polarizing effect of school-
leaving in which a minority ‘make it’ while the majority enter ‘the 
meantime’. The social and economic gradients in South Africa are so great 
that any expansion of opportunity without corresponding increases in 
solidarity will mainly result in those at the top of the pile capturing new 
benefits as private gains.  That society - where anyone, but not very many, 
can be a winner - will probably do little to change the underlying dynamics of 
crime, HIV infection and domestic abuse.  
 In order to reduce societal tolerance of risk, we need to reshape 
national identity and build solidarity for a society committed to expanding 
social, educational and economic opportunity, as envisioned by the notion of 
a developmental state, and by the perception of HIV/AIDS as the new 
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struggle. The task is not insurmountable if we can identify interventions with 
strong multiplier effects.  One intervention that can shift social norms and 
build solidarity through strengthened social networks is to foster leadership 
among young people committed to these ideals. 
 Much social theory is built on the premise of ‘agents for change’, 54 
and store placed on their attributes of leadership and communication.  This 
suggests that investment in young people with leadership potential could 
strengthen societal cohesion and solidarity.  In order to avoid investments in 
leadership being captured as private gains with little spin-off for broader 
society, investments should be made in young people with a proven track 
record in community service.  However, leadership development on its own 
won’t necessarily build solidarity and, for this, social network strategies also 
need to be fostered. 
 Social networks as a major driver of the HIV epidemic is starkly 
illustrated in Southern Africa. These networks are most intense in 
marginalized and disrupted communities.  It is very unlikely that the factors 
driving HIV in South Africa will be profoundly influenced by national 
interventions without parallel changes in sexual dynamics within local 
communities.55  Local leadership, communication and identification are 
critical in generating a sea-change in sexual behaviour. 56 Further, seeking out 
leaders from marginalized communities and strengthening their connections 
to mainstream economy and society will contribute to reduction of the 
extreme polarization of South African society. 
 In summary, building solidarity for a society committed to 
expanding opportunity will effect risk reduction in two ways: Firstly, an 
emergent leadership aware of the risks of HIV and committed to safer sexual 
behaviour can have positive impacts on sexual networks in South Africa and, 
secondly, an emergent leadership committed to reducing social and economic 
gradients in South Africa can help create a more risk-averse society.  
 
9. New Avenues for Risk Reduction 
 Together with their mpintshis (buddies), most groundBREAKERS 
continue to play an important leadership role in their communities. These 
young people are uniquely placed to be the bedrock of disseminated national 
leadership in South Africa - drawn from the most marginalized communities 
- who could effectively begin to respond to requirements of the prevention 
model outlined above. 
 Under consideration is a proposal to recruit 5,000 young people to 
participate in an accelerated leadership programme. They will be drawn from 
ex-groundBREAKERS who have been unable to find work, yet are still 
active and committed to loveLife. The programme will have three distinct 
components aimed at changing perceptions of opportunity, namely service, 
developing social entrepreneurialism and creating opportunity. 
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 These young people will participate in a dynamic programme 
aiming to:  
 
• Shift the mindset from low-grade defeatism, endemic in 
marginalized communities, to dynamic young people at the forefront 
of a new generation;  
• Develop hard skills in systematic programme management, and 
• Create opportunity for career choices that would typically be outside 
of the prospects for young people from marginalized communities. 
 
 Leadership development as a strategy for social cohesion is well-
known, but the key challenge is to create a big enough ripple effect so that 
other young people from similarly marginalized communities benefit too. 
This will require that the economic and educational opportunities that open 
for the leadership group establish precedents for others, and that candidate 
leaders disseminate and promote values that counter economic polarization 
and HIV, crime and domestic violence reduction, and environmental 
preservation.  
 For example, hopeless young people from marginalized 
communities often miss out on learnership and even volunteer placements 
that create paths into the mainstream economy. Yet loveLife’s experience is 
that prospective employers are often impressed by the self-confidence and 
work-preparedness of groundBREAKERS and are willing to take on young 
people like them. Critical knock-on effects will be achieved if other young 
people follow the examples of groundBREAKERS and mpintshis who have 
resumed tuition to complete secondary or tertiary studies, or are inspired by 
groundBREAKERS who have started local businesses or non-profit 
organizations. These connections are critical in building solidarity to reshape 
society and effect structural change. 
 
10. Conclusion 
 In the introduction, we questioned whether strategies that foster 
hope are as effective in highly polarized societies as in contexts where 
personal achievement is perceived to be more attainable. We queried whether 
or not there is hope only for those at the top of the bottom of the pile, in 
which case increased efforts need to be made to change individual behaviour. 
We also questioned whether it was possible or not to generate hope amongst 
those at the bottom of the bottom of the pile, in which case you could change 
a society. 
 We demonstrated the association between HIV infection and social 
and economic marginalization in South Africa, and described the response of 
loveLife, an HIV prevention campaign that aims to reinforce the aspirations 
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of adolescents of school-going age. We highlighted apparent gains from 
participation in loveLife programmes and the fact that the incidence of HIV 
among young people seems to have started to decline. 
 Despite these glimmers of hope, the epidemic continues to be 
fuelled by new infection, particularly among 18-21-year-old women. We 
demonstrated that the jump in HIV infection rates is closely associated with 
school-leaving and that the proximate determinant of higher incidence rates is 
lower condom use.  We concluded that the higher frequency of unprotected 
sex cannot be substantively explained by an explicit desire to have a baby, 
personal belief or partner trust, nor by declines in the ability of women to 
negotiate condom use. 
 We suggest that the shift to higher risk behaviour reflects a change 
in individual and group identity, which leads 18-21-year-old women to 
succumb to a particular set of social and economic constraints present at the 
time of school-leaving. We argue that risk tolerance among 18-25-year-olds 
will only diminish if we can change their perceptions of opportunity in the 
meantime.  In this regard, we outline our thinking about building leadership 
that helps shape individual and societal norms and builds solidarity which, in 
turn, could contribute to reducing the aggregate tolerance of risk and lead to 
structural change. By implication, we argue that it is not only structural 
change that affects opportunity, but that changed perceptions of opportunity 
can lead to structural change. 
 Our view is that interventions that simultaneously address 
individual, social and structural dimensions of HIV infection represent a 
major new frontier for prevention. In this regard, we believe that hope-based 
interventions which nurture the ‘capacity to aspire’ hold new promise for 
intractable social problems of developing countries, such as HIV/AIDS. In 
highly polarized societies like South Africa, the process of building that 
capacity must simultaneously reduce social and economic gradients.    
 In doing so, we will help to develop not only the capacity to aspire, 
but make day-to-day life worth aspiring to. 
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NGOs in Brazil: Hope is Not a Verb…It is an Adverb; It is 
Not an Action, It is a Modality. 
 
Mariangela Marcello 
 
Abstract: Children have dreams but sometimes, their hands are left empty by 
occurrences that in a split second change their lives forever. A child that is 
told he has cancer, a child who finds himself alone in the street, with no place 
or person to go to, has lost the balloon that was making him look at the sky, a 
far-away target. They need somebody who patiently and carefully weaves 
that thin invisible thread, so necessary in life, which is called ‘hope’. The 
experiences reported in this paper refer to two NGOs in Brazil, in Vitória 
(ES).The first one, ACACCI (Associação CApixaba Contra o Câncer 
Infantil) deals with children from shanty towns who have to undergo cancer 
treatment. They give meaning to the word ‘human’, offering a ‘Family 
Home’, a place which can host up to 30 children with their mothers to avoid 
therapy interruptions due to long distances, financial or social issues. The 
children receive, once they leave the hospital for their daily treatment, health, 
hygiene, nutrition and life style advice and are involved in recreational 
activities, while their mothers learn handicraft or improve their knowledge of 
their mother tongue. The second NGO is called ‘Casa Lar’, a House ‘Home’. 
It is a family experience with a married couple who, on a voluntary basis and 
under supervision, welcomes as ‘parents’ a certain number of ‘meninos de 
rua’, homeless children living in the streets, and leads them to discover 
dignity, rights and duties. The organization eventually helps the children find 
‘their place’ in society and a job. Each ‘Menino de Rua’, they say, ‘is an 
island surrounded by omissions’ 
 
Key words: children, cancer, Hope, NGOs, ACACCI, Casa Lar.  
 
An Italian poet, Eugenio Montale, ends one of his poems with these 
two lines: “But nothing comforts the child who grieves / for the balloon that's 
gone between the houses”. Children have dreams but, sometimes, their hands 
are left empty by occurrences that in a split second change their lives forever. 
A child that is told he has cancer, a child who finds himself alone in the 
street, with no place or person to go to, has lost the balloon that was making 
him look at the sky, a far-away target. Those children need somebody who 
patiently and carefully weaves that thin invisible thread, so necessary in life, 
which is called ‘hope’.  
Interestingly enough, in Portuguese the verb ‘to hope’ and the verb 
‘to wait’ are expressed with the same word ‘esperar’. It seems as if, at least in  
 
NGOs in Brazil 
______________________________________________________________ 
242 
the Brazilian context, the two concepts are intertwined. You wait for 
something to happen and your waiting is practically your hope it will happen. 
This verb is also so common in various areas, from religion to politics, sport, 
but also love, joy, and projects. Actually, Brazilians, whether it’s the football 
players commenting before a game or the janitor of a building talking about 
his future, or any other person, all end their thoughts about what they hope 
with ‘Se Deus quiser’, ‘God willing’. It is hope in waiting. This attitude is 
implicit in the quite commonly used verbal form ‘se entregar’, which people 
use to refer to their attitude beneath this expression. The translation for ‘se 
entregar’ is, literally, to ‘surrender, to yield’ to the other  you trust, which is 
also the term normally used in wedding formulas, when the spouse tells his or 
her own partner, that he/she ‘se entrega’, to him/her rather than ‘I take you 
as…’. It is the total donation of oneself to the other in total trust that the other 
will lead you towards what is best for you, so as to fully live the experience, 
almost in a strict body and soul connection, so peculiar to this culture.  
In 1988 the parents of a number of children with cancer, in the State 
of Espírito Santo, in Brazil, founded, in partnership with the Onco-
Hematology Unit of Vitória Children’s Hospital, the Espirito Santo 
Association against Children’s Cancer, the ACACCI (Associação Capixaba 
Contra o Câncer Infantil). It is the only NGO dealing with this issue in this 
State and it is located in the State capital city, Vitória, though it also deals 
with cases of children living in the surrounding States. The inspiring 
principles relate to Laws concerning children’s social assistance as well as to 
the Children’s Statute itself. In particular the focus is on the assistance to 
children with cancer, living in shanty towns, belonging, therefore, to poor 
families or to families left poor, or poorer, by the illness. In most cases the 
financial collapse is due to the fact that the parent assisting the child, often 
the only one the child lives with, has to quit his or her job to assist his child. 
In some cases, sadly, the treatment is suspended because of the parents’ 
financial situation or their feeling of inadequacy in a new and overwhelming 
situation, which requires a lot of radical changes in the family lifestyle. The 
Institution has developed a Project through which, up to the present time, 
have been supplied 101,150 benefits, such as: transport coupons, monthly 
‘food baskets’ (‘cesta basica’, in Portuguese), maintenance medications, 
prosthetic equipment, disposable nappies, wheelchairs, financial and 
organizational support for funerals.  
The ‘whole assistance’ policy, aims at making up for the lack of a 
social policy dealing with survival and dignity issues and has as objectives: a) 
the ‘humanization’ of cancer treatment through recreational activities and 
pedagogical support; b) making available financial resources; c) assuring  
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certainty of continuity in treatment; d) occupying fewer beds in hospitals, as 
the children, together with one parent, are hosted in the ‘Family Home’ 
building; and e) the minimization of the social impact of cancer both for the 
patients and for the parents, who, generally, are involved in language or 
handicraft classes, where they acquire new skills which will allow them to 
earn some money.  
 As stated in the Statute, the Board, the parents and most of the 
collaborators work on a voluntary base. Some people belong to the local 
Secretary of Education Department. The financial issues are public and are 
counterchecked by external people. The yearly balance is published in a 
widely read newspaper. The collaborators involved on a daily basis are 40, 
whereas the people working on a voluntary base for a limited number of 
hours are 121. The new ‘Family Home’ building, inaugurated on 23 
September 2006, can host up to 60 children with cancer, undergoing 
treatment at the Children’s Hospital and the parents accompanying them. 
Once the treatment cycle, often chemotherapy, is over, the children go back 
home and return for the next session. In the meantime other children arrive 
and are hosted in the various rooms.  
The objective of such an institution, therefore, is to supply support 
within the new situation developing after the onset of the disease but, at the 
same time, to try and supply a  life context as close to normality as possible. 
The ‘Family Home’ is a building in which the bedrooms are located on the 
third floor, strictly reserved for children and their mothers, whereas the 
ground floor, the first and the second floors are spaces reserved for 
socialization. On the ground floor there is a wide lounge where meals are 
served but which can be used as a meeting place for the mothers, who can sit 
around a table and chat, while drinking a coffee or a soft drink, or watch TV. 
The brand new self-service counter and the whole of the kitchen equipment 
have recently been donated by the Consulate of Japan. As the weather is good 
most of the year, the mothers can also sit in the yard, where there are 
comfortable benches. The first and second floors are reserved for all the 
children’s activities. There is a large playroom equipped with a great number 
of toys and fancy costumes, all donated by different shops, so that children 
can perform with the numerous actors and clowns who regularly dedicate 
some time to involve children in creative activities together with them. 
Further down along the corridor there is the library, equipped with some 
computers and a good number of books, a room for praying, whatever the 
religious inspiration, and two classrooms reserved to studying, so as not to 
miss out too much whilst being away from school, during the therapy cycle. 
Children who start experiencing sight problems or have already become 
blind, are taught the Braille system so that they can still be involved in 
learning. The hospital, too, hosts some classrooms where teachers, from the 
Secretary of Education, make up for lost lessons for the most seriously ill 
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children. It happens, too, that some of these children have never been to 
school so they are offered the chance to learn how to read and write. 
Downstairs there is a ‘bazaar’ shop and a workshop. These two spaces are 
reserved for the mothers who, as a counterpart for what they receive, produce 
handicraft which is sold so as to supply part of the money necessary to assist 
the children. The whole of the ‘Family Home’ is based on the principle of 
cooperation and responsibility. The mothers, for instance, are given a fixed 
quantity of appropriate products for washing their own clothes and the linen 
supplied to them; they keep their rooms clean and tidy and also take turns in 
cleaning the common areas. They are also given instructions and directions as 
to the relevance of hygiene in their daily life habits and the importance of 
eating properly, both for them and above all for their sick children. Junk food 
is not allowed either inside the Home or in their outings. In order to help 
everybody to accomplish that they all go out without any money. Every 
necessity is covered by the people from the institution who take them to 
places, so both the mothers and the children do not ‘fall into temptation’ and, 
at the same time, acquire the habit of ignoring all the ‘extras’ which, 
nowadays, have almost become the main issue in going out. 
In Brazil, childhood cancer is the third cause for the death of 
children and adolescents. The rate is about 420,000 new cancer cases each 
year, 3% in children. The good news, though, is that, at present, 70% of these 
children can completely recover if the disease is detected at an early stage. 
Most of these children will practically be able to lead a normal life. 
The disease represents a huge life change in each component of the 
family, the greatest being in the sick child’s life. The main issue is how to 
turn this change into something ‘constructive’, whatever the final result. 
Some mothers, when interviewed, explained how being in such an 
environment was an unexpected and wonderful experience in the context of 
the tragedy they were living. They spoke of the sense of despair when they 
learned their children had cancer, and how the very sense of despair triggered 
an intense hope, which gave them a strength never imagined before. Their 
minds focused only on getting results from the therapy no matter what pain 
for them and the children. It was only the result that mattered. Sharing the 
experience with other mothers and children living through the same emotions 
made them re-evaluate the meaning and the relevance of sharing; it made 
them feel like better people. They found themselves joined in a motherhood 
that included all the children, a motherhood in which there was even space 
for a smile for somebody else’s result, among the tears for one’s own failed 
result. Every child’s recovery points at the principle: if it happens to one 
child, it may happen to all children. It is a thorough reframing of their beliefs 
and values in the discovery of new strategies and tools aimed at surviving the 
cancer experience. 
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The idea behind these projects is to create a series of Social Support 
Homes, which then become reference points for parents dealing with their 
children’s diseases. It is not a charity system where people get help and go 
back to the loneliness of their own problems. It is a whole series of modules 
aimed at involving the parents and their children together with specialized 
personnel and voluntary collaborators, so that they can learn how to be strong 
and deal with the problems that changed their lives. In poor families the 
vulnerability of one of its members affects all the others. The sick child has 
to face new aspects of life never experienced before, like pain, social 
isolation from other children and school, invasive medical treatment, and vast 
changes in physical appearance. All of this, and the internal psychological 
exploitation of it, leads the child to experience a sense of ‘guilt’, as he or she 
holds him or herself as responsible for all the problems his/her family is 
going through. The child feels defenseless; he or she is totally lost and 
dependent on whoever has a ‘solution’ to his or her problems. Reactions 
vary, from intense sudden crying to obstinate silence. A difficult time is when 
children see their friends go away and never come back; they know it may 
happen to them, too. The families, too, apart from all the practical problems 
face a new feeling: ‘fear’. A different, stronger fear from the one they usually 
face when thinking of their future as poor families in shanty towns. This time 
the experience arrives like a punch in the stomach: a doctor is telling them 
their child has a serious disease and is talking about the chance of ‘death’.  
 The objective of the support institutions is to catch both parents and 
children whilst they are plunging into the dark sea of despair and lead them 
towards a different path, where they can discover new objectives, new 
strategies, new ways of dealing with their lives, based on the hope and the 
belief that what matters is to do as much as they can, at their best, in the 
situation they are in, looking at the future and not comparing it to the past. 
They learn to move on, without wasting their time in indulging in the fear of 
the unknown. They understand that their strength is based on the hope that 
they can make a difference. The limits will be only those things outside their 
powers. 
The experience in the Support Family Homes teaches them to 
believe that they can make it, and to be consistent with these beliefs by 
passing on to other parents the strategies and tools that helped them go 
through the treatment of the disease. It teaches them the value of sharing 
positive and non positive experiences. It all leads, as well, to ‘educating’ 
parents and children to examine their health and acquire an appropriate life 
style, which, in the context of the disease the children suffer from, is even 
more relevant an issue. Redirecting the focus of the attention on something 
constructive, though starting from the negativity of the disease, gives parents 
and children strength and a new direction to follow. It is like getting a new 
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chance to live or trying to live in a different way, in the hope and in the belief 
that it will work and the death of the child will be put off.  
The somewhat paradoxical aspect of this situation is that the 
children report amazingly positive experiences, something they would have 
never dreamed of previously. They are regularly taken to the cinema, to the 
theatre, to the circus, to concerts, to walks in the parks and to open air events. 
Christmas time is a big celebration, with donations of toys, toiletries, clothes, 
caps and bonnets of all kinds as they are regularly used by the children who 
totally lose their hair from chemotherapy. Food is donated in a larger quantity 
than they are used to. The sick children are not the only ones who receive 
presents, but their brothers and sisters also receive gifts so that there is no 
perceived discrimination in the family.  
The paradox continues as discrimination, however, will be 
something these children will have to face when returning it the outside 
world where healthy children and their families live. Society still has a long 
way to go before fulfilling the ideals of equality, dignity and participation of 
every citizen, something which is claimed in so many public events. The 
Social Support Homes, however, aim at reaching a wider range of people in 
need. The diseases are certainly a very relevant issue, but other children face 
a different kind of threat: the death of their own rights as citizens and of their 
own dignity as human beings.  
‘Meninos de rua’, ‘homeless children’, wondering around the streets 
of shanty or elegant towns so apparently autonomous and fearless represent 
‘islands surrounded by omissions’. They have to make up for the adults’ 
absence or lack of intervention; they can only rely on themselves and their 
initiative. Indeed their whole life is paradoxically based on hope and lack of 
hope simultaneously; the hope they make it through each day of their lives 
and the lack of hope in the others’ support. Their determination in 
confronting people in street corners, even at midnight and later, in big cities 
like Rio de Janeiro (nearly 12 million people) or São Paulo (nearly 20 million 
people), is the proof of their hope to be able to survive, which at the same 
time is a desperate act of survival.  
 In the leaflet about the ‘Casa Lar’ in Vila Velha, a town a few 
minutes away from the capital city of the State of Espírito Santo, Vitória, we 
may read that ‘street children’, ‘Meninos de Rua’, do not exist. What do exist 
are children outside the families, outside schools, and outside the community; 
children who only need a chance. The ‘menino de rua’ is actually an island 
surrounded by omissions on all sides and the responsibility is to be attributed 
to everybody living around them. ‘Children’, is stated metaphorically, ‘are 
the richest raw-material of the country, and to disregard them is like 
committing a crime’.  
 This NGO was started by Carlos Barcelos, a manager of the 
‘Companhia Vale do Rio Doce’, the largest mining company in Brazil and 
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the second largest in the world. The Casa Lar has been working for over 
twenty years with only the support of donations. The idea beneath this project 
is to select a married couple available to take up the role of ‘parents’ for 
about 20 ‘meninos de rua’, street children, children who have either been 
abandoned by their parents, or live with just one parent in a homeless 
context. It is not always certain that the person they are with is really their 
parent. These children are approached by selected personnel, mostly catholic, 
and invited to enter the ‘Casa Lar’ becoming members of a ‘family’ together 
with other street children as their ‘brothers’, all with the same rights and 
duties. These children can stay in this place until they are 18. At that point 
they have to leave the house, as they all have already got a job and can 
support themselves. They can take with them their belongings acquired over 
the years such as clothes, objects, books and whatever else. Their life in the 
family has meant going to school, practicing sports - generally beach sports 
trained by voluntary coaches - and acquiring computer skills, as well as 
general life skills. The children who leave are replaced by new younger ones.  
 This Family Home has five bedrooms, each hosting four children of 
a similar age. At present, the couple selected has also a child of its own. He is 
treated exactly like all the others, sleeps in the same room where the others 
are, and follows the same rules. These rules are imposed on all the 
components of this new family by the Board, which deals with the whole 
project. The money necessary to pay a salary to the couple, to buy the food 
and everything necessary for the maintenance of the house, comes from 
donations and social events organized for fund raising. The couple, acting as 
parents, gains a salary, the possibility to live in the big Family Home, the 
‘Casa Lar’, and total support and directions from the Board, whose decisions 
are mandatory. 
The very name of this project, of this home, ‘Casa Lar’, is an 
extremely interesting element.  The term ‘Casa’ in Portuguese corresponds to 
the English term ‘house’; the term ‘Lar’ is the Latin word for the divinities 
(lares) protecting the family living in the house; it leads to the English 
concept of  ‘Home’. The two terms joined give the children the idea that they 
have first of all a place to stay that is not the street, but also that they can 
‘feel’ that this place is something more than a physical container. It has to be 
a ‘Home’ where they will find more than a shelter. They will live  with 
emotions and feelings based on the principle of sharing, respecting and 
building together, all of this having a common aim, to ‘be’ a family. It will 
mean for them a place and the time where they might realize the hope to be 
equal to others, to have a chance to really live and not just exist. 
 It has become quite common, for the children who leave the ‘Casa 
Lar’ to return and offer voluntary help in looking after the new young ones. 
They know the issues very well and know exactly how these children feel. 
Their presence is the living proof that changes are possible. It only takes 
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belief and hope then becomes the necessary trigger for the system to start 
working. Through the experience of living in a ‘family’ children understand 
the real concept of family. They see that it is not only birth that makes you 
part of a family. It is possible for these children to feel part of a small society 
called a ‘family’ in order to learn how to become members of a greater social 
group, called a society. They start realizing that they, too, have something to 
say and give, and that their life is worth more than just begging and living on 
leftovers found in trash bins.  
 NGOs like this one work from the basic concept of family, the first 
place in which all children should find themselves, so as to develop the 
knowledge of the world through gradual steps supported by people who 
believe in them and are there for them, whatever the circumstances. Children 
may be very strong, against our predictions, but it is the strength of the 
people around them which makes them strong. Indeed, they are only children.  
The path to dignity follows the principle of equality, where each 
human being is allowed a chance. When it is not possible to take street 
people away from the streets and insert them into a healthier environment, 
then it is the Social educators’ and the Health professionals’ jobs to join them 
and help them improve their conditions in their own environment. One such 
example comes from the IBISS (Instituto Brasileiro de Inovações em Saúde 
Social, the Brazilian Institute for Innovations in Public Health) where trained 
people develop various projects concerning those who live in the streets for 
different reasons. In Rio de Janeiro, for instance, one project deals with paper 
and trash collectors. These people are helped to understand how they can 
organize their work better, even form ‘cooperatives’, and how they can look 
after their health. Information is already a remarkable change for them. 
Another project addresses the issues surrounding people involved in street 
prostitution. They are convinced to participate in systematic workshops, both 
for women and for men, on specific themes they themselves propose. Their 
social and health situation is greatly and positively affected by the 
information they get and the discussions they get involved in. They are all 
given condoms, whose price often discourages them from using them, and 
learn more about issues like STD (sexually transmitted diseases) and AIDS 
(Acquired ImmunoDeficiency Syndrome). These people would normally 
never go to a hospital to be treated, both because they cannot afford it and 
because they do not want to show their state. This is the reason why NGOs 
have to count on voluntary paediatricians, gynaecologists and general clinic 
doctors who go around the streets to meet and help these people. Another 
project gathers former street children and involves them in school education, 
ecology projects, Brazilian culture studies and computer science. Where 
possible these children are helped to go back to their families and leave 
behind the desperate state of abandon in which they were living. Whether 
they collect paper and garbage, or trade their bodies in the street, these people 
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are all helped to understand their rights as citizens and their relationship with 
the dynamics of the big cities in which they live.  
The fight to make everybody feel equal and part of a society, in 
practical terms, continues to be developed in other kinds of NGOs as well, 
like the one addressing the issues of children affected by Down Syndrome or 
other mental deficiencies. The APAE (Associação de Pais e Amigos dos 
Excepcionais, Association of Parents and Friends of the Exceptional people) 
was founded in Brazil in 1954 by an American lady who belonged to the 
diplomatic staff and was a mother of a girl affected by the syndrome. The 
association quickly developed throughout Brazil and at present, in its 53 
years of activity, has become the largest philanthropic movement in Brazil, as 
well as in the entire world, dealing with this issue. To be inspired by the hope 
for equality of rights, social inclusion and a better quality of life; to feel 
proud for being able to reach out for one of these children’s hand and make 
him/her feel ‘special’ in the right sense – for being unique - is what makes all 
the work worthwhile. The poster publicizing the ‘National Week for 
Exceptional people’ shows a smiling young girl playing with the colours of 
some paint on her fingers. The words at the top left of the poster are: ‘the 
great artists are like this: different, sensitive and special’. The focus is, 
indeed, on the qualities present in these children, not on the ones which are 
missing. It means showing children with problems that there is a place for 
them, too, rather than giving them the sensation that they do not fit in. The 
language used to refer to children with these characteristics, ‘the exceptional’ 
is, also, a very interesting point. The Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary, 
in fact, translates the word ‘exceptional’ as i) unusual ; ii) unusually good, 
outstanding. Very intriguing, indeed.  
The real issue with so many children, whether they live in the streets 
or suffer from some kind of deficiency, is exactly the lack of a role available 
for them in a society which seems to squeeze them out, rather than welcome 
them in. Shanty towns and slums are places of hopelessness because of the 
abandon and lack of hope in a future different from the present. However, in 
shanty towns where some projects have bet on some of the brave adolescents 
living there, the result has been the birth of the ‘young black leaders’.  This 
group of teenagers has decided to patrol the area, settle arguments and 
disputes, improve the relationship between the people living in the slum and 
people living outside. The chance given to them to have a role, has made 
them fit into that role and accomplish meaningful work. 
Emotions and feelings play a great role in the boosting of one’s 
sense of dignity. Another NGO, the Afecc (Associação Feminina de 
Educação e Combate ao Câncer) among some predictable activities has a 
Project named ‘Live smiling project’. It started after observing that the 
evenings in hospitals were the most melancholic and solitary time for the 
patients. A series of performances was organized, based on the contribution 
NGOs in Brazil 
______________________________________________________________ 
250 
of voluntary musicians, in the Hospital Auditorium, in the evenings. Music is 
an intrinsic element to the Brazilians’ life; it is in their blood. To listen to 
music, their music, when the body is struggling against a dark enemy, is like 
giving an injection of fresh blood to them. It is like being taken back to better 
times and starting over from there with a renewed energy that feeds the mind 
with hope and willpower. The musicians involve the patients in singing and 
even dancing when possible. This activity helps bring out the smothered 
silent pain and puts a forgotten smile on quite a few lips. Another project 
hinting at rescuing self-esteem and hope for life, takes place in a beauty salon 
on the Hospital premises. Voluntary personnel offer hair styling, cosmetic 
treatment, nail care and even massages. The body, one’s physical appearance, 
is another relevant element in the Brazilian culture. To let oneself go, to 
neglect one’s appearance, is going to affect one’s mood in a remarkable way, 
and that is not going to be useful in treatment and recovery periods. As it 
happens in the Casa Lar, here too former patients go back to the hospital and 
join the experts in the meetings with the patients so as to pass on their 
experience and prove that to hope for an improvement does not mean to fool 
oneself; it is possible to survive and hope is a right, not an illusion. The 
meetings include also dealing with the psychological preparation for things 
like amputation, both for the people experiencing it and for the people who 
live with them. The idea beneath all of these projects is never to leave the 
person alone in the fight against the different occurrences in life but, at the 
same time, enabling the person to proceed on his or her own once the worst is 
over. Above all, it means never stripping a person’s dignity away. It is fear 
and despair, in fact, that prevent people from resisting and winning their 
battles. 
Indeed, a social project can be considered effective if it assures the 
independence of the individual in relation to the program itself in a definite 
span of time. To teach someone to hope means creating in him or her the 
wish and the enthusiasm for expectations, whose outcomes he or she has the 
right to live at full in his or her own time and space. How people say and do 
things means more than what they say and do, especially if there is no 
consistency between the what and the how. Indeed, it is not enough to believe 
and act. It is necessary to make other people believe and act. If you really 
hope that things will change, you have to make other people feel that hope for 
the change. To have courage does not mean not to be scared; it means to have 
the strength to do things even if they scare us. 
Everybody has the right to be respected as a citizen, to feel like a 
citizen, like any other person, whatever happens in his life. Nobody should 
feel ashamed of having difficulties to face. It is the people, the social 
institutions, the governments who created or did not deal appropriately with 
those difficulties, who have to feel the shame for their ‘omissions’.  
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Being different should not take away the right to be equal. The 
‘otherness’ is a right. Shakespeare, in The Merchant of Venice (Act III, sc.i), 
makes Shylock say:  
 
what's his reason? - I am a Jew. Hath not a Jew 
eyes? hath not a Jew hands, organs, dimensions, senses, 
affections, passions? fed with the same food, hurt with the 
same weapons, subject to the same diseases, healed by the 
same means, warmed and cooled by the same winter and 
summer, as a Christian is? If you prick us do we not bleed? 
If you tickle us do we not laugh? If you poison us do we 
not die? 
 
Religion, skin colour, mental abilities, physical qualities; so many 
different words for so many peculiarities: the outcome is always the same, a 
human being. 
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